Oyuela v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 8, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30779
REYNALDO OYUELA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
SEACOR MARINE (NIGERIA), INC., ET AL.,
Defendants,
SEACOR MARINE, INC., SEACOR MARINE (BAHAMAS), INC.,
SEACOR SMIT, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(02-CV-3298)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Reynaldo Oyuela appeals from the district court’s order
denying a motion to reopen his case. The district court previously
administratively closed Oyuela’s case based upon the court’s
conditional dismissal for forum non conveniens. The court
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
dismissed Oyuela’s complaint for forum non conveniens subject to
four specific conditions, including initiation by Oyuela of
“appropriate proceedings within 120 days” in the appropriate
English forum. Oyuela v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 713, 726 (E.D. La. 2003). Also, the court’s original
conditional dismissal and administrative closure contemplated a
possible, future return to the forum for further adjudication. Id.(stating that the court would “reassume jurisdiction” if the
conditions of dismissal were not satisfied).
Oyuela filed his complaint in an English court. Shortly
thereafter, Oyuela moved to reopen the case in the Eastern District
of Louisiana. Defendants opposed the motion; the district court
held a status conference; and on March 23, 2004, the court denied
the motion to reopen. Oyuela did not file a notice of appeal from
the district court’s first refusal to reopen the case. At about
the same time, Defendants objected before the English court to the
timeliness of service of process. The English court ultimately
dismissed Oyuela’s claims because of his failure to timely serve
process, and Oyuela did not appeal. Oyuela then moved a second
time to reopen the proceedings before the district court. The
district court, without reopening the case, permitted supplemental
briefing. The court then denied Oyuela’s motion by written order
dated June 5, 2005 without modifying the original conditional
dismissal. The court explained that the case would not be reopened
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because Oyuela, in failing to timely serve Defendants in the
English forum, failed to satisfy the condition that Oyuela initiate
“appropriate proceedings” in the English forum. The court did not,
however, indicate whether the refusal to reopen continued the
administrative closure and conditional dismissal or instead
converted the conditional dismissal into a final dismissal,
precluding any subsequent review initiated by the court sua sponte
or by a party’s motion.
The court’s underlying order of dismissal for forum non
conveniens provides for both conditional dismissal and
administrative closure. In some cases, an administrative closure
may not be a final and appealable order. See, e.g., Mire v. Full
Spectrum Lending, Inc., 389 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 2004); S. La.
Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk Handling, 383 F.3d 297, 298 (5th
Cir. 2004). Similarly, a court’s refusal to reopen a conditionally
dismissed, administratively closed case is not necessarily a final
and appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Therefore, because the district court failed to explain the
procedural nature of its refusal to reopen, we must remand for the
limited purpose of requesting the district court to supplement the
record. Upon limited remand, the district could should enter a
memorandum or order that explains the procedural nature of its
refusal to reopen this case, that is, either the court intended the
dismissal to remain conditional, allowing the court to reopen the
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case in its discretion by either its own motion or the motion of a
party, or instead, the court intended to convert its prior
conditional dismissal into a final dismissal, ending the dispute
between the parties. See WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d
424, 429 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “although an administrative
closing may mature into final order of dismissal, the district
court . . . must enter an order so providing”). If the latter,
then the district court should also enter a final judgment.
The text of the district court’s June 5, 2005 order denying
Oyuela’s motion to reopen the case permits both of the above
readings, thereby clouding any determination of appellate
jurisdiction. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
Local Lodge 2121 v. Goodrich Corp., 410 F.3d 204, 209 (5th Cir.
2005) (citing Mire, 389 F.3d at 167; Apachi Bohai Corp. v. Texaco
China B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Following the district court’s entry of an explanation of its
order, including entry of final judgment if appropriate, the case
should be returned to this Court. This Court retains jurisdiction
during the pendency of the limited remand. Wheeler v. City of
Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 1154 (5th Cir. 1982).
LIMITED REMAND.
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