DirecTV, Inc. v. Young

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 8, 2006
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-61023
Summary Calendar
_______________________
DIRECTV, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES YOUNG, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
No. 4:04-CV-118
________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal arises from Appellee DirecTV, Inc.’s
(“DirecTV”) lawsuit against Appellant Charles Young, Jr. (“Young”)
for his piracy of DirecTV’s satellite communications. Due to
Young’s complete failure to defend the lawsuit, the district court
entered a default judgment against Young. DirecTV, Inc. v. Young,
No. 4:04CV118 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1, 2005). Young argues that the
district court abused its discretion by not granting him relief
under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Young also contends that the district
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
court erred in striking his untimely answer. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
DirecTV filed a complaint against Young on June 29, 2004.
On August 23, 2004, more than a month after Young’s answer was due,
Young’s first counsel in the case filed a motion to withdraw,
citing Young’s pattern of “refrain[ing] from cooperation with
counsel’s efforts to represent him in this matter” and “refusal to
answer calls from or come sign anything with or for counsel.”
In light of the withdrawal of Young’s counsel, DirecTV
made repeated efforts to communicate with Young in an effort to get
him to engage in settlement discussions or defend the lawsuit. In
a February 4, 2005 letter, DirecTV’s counsel reminded Young that,
as of September 27, 2004, his attorney had withdrawn and his answer
was overdue. DirecTV also extended Young’s deadline to file an
answer to February 21, 2005.
In a follow-up letter dated March 30, 2005, DirecTV
repeated its willingness to settle the matter and, once again,
reminded Young that he had failed to submit an answer. DirecTV
again gave Young more time in which to file an answer, setting a
new deadline of April 15, 2005. However, the letter made clear
that, if Young failed to file an answer, DirecTV would “initiate
default judgment proceedings” and “[t]he Court could enter a
default judgment against you in the amount of $350,000 plus
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attorney’s fees.” Young, No. 4:04CV118, slip op. at 5.
In an April 15, 2005 phone call, DirecTV’s counsel once
again agreed to postpone default judgment proceedings and send
Young another copy of the complaint. In an April 27, 2005 followup
letter, DirecTV’s counsel wrote, “This case has been pending since
June 29, 2004, and you were served with a copy of the Complaint on
July 14, 2004. Your answer is extremely overdue! If you have not
filed an answer by Monday, May 9, 2005, we will proceed with
default.” Id. at 6. Young did not file an answer by May 9; thus,
DirecTV filed an application for entry of default the next day. On
May 13, 2005, the district court clerk entered default against
Young. On June 1, 2005, DirecTV moved for default judgment,
seeking $350,000 in statutory damages plus attorney’s fees. In
response, on June 6, 2005 — eleven months after he had been served
with the complaint — Young filed an answer. On June 24, 2005,
DirecTV filed a motion to strike Young’s untimely response.
On August 2, 2005, having received no response from Young
on the motion for default judgment or motion to strike answer, the
district court granted DirecTV’s motion to strike, and ordered and
entered a default judgment, awarding DirecTV $350,000 in statutory
damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion for an abuse of discretion. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi,
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635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 60(b)(1), a district
court may grant relief from a judgment for “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect” on a motion made within one year of
the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). In determining whether
sufficient grounds exist for setting aside a judgment, district
courts are to consider: (1) the culpability of the defendant’s
conduct; (2) the extent of prejudice to the plaintiff; and (3) the
merits of the defendant’s asserted defense. Rogers v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 938 (5th Cir. 1999).
Additional factors may be considered by the court as well, and “the
decision of whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) falls
within [the court’s] sound discretion.” Id. at 939. Finally, “[a]
finding of willful default ends the inquiry, for ‘when the court
finds an intentional failure of responsive pleadings there need be
no further finding.’” Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292 (5th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Dierschke v. O'Cheskey (In re Dierschke), 975
F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir.1992)).
Young argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment.
The district court denied Young’s motion because of his willful
conduct, namely his complete failure to act after having been
specifically informed by DirecTV that it would seek a default
judgment if he did not file an answer by May 9, 2005. Young, No.
4:04CV118, slip op. at 7, 8. Young contends that his conduct was
not willful. Rather, he contends that his failure to respond was
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due to his counsel’s unilateral decision to withdraw and his
ignorance of the processes of the court.
We note at the outset that the district court engaged in
a detailed examination of the lengthy correspondence between
DirecTV and Young prior to finding that Young’s failure to file an
answer had been willful. That correspondence, coupled with Young’s
inaction, is the basis on which the district court refused to set
aside the default judgment. Young, No. 4:04CV118, slip op. at 7-8.
Significantly, the district court recognized that it was irrelevant
to its willfulness analysis that Young had not received his
original counsel’s notice of withdrawal. Id. at 4, 6-7.
Regardless of whether Young learned in September 2004 that his
counsel had withdrawn, the district court found that Young could
not argue plausibly that he was without notice of this development
by March 2005. Id. at 6. As noted supra, in a February 4, 2005
letter to Young, DirecTV stated that Young’s counsel had withdrawn
as of September 24, 2004. And a followup letter from DirecTV to
Young on March 30, 2005 made the same statement. The district
court’s review of the record led it to conclude that “[i]t appears
from the foregoing that Young’s assertion to the court that he was
unaware until May 2005 that Mr. Ready had been allowed to withdraw
as counsel in the fall of last year is not true.” Id.
Additionally, in its analysis, the district court gave
Young the benefit of the doubt by noting that, prior to DirecTV
setting the May 9, 2005 deadline, Young’s failure to file an answer
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did not appear to be willful. Id. In so concluding, the court
noted that the record demonstrated that DirecTV sought to engage
Young in settlement discussions and agreed to a series of
extensions for Young to file his answer. Id. The district court
decided, however, that DirecTV’s April 27, 2005 letter to Young
changed the dynamics of the discussions between the parties in a
significant way. Id. at 7. As noted supra, DirecTV made clear in
its April 27 letter that Young’s answer was “extremely overdue” and
that if Young did not file an answer by May 9, 2005, the company
would proceed with default.
In coming to its decision that Young’s failure to answer
was willful, the court also noted that, not only had Young failed
to answer or seek an extension by the May 9 deadline, but also
failed to make any response to DirecTV’s May 10, 2005 application
for entry of default. The district court summed up its finding of
willfulness as follows:
Given that he has offered no explanation whatsoever for
any of these failures, the court cannot conclude that
they were other than willful. Young had been specifically
apprised that an answer would be due on or before May 9,
2005, and that DirecTV would seek a default judgment were
one not filed, and yet he did nothing. He did not try to
find an attorney; he did not ask DirecTV or the court for
more time; and he did not file an answer.
Id. at 7.
Young has failed to show how the district court abused
its discretion; thus, we find no reason to disturb the court’s
decision to not set aside the default judgment. Further, because
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we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Young’s failure to file an answer was willful, it
is unnecessary for us to analyze the other Rule 60(b) elements.
See Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 184 (noting that “when the court finds
an intentional failure of responsive pleaings there need be no
other finding”).
Finally, Young contends that the district court erred by
granting DirecTV’s motion to strike his untimely answer. The entry
of the default judgment against Young disposed of all matters
relating to this case. The district court noted, “Although Young
did later obtain counsel and file an answer, he did so only after
the clerk had already entered default and DirecTV had moved for
entry of a default judgment . . . . His default at that point
could not be cured simply by the filing of an untimely answer.”
Young, No. 4:04CV118LN, slip op. at 8. Additionally, the court
noted that Young had failed to respond in opposition to DirecTV’s
motion to strike Young’s answer, and thus the motion should be
granted as unopposed pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(C). The district
court’s decision to strike Young’s response pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 12 was not an abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
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