Fennell v. TX Education Agency

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50374
Summary Calendar
PATRICIA L. FENNELL, also known as Patty L. Fennell;
RAMESES SCHOOL OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, as Represented by Patty
Fennell,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
THE TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, Mike Moses, Pat Pringle, Linda Mora,
Tom Canby, Jim Thompson, Nora Rainey, David Loeske, Rita Chase,
Delia Blanco, Michael Richmond, Linda Mora, Judge Joan Allen &
Mr. Brooks Flemister, all in their Official Capacities; THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE BOARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-99-CV-1044-FB
--------------------
August 22, 2001
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Patricia L. Fennell (“Fennell”) and the Rameses School of San
Antonio, Texas (“Rameses”) appeal from the dismissal of their
action against the Texas Education Association (“TEA”), the Texas
Infrastructure Board (“TIF Board”), and twelve state officials
sued, with one exception, in both their official and individual
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-50374
-2-
capacities. The action sought compensatory damages, punitive
damages, the restoration of a $40,000 grant, and the permanent
continuation of Rameses as a state charter school.
The district court dismissed all claims against the TEA and
the TIF Board for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. “In the absence of
consent, a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or
departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 100 (1984). This bar to federal jurisdiction “applies
regardless of the relief sought.” Id. Appellants’ reliance on
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), is
misplaced. Monell concerned suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a
municipality, and in no way suggests that state agencies are
subject to suit in federal court.
The district court likewise dismissed all claims against the
state officers sued in their official capacities for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Suits against state officers in their
official capacities seeking the payment of moneys from the state
treasury for alleged compensatory damages, monetary damages, and
payments in the nature of equitable restitution are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Clay v. Texas Women’s Univ., 728 F.2d 714,
715 (5th Cir. 1984). The Eleventh Amendment “may not be evaded by
suing state employees in their official capacity since such an
indirect pleading device remains in essence a claim upon the state
treasury.” Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1990).
Likewise, although a federal court may award prospective injunctive
No. 00-50374
-3-
relief based on a violation of federal law, see Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974), federal courts are forbidden “from
exercising remedial authority in any form if the award of such
relief against a nonconsenting state is based on a state law
claim.” Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1252 (5th Cir. 1987).
The district court also ruled that plaintiffs’ claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the state officers in their
individual capacities were barred by qualified immunity. In
qualified immunity cases, plaintiffs are held to a heightened
pleading requirement which demands “allegations of fact focusing
specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the
plaintiffs' injury.” Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
1999). Suits against governmental actors in their individual
capacities “must be pleaded with factual detail and particularity,
not mere conclusionary allegations.” Anderson v. Pasadena Indep.
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations and
citations omitted). Fennell and Rameses offer only conclusory
allegations and fail to show why the state officials are not
entitled to qualified immunity; accordingly, their claims under §§
1981 and 1983 were properly dismissed. See id.
Finally, the district court ruled that the complaint failed to
state a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(15). Fennell does not brief the issue of the
Title VII claim’s dismissal, and has thereby abandoned any
arguments she might conceivably assert. Even pro se litigants must
brief arguments in order to preserve them. See Yohey v. Collins,
985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Arguments not adequately argued
No. 00-50374
-4-
in the body of the brief are deemed abandoned on appeal. See id.
at 224-25.
The judgment of the district court is in all respects
AFFIRMED.