Santiago-Lugo v. Tapia

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 12, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30948
Summary Calendar
ISRAEL SANTIAGO-LUGO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT M. TAPIA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
No. 1:04-CV-993
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Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Israel Santiago-Lugo, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial
of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in this
28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus action that was purportedly filed
pursuant to the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Santiago-
Lugo is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for convictions
from 1996, in the United States District Court for the District of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circum-
stances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-30498
-2-
Puerto Rico, of a serious drug-trafficking conspiracy, a continuing
criminal enterprise count, and other offenses.
At the time Santiago-Lugo filed his Rule 60(b) motion, the
district court in the Western District of Louisiana, where he is
currently confined, had already transferred the case to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for consideration whether he should be
authorized to file what amounted to a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255motion to vacate, and the First Circuit had denied such authoriza-
tion. We must examine our own jurisdiction, see United States v.
Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001), and we have “inherent
jurisdiction to examine the jurisdiction of district court courts
within [this] circuit.” In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571,
576-77 (5th Cir. 2002).
We have expressed “grave doubt” that a district court had jur-
isdiction to “clarify,” pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), a two-
year-old order by which it had granted a motion by defendant cor-
porations to transfer a plaintiff’s diversity action to a federal
district court in New York. See In re Galiardi, 745 F.2d 335, 337
(5th Cir. 1984); see also In re Southwestern Mobile Homes, Inc.,
317 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1963) (expressing doubt about this
court’s “power to compel” a federal district judge in Texas to va-
cate his order transferring an action to another district). Sister
circuits have held that “when a transfer of a case has been com-
pleted, the transferor courtSSand the appellate court that has jur-
isdiction over itSSlose all jurisdiction over the case.” See,
No. 05-30498
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e.g., In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2001) (and
citations therein). This is especially true where, as here, the
transferee court has proceeded with the transferred case. See id.
at 384.
Given that the First Circuit had already disposed of Santiago-
Lugo’s transferred case, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the case thereafter. Even if that were not so, the appeal
from the denial of rule 60(b) is frivolous. Accordingly, the ap-
peal is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.