United States v. Collins

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 10, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10604
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LANCE COLLINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:03-CR-206-ALL-A
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Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lance Collins appeals his conviction by a jury for aiding
and abetting bank robbery and the resulting 210-month sentence.
He contends that the district court denied him a fair trial by
compelling him to go to trial in identifiable prison clothing.
Collins has not established that district court’s actions were
the cause of his attire at trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 504 (1976)(habeas corpus case); Brooks v. Texas, 381
F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1967)(same).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-10604
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Collins contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for bank robbery. We have reviewed the
record, and we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found that the evidence established Collins’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 f.3d
374, 378 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186,
190 (5th Cir. 1993).
Collins asserts that the district court failed to provide
sufficient reasons for the sentence imposed. He maintains that
the court’s rulings made it unclear whether it was imposing
sentence on the basis of the original recommendation in the
presentence report, the first addendum, or the second addendum.
A review of the district court’s presentencing order and the
sentencing transcript reveals that the court based its sentence
on a finding that Collins was a career offender pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Collins cannot establish reversible error
arising out of the court’s reasons for judgment.
Collins contends that his prior attempted escape offense
should not be considered a “crime of violence” for purposes of
the career offender guideline because his escape constituted a
“walkaway” escape from a noncustodial facility. As Collins
concedes, this issue is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See
United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 676-77 (5th Cir. 1999).
Collins challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-
level enhancement to the base offense level based upon his role
No. 04-10604
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in the offense and another two-level enhancement based upon the
fact that a death threat was issued during the offense.
Collins’s offense level was determined based upon the finding
that he was a career offender; the enhancements listed above did
not affect his sentence. We therefore decline to consider his
arguments on these grounds.
Collins asserts that the district court erred in enhancing
his sentence based upon facts not submitted to or found by the
jury. Because Collins’s sentence was based upon a finding that
he was a career offender, the applicable guideline was not based
upon facts other than his prior convictions and does not
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation under United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). See United States v. Guevara, 408
F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 2005). Collins also contends that the
district court erred in imposing his sentence pursuant to a
mandatory Sentencing Guideline regime that was held
unconstitutional in Booker. He has not established that his
sentence was the result of plain error. See United States v.
Valenzuela-Quevedo, 407 F.3d 728, 732-33 (5th Cir. 2005). The
judgment of the district court is thus AFFIRMED.