Blake v. University of Mississippi Medical Center

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT August 2, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-60496
MD ROGER BLAKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER; Doctor DANIEL JONES, in
his official capacity as Chancellor of the University of MS
Medical Center; JAMES ROY KLUMB, in official capacity as member
of the board of trustees of state institutions of higher
learning; ED BLAKESLEE, in official capacity as member of the
board of trustees of state institutions of higher learning;
THOMAS W. COLBERT, in official capacity as member of the board of
trustees of state institutions of higher learning; Doctor RICHARD
A. CROFTS, in official capacity as member of the board of
trustees of state institutions of higher learning; Doctor L.
STACY DAVIDSON, JR., in official capacity as member of the board
of trustees of state institutions of higher learning; Doctor D.E.
MAGEE, JR., in official capacity as member of the board of
trustees of state institutions of higher learning; Doctor BETTY
HENDERSON NEELY, in official capacity as member of the board of
trustees of state institutions of higher learning; VIRGINIA
SHANTEAU NEWTON, in official capacity as member of the board of
trustees of state institutions of higher learning; BOB OWENS, in
official capacity as member of the board of trustees of state
institutions of higher learning; AUBREY PATTERSON, in official
capacity as member of the board of trustees of state institutions
of higher learning; ROBIN ROBINSON, in official capacity as
member of the board of trustees of state institutions of higher
learning; SCOTT ROSS, in official capacity as member of the board
of trustees of state institutions of higher learning; AMY
WHITTEN, in official capacity as member of the board of trustees
of state institutions of higher learning; PAUL TRUSSELL,
Individually and as director of Human Resources of the University
of MS Medical Center,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:05-CV-187)
Before KING, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
For his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Roger Blake challenges an
adverse summary judgment, primarily on his claims for deprivation
of due process. AFFIRMED.
I.
Blake was employed by the University of Mississippi Medical
Center (UMC) as a staff physician. In addition, pursuant to a one-
year employment contract, which permitted termination for, inter
alia, “contumacious conduct”, he was a non-tenured assistant
professor of surgery.
On 1 October 2004, having been notified of Blake’s alleged
inappropriate sexual conduct toward another UMC physician, UMC
suspended Blake’s physician privileges, placing him on paid
administrative leave. Regarding the suspension, UMC notified Blake
of his bylaws-provided right to request a hearing before its
Executive Committee. Blake did not do so.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2
On 4 October, Blake met with UMC’s human-resources director
and discussed the alleged misconduct. Subsequently, both Blake and
the accusing physician submitted to polygraph examinations.
Settlement discussions between Blake and UMC, which spanned
several weeks and involved the possibility of Blake’s resigning
from his faculty position but having his physician privileges
reinstated, were not successful. On 10 December, UMC terminated
Blake for “unprofessional conduct ... involv[ing] a resident
physician”. In doing so, UMC notified Blake of his “right to file
a grievance in regard[] to th[e] decision”. Blake did not do so.
Instead, he filed this action, asserting: federal-law claims
for deprivation of procedural and substantive due process; and
state-law claims for, inter alia, breach of contract. After the
district court dismissed some of Blake’s claims, defendants moved
for summary judgment on those that remained: claims through § 1983
against UMC’s human-resources director; equitable claims through §
1983 against the other individual defendants; and state-law claims.
On 28 March 2006, the district court denied Blake’s motion to
strike the polygraph-examination results, and awarded summary
judgment against his remaining claims. Blake v. Univ. of Miss.
Med. Ctr., No. 3:05-CV-187-BS, 2006 WL 839556 (S.D. Miss. 28 Mar.
2006) (district court opinion).
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II.
A.
Blake contests the denial of his motion to strike the
polygraph-examination results, maintaining the evidence was
unreliable, unsworn, and hearsay. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. E.g., Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs.,
Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1514 (5th Cir. 1996) (exclusion of
polygraph evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion). Of course,
an erroneous ruling is reversible error only if it affected the
complaining party’s substantial rights. FED. R. EVID. 103(a); see
also, e.g., Hodges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 474 F.3d 188, 199 (5th
Cir. 2006). Based on our review of the record, and essentially for
the reasons stated in the district court opinion, admitting the
polygraph evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
B.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court. E.g., Keelan v. Majesco Software,
Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2005). Such judgment is proper
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
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for the nonmoving party”. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Based on our review of the record, and
essentially for the reasons stated in the district court opinion,
summary judgment was proper.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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