United States v. Rogers

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit June 11, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-20402
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
BRALYONNE DONTRAILL ROGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:05-CR-309-3)
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bralyonne Dontraill Rogers appeals his conviction -- following
a bench trial on stipulated facts -- for bank robbery and use of a
firearm during the commission of a bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) & (d), 2, and 924(c). The district court
sentenced Rogers to a total prison term of 135 months and a total
supervised-release term of 5 years.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Rogers argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the results of a search and seizure that
followed an investigatory stop of the red sports utility vehicle
(“SUV”) in which he was a passenger. Specifically, Rogers maintains
that the investigatory stop was conducted attendant to a police
roadblock that was unconstitutionally broad in scope, not based on
particularized suspicion, and implemented in an unreasonably
intrusive manner. Further, Rogers contends that the police officers
did not have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to
focus on the passengers of the red SUV and ultimately detain them,
and he believes that the officers effectively relied on an
impermissible, race-based hunch by seizing the first vehicle
containing three black males.
We review a motion to suppress based on live testimony at a
suppression hearing by “accept[ing] the trial court’s factual
findings unless clearly erroneous or influenced by a incorrect view
of the law.” United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701, 704 (5th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below. United
States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1314 (5th Cir. 1993). “Questions of
law are reviewed de novo, as are the district court’s ultimate
conclusions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.” United States v.
Vasquez, 298 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err when it
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concluded that the roadblock established by the police had a proper
purpose and was implemented reasonably. The absence of an
individualized suspicion in the police roadblock context is not
dispositive of constitutionality. See generally Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Roadblocks designed to
address specialized law enforcement purposes may be permissible
without the presence of individualized suspicion, provided the
court finds a favorable balance between “the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51
(1979); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004)
(quoting Brown).
The roadblock established by the Houston Police Department
(“HPD”) was a targeted law enforcement effort designed to address
a specific and dangerous crime -- an armed bank robbery -- about
which the HPD had particularized knowledge. Because the money
stolen during the bank robbery contained electronic tracking
devices (“ETDs”), the HPD were able to focus their attention on a
particular geographic area in which there was a high likelihood of
catching armed criminals fleeing from the commission of a specific
crime. Thus, the police roadblock was properly tailored to detect
evidence of a particular criminal wrongdoing rather than for
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general crime control, Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424, and accordingly,
it was not unconstitutional per se. See City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (noting that “an appropriately
tailored roadblock set up to . . . catch a dangerous criminal who
is likely to flee by way of a particular route” would “almost
certainly” be permissible).
Furthermore, the roadblock established by the HPD was not
unreasonable under the circumstances, and it satisfies the
requirements of the Brown balancing test. The public concern of
apprehending armed bank robbers was substantial. Moreover, the
roadblock was a discretionary police tactic specifically tailored
in both time and place to further the public interest in
apprehension, as the roadblock was established within several miles
of the crime scene based on strong scientific evidence extracted
from the ETDs. Additionally, although the roadblock may have caused
some interference with subjective liberties, the objective
intrusion was minimal and brief. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
558; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (citing Martinez-Fuerte).
Thus, the district court did not err in holding that the HPD
roadblock was permissible.
We also conclude that the district court did not err in
concluding that the police had sufficient articulable facts on
which to base a reasonable suspicion to focus on the occupants of
the red SUV. Whether an investigatory stop was objectively
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reasonable is examined under the “totality of the circumstances.”
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). “Any analysis of
reasonable suspicion is necessarily fact-specific, and factors
which by themselves appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to
the level of reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Santiago, 310
F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide
a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion in the
minds of experienced officers . . . .” United States v. Hollaway,
962 F.2d 451, 459 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted). The
Government bears the burden of showing the reasonableness of a
warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Chavis, 48 F.3d
871, 872 (5th Cir. 1995).
We conclude that the police were justified in focusing on the
red SUV because: (1) the vehicle was located in the dense traffic
where the ETDs suggested the stolen money was to be found; (2) the
race and gender of the occupants of the SUV matched the description
of the suspects; and (3) the occupants of the SUV exhibited
behavior that experienced officers interpreted as suspicious
conduct. Although Rogers contends that the officers
unconstitutionally used race as a basis for their inquiry, the race
of the suspects was a relevant fact because of witnesses’
identifying information. Ultimately, the presence of three black
males exhibiting suspicious behavior in a location in which a
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reliable technology suggested the stolen money should be found
provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to the officers. The
officers had more than a minimal level of objective justification
for the stop and seizure. See United States v. Jacquez, 421 F.3d
338, 341 (5th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it denied
Rogers’ motion to suppress the evidence. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
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