Moore v. Barnhart

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT May 24, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-50693
Summary Calendar
CECIL MOORE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(1:04-CV-238)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Cecil Moore appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
determination by the Commissioner of Social Security that he was
not eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits.
Concerning Moore’s claim for such benefits, an administrative
hearing was held in July 2003; the administrative law judge (ALJ)
considered the testimony of both a medical expert and vocational
expert, as well as several exhibits, including Moore’s medical
records since 2001, the year of his last employment. In denying
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the claim, the ALJ questioned the credibility of Moore’s statements
and found that, although Moore suffered severe impairments limiting
him to sedentary work, Moore was not disabled. The Appeals Council
affirmed. The district court held the claim properly denied.
Our review of Moore’s challenges to the Commissioner’s
conclusion that he was not disabled is limited to whether: (1)
substantial evidence supports the decision; and (2) correct legal
standards were used to evaluate the evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
e.g., Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence requires “more than a scintilla but less than
a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”. Watson v.
Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2002). It is the role of the
Commissioner, not our court, to weigh the evidence. Brown, 192
F.3d at 496.
First, Moore contends the burden of proving he would be unable
to engage in either his past work, or other gainful employment, was
placed improperly on him. As the court stated, a “claimant has the
initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps
of this analysis. The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.” (Internal citation omitted.) The proper
burden-shifting was applied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146
n.5 (1987); Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Next, Moore contends the ALJ’s finding of residual functional
capacity, despite his severe impairment, difficulty in
concentrating, and anxiety attacks, was not supported by
substantial evidence. Residual functional capacity concerns
Moore’s ability to perform work despite his physical or mental
impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). As the Commissioner notes,
Moore was seen by two examining physicians, both of whom stated he
retained sufficient physical capacity to perform sustained work
activity. The ALJ was responsible for determining Moore’s residual
functional capacity. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir.
1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546. Although the opinions and diagnosis
of a treating physician are to be accorded considerable weight, the
ALJ is permitted to reject a physician’s opinion when the overall
evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1995). The ALJ properly relied on “more
than a scintilla” of evidence that he could reasonably “accept as
adequate to support [his] conclusion”. Watson, 288 F.3d at 215.
Moore maintains the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his
credibility and failed to consider and explain the weight given to
his statements. An ALJ must explain his reasons for rejecting a
disability applicant’s complaints of pain, Falco v. Shalala, 27
F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994), and evaluates the credibility of
witness testimony, Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs v.
Vessel Repair, Inc., 168 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1999). We are to
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give his determinations considerable deference. Harrell v. Bowen,
862 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1988). As the Commissioner notes, the
ALJ considered Moore’s subjective complaints of pain and cited the
requirement that he do so in his decision; and the ALJ found
Moore’s claims lacking in credibility, based on his review of the
evidence and testimony from treating and examining physicians.
Pursuant to our deferential review, we cannot say the ALJ erred in
deeming Moore’s statements lacking in credibility; substantial
evidence supports this determination.
Moore also claims the ALJ improperly rejected the medical
opinion of Moore’s treating physicians and instead relied upon
testimony of a medical expert witness, without providing a detailed
analysis of his reasoning for doing so. Contrary to Moore’s
interpretation, this detailed analysis is required only “absent
reliable medical evidence from a treating or examining physician
controverting the claimant’s treating specialist”. Newton v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). The
opinion of a treating physician is not given controlling weight
when it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1993).
Because contrary reliable evidence existed in opposition to Moore’s
claims, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision not to
rely on Moore’s treating physicians.
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Finally, Moore contends the ALJ and district court failed to
consider his ability to maintain and perform tasks needed for
employment, in the light of his many limitations. Moore cites
Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1987), for the proposition
that the ALJ and district court failed to consider “both the
disabling effect of each of [his] ailments and the combined effect
of all of these impairments” on his ability to obtain and maintain
employment. Id. at 1305 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Where the record reasonably shows a disability claimant
has the capacity to work, however, such a discussion of the
claimant’s ability to maintain employment is not needed. Frank v.
Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619 (5th Cir. 2003). Both treating and
examining doctors found Moore capable of performing sedentary work.
Based on this substantial evidence, no further discussion was
required.
AFFIRMED
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