Pippins v. Tangipahoa Parish Council

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 26, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30817
Summary Calendar
JANET PIPPINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TANGIPAHOA PARISH COUNCIL; GORDON BURGESS,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Duly Elected
Tangipahoa Parish President,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana
(USDC No. 2:03-CV-1334)
_________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The judgment is affirmed for the following reasons:
1. We essentially agree with the analysis of the district court as set forth in the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
magistrate judge’s Order and Reasons.
2. For the Louisiana whistleblower statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:967 (West
1998), to apply, the employer must have committed a violation of state law. Puig v.
Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 772 So. 2d 842, 845 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
The policy decision of the parish to limit animal cruelty investigations by the animal
control department to pets, and to leave livestock cruelty investigations to other law
enforcement officials with concurrent jurisdiction over such investigations, was not
illegal or a violation of state law.
3. Summary judgment was also warranted on the Title VII sex discrimination
claim. The district court did not misunderstand or misapply the law governing such
claims. Assuming that appellant Pippins established a prima facie case, the defendants
offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination. Summary judgment
was therefore appropriate if the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext
under the summary judgment standard. See Price v. Federal Express Corp., 283 F.3d
715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, a showing that the defendant’s proffered
justifications for the employment decision were rejected in part does not necessarily
preclude summary judgment. Id. “Once a Title VII claim reaches the pretext stage, the
only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence
to create a jury question regarding discrimination.” Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d
296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). We agree with the district court that Pippins did not present
sufficient evidence of pretext for a rational jury to decide this case in her favor by finding
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that her termination was due to her gender. The evidence of sexual discriminations was
limited to the prima facie proof that a man replaced her, while the evidence that she was
fired for other reasons, including her failure to keep the department within its budget and
the failure to follow the parish policy regarding livestock, was relatively so substantial
that a rational jury could not find on this record that Pippins was terminated for
discriminatory reasons.
AFFIRMED.
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