Broussard v. Chevron USA, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 22, 2006
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-30082
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JEFFREY A. BROUSSARD; KATHERINE B. BROUSSARD
Plaintiffs–Appellants
v.
CHEVRON USA, INC.; ET AL
Defendants
CHEVRON USA, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
JEFFREY BERTRAND
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
CHEVRON USA, INC.; ET AL
Defendants
CHEVRON USA, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
GERVASE J. DECLOUET
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
CHEVRON USA, INC.; ET AL
Defendants
CHEVRON USA, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
No. 6:04-CV-1385
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jeffrey A. Broussard, Katherine B.
Broussard, Jeffrey Bertrand, and Gervase J. Declouet
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s order
dismissing their claims of negligence against Defendant-Appellee
Chevron USA, Inc. (“Chevron”). With the exception of Katherine
Broussard, Plaintiffs were all employees of Production Management
Industries, L.L.C. (“PMI”), an independent contractor hired by
Chevron to perform work on one of its platforms. During their
work on the Chevron platform, Plaintiffs were injured in a flash
fire that occurred when another PMI employee failed to properly
ventilate the area in which Plaintiffs were working. Plaintiffs
brought suit against Chevron, and the district court granted
Chevron’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Chevron was
not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs contend on
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
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appeal that this decision was erroneous.
Jurisdiction in this case is founded on the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, which requires us to apply federal
law to Plaintiffs’ claims, supplemented by the law of the
adjacent state--Louisiana in this case--to the extent the state
law is not inconsistent with federal law. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1333(a), 1349 (2000); see also Bartholomew v. CNG Producing
Co., 832 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, absent any
conflict with federal law, this court will apply Louisiana law as
“surrogate federal law” in this case. See Bartholomew, 832 F.2d
at 328.
Pursuant to Louisiana precedent and this court’s
interpretation of it, a principal, such as Chevron, is typically
not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. See
Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir.
2001). This court has recognized two exceptions to this rule:
(1) when the principal maintains operational control over the
activity in question; or (2) even in the absence of such control,
when the activity is ultrahazardous. Id. Further, a principal
always remains liable for its own negligence. Graham v. Amoco
Oil Co., 21 F.3d 643, 645 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Crane v.
Exxon Corp., USA, 613 So. 2d 214, 221 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Chevron is liable for their
injuries for three reasons: (1) Chevron was negligent; (2)
Chevron meets the operational control exception; and (3) Chevron
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is liable under an “inherently dangerous activity” exception that
Plaintiffs contend has been recognized under Louisiana law. As
argued by Plaintiffs, the inherently dangerous activity exception
permits a court to impose liability on a principal if the
activity is inherently dangerous and the principal has “expressly
or impliedly authorized the particular manner” which renders the
work unsafe. See Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So.
2d 604, 606-07 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
After reviewing the briefs and pertinent record excerpts and
considering the oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that the district court did not err in determining that
Chevron was not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs have
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issues
of whether Chevron was negligent or whether Chevron retained
operational control over Plaintiffs’ activities. Further, even
if the court were to recognize the inherently dangerous activity
exception as argued by Plaintiffs, there is no evidence that
Chevron expressly or impliedly authorized the act in question.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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