Ackerson v. Kijakazi

Case: 20-30682 Document: 00516414716 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/01/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-30682 August 1, 2022
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Alric Desmond Ackerson,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-CV-9158
Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Alric Desmond Ackerson moves for leave to appeal in forma pauperis
(IFP) from the district court’s summary judgment dismissing his action
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in which he challenged a decision by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying Social Security Disability
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30682 Document: 00516414716 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/01/2022
No. 20-30682
Insurance Benefits. We GRANT the IFP motion, but the district court’s
judgment dismissing the action must be affirmed.
Our review “is limited to determining whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the proper legal
standards were used in evaluating the evidence.” Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d
1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (appeal of summary judgment). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. at 1021-22 (internal quotation and citation omitted). A
finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible
evidentiary choices or medical findings exist in the record to support the
decision. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988).
On appeal, Ackerson argues that the ALJ “cherry picked” the
evidence and thus misconstrued his claim and the evidence and failed to
properly evaluate his subjective testimony in light of other evidence about the
pain resulting from the peripheral neuropathy caused by his diabetes. He also
asserts that his peripheral neuropathy meets the legal definition of a listed
impairment under Listing 11.14 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. However, the ALJ not only considered the neuropathy but also
found that it was severe enough to reduce Ackerson’s capacity to do all but
sedentary work. Ackerson’s contention is thus merely a disagreement with
the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence, and he fails to show that the ALJ applied
an improper legal standard or that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022; see also Johnson, 864 F.2d
at 343; Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 480 (5th Cir. 1988). The district
court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
2