Charles v. Rodriguez

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 13, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20119
Summary Calendar
VICTOR A. CHARLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, Director; BYRAN COLLIER, Director;
LINDA TIERLING, Assistant Regional Director; RODELL BOOKER,
Unit Supervisor; TRACY JAMES, Supervisor; BRENDA GREEN,
Parole Officer; BRIGID AKIRI; SANDRA WHITE, Parole Officer;
YOLANDA M. WOODS, Unit Supervisor,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-02-CV-3568
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Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Victor A. Charles appeals the summary-judgment dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint wherein he raised claims of
arbitrary confinement, interference with employment, false arrest
and prosecution, retaliation, and denial of access to the courts.
We have reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal and conclude
that the district court did not err in finding that there were no
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-20119
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genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc.,
95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Quives v. Campbell, 934 F.2d
668, 670 (5th Cir. 1991).
With regard to Charles’s confinement claim, Charles does not
dispute the district court’s finding that he was confined to his
home until the monitoring equipment was functional. He also does
not dispute that electronic monitoring was a condition of his
mandatory supervision. Thus, Charles’s limited confinement in
furtherance of a condition of his mandatory supervision did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987).
As Charles failed to show that he had a clearly established
constitutional right to unrestricted employment while on parole,
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to
his employment-interference claim. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d
299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). Charles’s claims of false arrest and
prosecution fail because, at the most, the defendants’ actions or
inactions amounted to negligence, which is not cognizable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d
521, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1994).
Charles’s retaliation claim is also without merit. Charles
has failed to set forth a chronology of events from which it can
be inferred that his September 2001 arrest was retaliatory.
Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995).
No. 04-20119
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We reject Charles’s claim that he was denied access to the
courts as he failed to show that he was prejudiced. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Charles waited more than two
years after being released from prison in May 2002 to file his
September 2002 state habeas application. Moreover, the only
specific time period which Charles alleged that he was unable to
conduct legal research was a 12-day period when he was allegedly
confined to his home.
Charles’s claims that the defendants denied him access to
the courts with regard to his filing of the Schultea** reply and
that the district court erred in denying his motion for access to
the law library fail. The record shows that after the district
court entered its order requiring that Charles file a Schultea
reply, Charles was allowed to go to the Harris County Law
Library. Moreover, a review of Charles’s Schultea brief shows
that he was able to adequately set forth his claims, and he does
not state how additional research would have salvaged his
otherwise meritless claims.
We decline to address Charles’s claim with regard to the
denial of access to the FBI and his claims that the defendants
had no authority to change his mandatory release date and had no
authority to impose electronic monitoring without affording him
due process, which are raised for the first time on appeal. See
**
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995)
(en banc).
No. 04-20119
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Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1997). The judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.