Hagerty v. Van Duser

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 00-30651
Summary Calendar
____________________
ROBERT HAGERTY
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
KEVIN JOSEPH VAN DUSER; ET AL
Defendants
KEVIN JOSEPH VAN DUSER; PATHFINDER INSURANCE COMPANY; TIG
HOLDINGS GROUP, doing business as TIG Insurance Company,
doing business as TIG Insurance Company of New York
Defendants - Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 98-CV-146-E
_________________________________________________________________
January 31, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Hagerty appeals from the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Kevin Joseph
Van Duser, et al. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from a car accident that occurred in New
Orleans on January 27, 1997, shortly before the 1997 Super Bowl.
The National Football League (the “NFL”) hired Paul Ridgeway
Companies, Inc. (“Ridgeway”), as it had since the 1994 Super
Bowl, to perform transportation consulting services for the 1997
Super Bowl and related events, including inter alia arranging all
necessary local transportation and designing and implementing
parking plans.
Ridgeway generally hires employees, both individuals and
companies, on an “event specific,” rather than a permanent,
basis.2 Ridgeway had hired the plaintiff, Robert Hagerty, on an
individual basis for a number of earlier events, including the
Atlanta, Miami, and Tempe Super Bowls and World Youth Day.
However, for the 1997 Super Bowl, Ridgeway subcontracted with
Straight Shot Concrete, LLC (“Straight Shot”)3 to “lay out and
2
Ridgeway uses oral, not written, contracts in the hiring
of its employees.
3
Straight Shot Concrete, LLC was started by Robert
Hagerty and “some of [his] friends” in July 1996. Robert Hagerty
is the president of Straight Shot. In his appellate brief, he
refers to himself both as an “independent contractor” of Straight
Shot and an “employee” of Straight Shot. Because he has offered
2
manage parking lots.” Specifically, it subcontracted with
Straight Shot for the services of Hagerty and Jeff Cotrell. In
return for Hagerty’s services, Ridgeway paid Straight Shot a flat
fee of $250 per day. Additionally, Hagerty personally received a
$25 per diem for meals. Finally, Ridgeway paid Hagerty’s airfare
and housing and, as arranged by Ridgeway, the NFL provided a car
for his use.4 As part of the oral contract, Straight Shot was
required to have its own insurance.
On the morning of the accident, Cotrell was not feeling well
and, because Cotrell and Hagerty were sharing a car, Hagerty
decided to leave the car with Cotrell in order to allow him to
use the car later in the afternoon. In order to get to the job
site, Hagerty “hitched” a ride with Kevin Joseph Van Duser, a
Ridgeway employee and a defendant in this appeal. Van Duser
drove and Hagerty rode in the passenger seat. On the way to the
job site, the car was struck by another vehicle driven. Hagerty
was immediately taken to the hospital. He applied for and
no evidence as to his independent contractor status and his
arguments on appeal do not address this distinction, but rather
presuppose his status as an employee, we do not reach this issue.
4
Ridgeway asserts that it paid for Hagerty’s airfare and
housing and arranged for the NFL to provide a vehicle for
Hagerty’s transportation to and from the job sites. Hagerty does
not expressly concede this, but admits that neither he nor
Straight Shot paid for the airfare, hotel room, or car. He
simply states that he does not know who paid for the hotel room
or airfare and that the car was provided as a courtesy by the
NFL. We do not find these statements in conflict with Ridgeway’s
assertions.
3
received worker’s compensation benefits pursuant to the policy
provided by Straight Shot.5
Hagerty filed suit against multiple defendants on January
16, 1998. Some of those defendants, Van Duser, TIG, and
Pathfinder (the “defendants”), moved for summary judgment
asserting that, because Hagerty was a statutory employee of
Ridgeway, under Louisiana law the defendants were entitled to
tort immunity. On March 21, 2000, the district court denied the
motion, stating that there were material issues of fact in
dispute regarding the relationship between Ridgeway, Hagerty, and
Straight Shot. The defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration, and, on May 2, 2000, the district court granted
the motion, stating that regardless of whether Hagerty was a
direct employee of Ridgeway or an employee of Straight Shot, he
was limited to a worker’s compensation remedy.6
Hagerty appeals the grant of summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
5
Hagerty did not receive worker’s compensation benefits
from any Ridgeway policy.
6
In regards to the remaining defendants, on May 12, 2000,
the district court granted summary judgment on Hagerty’s claim
against Ridgeway based on the parties stipulation that any
summary judgment ruling entered as to Van Duser would apply to
Ridgeway and, on June 7, 2000, the court dismissed Hagerty’s
claims against Pitre, Allstate Insurance Company, and Darlene
Wheeler based on Hagerty’s assertion that he would not pursue
those claims.
4
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, “applying the same criteria used by the
district court in the first instance.” Bussian v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the record shows “‘that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,
204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. Principal
Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996)). “[W]e must
view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d
686, 690 (5th Cir. 1999).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of
demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant’s
case, “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). However, if the party seeking summary judgment will
bear the ultimate burden on the issue at trial, “it must adduce
evidence to support each element of its defenses and demonstrate
the lack of any genuine issue of material fact with regard
thereto.” Rushing v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505
(5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1171 (2000).
After the movant has presented a properly supported motion
for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
show with “significant probative evidence” that there exists a
5
genuine issue of material fact. See Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d
1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994). Unsupported allegations, conclusory
in nature, are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See
Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1984).
“The mere existence of a disputed factual issue . . . does
not foreclose summary judgment. The dispute must be genuine and
the facts must be material.”7 Prof’l Managers, Inc. v. Fawer,
Brian, Hardy & Zatskis, 799 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1986). A
fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An
issue is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.“As an Erie court, although we apply federal procedural
rules including the summary judgment standard, we apply
7
We note that Hagerty argues that whether he was in the
course and scope of employment is a factual determination for the
jury to make and therefore should not be decided on a motion for
summary judgment. However, where the material facts on the issue
are not in dispute, the question of course and scope may be
disposed of on motion for summary judgment. See Keating v. Shell
Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1980) (“By summary
judgment or otherwise the Trial Court may properly determine that
on facts which are uncontradicted, or impliedly found most
favorable to Keating, Benson could not, as a matter of Louisiana
law, be outside the § 1032 course and scope of employment.”);
Bolton v. Tulane Univ. of La., 692 So. 2d 1113, 1119 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (“Unlike the granting of a motion for summary judgment
finding that an employee was not within the scope of his
employment, the granting of a motion for summary judgment finding
that an employee was within the course and scope of his
employment is a proper use of a motion for summary judgment.”);
Leflore v. Coburn, 665 So. 2d 1323, 1330 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
6
Louisiana’s substantive law.” Brock v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 976
F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Under Louisiana law,8 an employer is liable for paying
worker’s compensation benefits to an injured employee. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031(A) (West 1996);9 see also Bolton v.
Tulane Univ. of La., 692 So. 2d 1113, 1120 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
Louisiana law further provides that worker’s compensation is the
exclusive remedy of the injured employee. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1031(A);10 see also Bolton, 692 So. 2d at 1120. An employer
8
There are three provisions of the Louisiana Code
relevant to our inquiry: §§§ 23-1031, 23-1032, and 23-1061.
These provisions were all amended by § 1 of Acts 1997. However,
§ 3 of Acts 1997, No. 315 provides: “The provisions of this Act
shall be applied prospectively only and shall not apply to any
cause of action arising prior to the effective date of this Act[,
June 17, 1997].” Because the accident occurred in January 1997,
the case must be interpreted under the provisions as they existed
prior to the 1997 amendments, and, therefore, the pre-Amendment
versions are cited in the opinion.
9
Section 23-1031(A) provides as follows: “If an employee
not otherwise eliminated from the benefits of this Chapter
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, his employer shall pay compensation in
the amounts, on the conditions, and to the person or persons
hereinafter designated.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1031(A) (West
1996).
10
Section § 23:1032(A) provides:
A. (1)(a) Except for intentional acts provided for in
Subsection B, the rights and remedies herein granted to
an employee or his dependent on account of an injury,
or compensable sickness or disease for which he is
7
seeking tort immunity under these provisions bears the burden of
proving its entitlement to the immunity. See Bostwick v.
M.A.P.P. Indus., Inc., 707 So. 2d 441, 445 (La. Ct. App. 1997);
Bolton, 692 So. 2d at 1120; Tucker v. Northeast La. Tree Serv.,
665 So. 2d 672, 677 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Hebert v. Jeffrey, 653
So. 2d 842, 844 (La. Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, the immunity
is available not only to employers, but also to co-employees and
insurers. See Hill v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 1165, 1169
(La. Ct. App. 1994).
Hagerty argues that he was not in the course and scope of
his employment when the accident occurred and that, therefore
Ridgeway is not entitled to tort immunity.11 The burden is on
Ridgeway to prove Hagerty was injured in the course and scope of
his employment and that, therefore, his sole remedy is worker’s
compensation.
entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be
exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims for
damages.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032(A) (emphasis added).
11
We note that in the district court Hagerty argued that
Ridgeway was not entitled to the tort immunity defense because he
was not an employee of Ridgeway, but of Straight Shot. The
district court held that the determination of whether Hagerty was
a direct employee of Ridgeway or an employee of Straight Shot, a
subcontractor of Ridgeway, was not material because, in either
situation, Hagerty would be limited to a worker’s compensation
remedy if the injury occurred in the course and scope of his
employment. Because Hagerty did not appeal this finding, the
sole issue before this court is whether the injury occurred in
the course and scope of employment.
8
Generally, a party to a lawsuit seeking to prove that
an employee was within the course and scope of his
employment must prove two elements: (1) that the injury
suffered by the employee arose out of the employment
(“the arising-out-of requirement”), and (2) that the
employee suffered the injury during the course of his
employment (“the during-course-of requirement”).
Bolton, 692 So. 2d at 1120; see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031;
Keith v. Gelco Corp., 705 So. 2d 244, 246-47 (La. Ct. App. 1997);
Tucker, 665 So. 2d at 677.
“As a general rule, an accident which occurs while an
employee is traveling to and from work is not considered as
having occurred during the course and scope of employment.”
Keith, 705 So. 2d at 247; see also Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So.
2d 224, 227 (La. 1994); Johnson v. Templeton, 768 So. 2d 65, 70
(La. Ct. App. 2000); Lorraine v. Theriot, Inc., 729 So. 2d 1160,
1163 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Tucker, 665 So. 2d at 677; McBride v.
R.F. Kazimour Transp., 583 So.2d 1146, 1147 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(“The general rule is that employees are not covered by workman’s
compensation when traveling to and from work.”). “This rule is
premised on the theory that ordinarily, the employment
relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his
work to go home until he resumes his work.” Lorraine, 729 So. 2d
at 1163; see also Orgeron, 639 So. 2d at 227 (“[A]n employee’s
place of residence is a personal decision not directly controlled
by the employer, and treating commuting time as part of the
determination of course and scope of employment would remove
9
manageable boundaries from the determination.”); Keith, 705 So.
2d at 247.
However, courts have established a number of exceptions to
the general rule. See Tarver v. Energy Drilling Co., 645 So. 2d
796, 798-99 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (listing seven recognized
exceptions to the general rule); Yates v. Naylor Indus. Servs.,
569 So. 2d 616, 619-20 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (same). One such
exception is where the transportation is furnished as an incident
of employment: “The courts have held employees entitled to
workmen’s compensation in those cases in which the employer had
concerned himself with the transportation of his employees—he has
furnished transportation . . . and/or the employee is furnished
travel expenses or is paid wages for time spent in traveling.”
Castille v. Sibelle, 342 So. 2d 279, 281 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Keith, 705 So. 2d
at 247 (“One exception to the rule occurs when the employer has
furnished transportation as an incident to the employment
agreement, either through a vehicle or payment of expenses, or
where wages are paid for the time spent in traveling.”).12
12
We note that some cases have misquoted this exception,
stating that the requirement that wages be paid for time spent
traveling is in addition to the requirement that the employer has
furnished transportation as an incident to the employment
agreement. See, e.g., Tucker, 665 So. 2d at 677; Hebert, 653 So.
2d at 844. We follow the exception as originally stated.
Furthermore, we note that the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
required that wages be paid for travel time in order to find the
employer provided transportation as an incident of employment.
See Michaleski v. W. Preferred Cas. Co., 472 So. 2d 18, 20 (La.
10
The evidence reveals that Hagerty was in New Orleans to
perform work for Ridgeway. Ridgeway paid for his air travel and
his hotel room and gave him a $25 per diem for meals. Hagerty
admits he did not pay for a car, but that a car was provided for
him by the NFL. We do not find that inconsistent with Ridgeway’s
assertion that, as was its usual practice at these events, it
arranged for the NFL to provide cars for some of its employees,
including some of the employees of its subcontractors.
Furthermore, on the day of the accident Ridgeway was riding in a
car arranged for by Ridgeway and driven by a Ridgeway employee.
The accident occurred while driving from the hotel (where Hagerty
and several other Ridgeway employee were staying) to the job
site. We agree with the district court that this evidence
supports the finding that transportation was furnished to Hagerty
as an incident of employment, and not as a gratuity.
The decision in Keith v. Gelco Corp., 705 So. 2d 244 (La.
Ct. App. 1997), is instructive. In Keith, the employee-
plaintiffs were returning from a work site in a vehicle owned by
their employer and driven by their supervisor. The court found
1985) (stating the exception as “when transportation is furnished
as an incident of employment, either through a vehicle, a
conveyance and driver, or payment of expenses” with no mention of
the necessity of wages paid for time spent traveling); see also
Hill, 635 So. 2d at 1169-70 (same); McBride, 583 So.2d at 1147
(same).
Hagerty asserts that because he was not paid for travel or
time spent traveling, the accident did not occur in the course
and scope of employment. Even if these facts are in dispute,
they are not material because they do not alter the outcome.
11
that those facts indicated that the accident, which occurred
during that drive home, was in the course and scope of their
employment, although it was uncertain if they were paid for the
time spent traveling. Id. at 248.
Although employees were not required to travel to and
from work and their homes in company vehicles, it is
clear from the affidavits and depositions submitted by
both sides that it was customary for the crew to ride
in the company vehicle with their operator/supervisor
to and from the work site. . . . [The employer’s]
custom of providing transportation is contrary to the
plaintiffs’ assertion that the ride which plaintiffs
accepted from [their supervisor] on the day of the
accident was gratuitous.
Id.
The distinguishing feature between those cases that find the
travel within the course and scope of employment and those that
find it a mere gratuity appears to be the regularity with which
the employer provided the transportation. See, e.g., Johnson,
768 So. 2d at 71-72; Lorraine, 729 So. 2d at 1161-63.
‘The fact that the employer occasionally provides
transportation to accommodate an employee is not enough
to bring the situation within the exception to the
general rule that trips to and from the place of work
are outside the course of employment. . . . In view of
the informal character of hiring agreements, the
undertaking to provide transportation must usually be
implied from the circumstances. For this reason, the
fact that there is a prevailing practice of carrying
employees back and forth is important, and the fact
that such trips have been made only infrequently or
irregularly has been regarded as an indication that the
arrangement is one of accommodation only.’
Hebert, 653 So. 2d at 844 (first alteration in original) (citing
MALONE AND JOHNSON, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, WORKER’S COMPENSATION
12
§ 170, at 392 (1994)). Ridgeway’s regular practice of arranging,
in advance, for the provision of vehicles for their employees and
subcontractors implies that the transportation is an incident of
employment and not, as Hagerty’s argues, a gratuity.
The cases cited by Hagerty, Hebert v. Jeffrey, 653 So. 2d
842 (La. Ct. App. 1995), and Hill v. West American Insurance Co.,
635 So. 2d 1165 (La. Ct. App. 1994), are distinguishable. In
Hebert, four employees, including a supervisor, “met at a
predetermined location, intending to follow each other to the
jobsite.” Id. at 844. The supervisor offered to drive and the
other employees accepted his offer. Id. The court found that
the accident on the way to the job site was not in the course and
scope of employment because it was an unplanned, gratuitous offer
by the supervisor. Id. at 845. In the normal course of work,
the employer required the employees to provide their own
transportation and did not furnish travel expenses or pay for
travel time. Id. at 844. “The incidental occasion on which
transportation was provided to [the employee] was insufficient to
place [him] in the course and scope of his employment at the time
of the accident.” Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
The transportation provided by the supervisor in Hebert was
unplanned and atypical. By contrast, the evidence shows that
Ridgeway regularly arranged for transportation to be provided to
its employees for use during the various events around the
country and that Ridgeway arranged for this transportation in
13
advance. See Johnson, 768 So. 2d at 71 (distinguishing Hebert on
the grounds that this employer had regularly provided
transportation or travel expenses and arranged for the
transportation in advance).
Hill is similarly distinguishable. In Hill, an employee
took the truck owned by the employer and drove from the job site
to a nearby market during her lunch break. See Hill, 635 So. 2d
at 1167. The employee was using the truck while on her lunch
break, having left the job site and taken the truck without
informing her supervisor. Id. at 1169. The court found the
accident that occurred during the drive was not within the scope
and course of her coworker’s employment because the use of the
vehicle to go to lunch was entirely personal and did not further
the employer’s business. Id. at 1170. Therefore, although it was
customary for employees to use the trucks for this purpose, the
court found that the company had provided the truck for this type
of personal use only a courtesy and not as an incident to
employment. By contrast, Ridgeway arranged for the vehicles
precisely to allow its employees to travel from the hotel, for
which it was paying, to the various job sites around the city.
Hagerty was not on a personal errand, but was in the vehicle for
the very reason for which the vehicle was provided.
14
We agree with the district court that the accident occurred
in the course and scope of Hagerty’s employment, and, therefore,
his exclusive remedy is in worker’s compensation.13
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
13
Ridgeway also argued that two other exceptions to the
general rule applied. As we find the evidence sufficient to
support the grant of summary judgment on their first theory, we
need not address the other exceptions.
15