United States v. Lee

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 01-30876
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
WARREN LEE, JR.
Defendant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CR-146
_________________________________________________________________
December 4, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Warren Lee, Jr. appeals the district
court’s affirmance of the magistrate judge’s pretrial detention
order. Lee contends that there was insufficient evidence to
detain him under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141
et seq. (2000). This interlocutory appeal is now before us for
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
the second time. Previously, we remanded the case to the
district court for the limited purpose of clarifying its reasons
for affirming the magistrate judge’s pretrial detention order.
The district court submitted a written response to our remand
order, and on November 19, 2001, we scheduled the case for a
panel hearing. However, on the same day that we scheduled the
case for a panel hearing, Lee was rearraigned, and he pleaded
guilty to the charge in the indictment. The district court
accepted Lee’s plea and scheduled his sentencing. Lee’s
conviction has rendered this appeal of the pretrial detention
order moot.
We have held that challenges to pretrial detention orders
are rendered moot by a defendant’s conviction (or conviction and
sentence). United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 356 (5th Cir.
1998); United States v. O’Shaughnessy, 772 F.2d 112, 113 (5th
Cir. 1985). Lee argues that we should nevertheless consider his
appeal of the district court’s pretrial detention order because
he raises an issue that he claims will also be relevant to the
district court’s determination whether he is entitled to release
pending sentencing (or appeal). However, whether a defendant
should be released pending trial and whether a defendant should
be released pending sentencing or appeal are distinct inquiries
governed by different provisions of the Bail Reform Act. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3142 (“Release or detention of defendant pending
trial”), 3143 (“Release or detention of defendant pending
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sentence or appeal”); see also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481
n.5 (1982) (noting that a claim for bail pending appeal is “quite
distinct [from a] claim for bail by a presumptively innocent
person awaiting trial”). Thus, even assuming that Lee is correct
in his assertion that the issue he presents in the instant case
will bear on the district court’s determination whether he should
be released or detained pending sentencing (or appeal), we do not
have such a determination by the district court before us.
Lee appeals only the district court’s determination that the
magistrate judge properly ordered his pretrial detention. As we
have noted, once a defendant is convicted (or convicted and
sentenced), “the issues [of pretrial detention and release] are
no longer ‘live,’ and the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome,” because “[n]either pretrial detention
nor release on pretrial bail may . . . be ordered.”
O’Shaughnessy, 772 F.2d at 113; see also Murphy, 455 U.S. at 481-
82 (holding that “[the defendant’s] claim to pretrial bail was
moot once he was convicted,” reasoning that “[t]he question was
no longer live because even a favorable decision on it would not
have entitled [the defendant] to bail”). Thus, we DISMISS Lee’s
appeal of the pretrial detention order as moot.
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