DocketNumber: 03-41497
Judges: Smith, Demoss, Stewart
Filed Date: 7/13/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D July 13, 2004 In the Charles R. Fulbruge III United States Court of Appeals Clerk for the Fifth Circuit ___________________ m 03-41497 Summary Calendar ___________________ LISA R. REZNICK, DOCTOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS ASSOCIATED ORTHOPEDICS & SPORTS MEDICINE, P.A., Defendant-Appellee. ___________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Nº 4:01-CV-92 ___________________ Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Lisa Reznick sued her former employer, Circuit Judges. Associated Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, P.A. (“AOSM”), alleging violation of the JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* Equal Pay Act and sex discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. AOSM filed a motion for summary judgment, * which the district court granted, and this ap- Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de- peal followed. Agreeing with the district court termined that this opinion should not be published that Reznick fails to establish a prima facie and is not precedent except under the limited cir- case for either claim, we affirm. cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Reznick asserts that only a few short I. months after she began her employment, Glo- In early 1997, Reznick, an orthopedic sur- gau made a crude, sexist comment to her in geon specializing in hand, wrist, and elbow the presence of two pharmaceutical salesmen care, contacted AOSM about possible employ- during lunch.2 Afterwards, Reznick confront- ment. AOSM is a medical practice group spe- ed Glogau about the statement. Although he cializing in orthopedic care and was founded brushed her off, telling her she was being too by partners and sports medicine specialists, sensitive, he did regret “if he might have of- Drs. Neal Small and Alex Glogau. Interested fended her.” Also that fall, Glogau allegedly in adding a hand specialist to their practice asked other employees whether they believed group, AOSM accepted Reznick’s resume and that Reznick is a lesbian. After hearing this in- set up an interview. Although receiving sever- formation second-hand, Reznick talked to al negative recommendations from previous Glogau and assured him she was heterosexual. employers regarding Reznick’s productivity During this period, Glogau allegedly made and ability to get along with other personnel, several comments to Reznick regarding her of- AOSM offered her the position of associate fice attire, noting that he wished she wore physician, and negotiations began between skirts more often. AOSM and Reznick, who had the assistance of counsel. In the spring of 1998, Kwong resigned from AOSM because, according to Reznick, AOSM initially offered Reznick nearly the he was informed that he would not make part- same three year employment contract that it ner. During that time, AOSM entered into in- had made in June 1996 with Dr. Peter Kwong, tense negotiations with Dr. Michael Schwartz an associate doctor and sports medicine spe- to join AOSM as an associate doctor. At the cialist whose three-year employment agree- time, Schwartz had just completed a one-year ment provided for a base pay in year one of fellowship in sports medicine with AOSM, and $125,000, in year two of $135,000, and in year Glogau and Small regarded him as an excellent three of $145,000. The agreement also includ- doctor. AOSM initially offered Schwartz an ed a provision for potential bonus compensa- employment agreement substantially similar to tion based on Kwong’s yearly collections. Reznick’s, both having the same initial base AOSM’s first offer to Reznick included identi- salary of $125,000. cal base pay and slightly more favorable bonus compensation. Schwartz, however, rejected this initial of- fer, maintaining that he had other offers with Reznick rejected this first offer and made a salaries in excess of $200,000. Faced with a counteroffer that included several new eco- partner (Small) who wanted to phase out his nomic terms and a maternity leave clause. The sports medicine practice, and desirous of counteroffer proposed a base pay of $125,000 for the first year, $140,000 in the second, and $160,000 in year three. This counteroffer was 2 During the course of the meal, one of the accepted, and the parties entered into an salesmen asked Glogau when the practice would agreement in July 1997. begin advertising for Reznick. Glogau replied that Reznick would receive advertising “when she gets laid.” 2 Schwartz’s already proven abilities, AOSM ac- her on the invitation to Schwartz’s are the quiesced and reached an agreement with result of her sex. Schwartz for $175,000 in year one, $185,000 in year two, and $195,000 in year three. The During 1998, Reznick was assigned Karen bar required for Schwartz to be eligible for Botte, a medical assistant/x-ray technician, to bonuses, however, was set substantially higher assist her during the two and one-half days she than that set for Reznick.3 spent at the clinic. After Schwartz started as an associate doctor in September, he was as- In May 1998, Reznick overheard a tele- signed to Marilee Harden, a nurse whom he phone conversation among Schwartz, Small, shared with Small. and AOSM’s attorney, with Glogau on a speaker phone. According to Reznick, she Later that year, Reznick began to complain heard Glogau discussing that she would not be about Botte’s competence, so AOSM offered made a partner. Reznick believes her failure to to switch plaintiff to Harden and allow her to make partner was based on her sex, not job share Harden with Small, who worked in the performance. clinic only on Wednesday mornings. Reznick maintains that AOSM’s request that she share After Schwartz formally joined the practice an assistant while Schwartz had his own is fur- in September 1998, Kathy Starnes, AOSM’s ther evidence of AOSM’s discriminatory administrator since September 1997, suggest- behavior. In January 2000, however, AOSM ed that AOSM hold an open house to advertise hired Bobbie Caldwell in response to Rez- Schwartz’s association with the group. Ini- nick’s complaints, and Caldwell worked for tially skeptical of the suggestion, Glogau only Reznick exclusively until Reznick’s resigna- reluctantly agreed to host the party when tion. Starnes was able to assure him that the phar- maceutical groups would foot most of the bill. In March 2000, Reznick submitted her res- ignation letter, providing ninety days’ notice. Despite the sending of over four hundred Reznick proceeded to fulfill her obligation and invitations, the open house was very poorly at- worked the ninety days despite AOSM’s offer tended, and AOSM again returned to its policy to pay her for the entire period if she wished to of not hosting such events. When Dr. Greg leave earlier. Reznick alleges that her resig- Powell joined the practice in January 2000, nation was triggered by Glogau’s last-minute AOSM did not host an open house. Reznick request that she see one of his patients because alleges, however, that AOSM’s failure to host he was unavailable. Unable to help the patient an open house for her and its refusal to include and frustrated by Glogau’s absence, Reznick determined that she could no longer remain with AOSM. 3 During her first year alone, Reznick became eligible for a bonus equal to 10% of her collections II. in excess of $276,000, 12.5% in excess of Summary judgment is appropriate only $400,000, and 15% in excess of $500,000. where there are no genuine issues of material Schwartz, on the other hand, was only eligible for fact and the moving party is entitled to judg- a bonus equal to 20% of his collections in excess of ment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. $450,000. 3 56(c). In determining whether there is a gen- where the jobs performed require equal skill, uine issue of material fact, evidence and infer- effort, and responsibility and are performed ences must be drawn in the light most favor- under similar conditions.29 U.S.C. § 206
- able to the non-moving party. Daniels v. City (d)(1). To establish a prima facie case, Rez- of Arlington, Tex.,246 F.3d 502
(5th Cir. nick must offer proof (1) that AOSM is subject 2001). The party seeking summary judgment to the Equal Pay Act; (2) that she performed carries the burden of demonstrating that there work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, are no actual disputes as to any material fact. and responsibility under similar working condi- tions; and (3) that she was paid less than a If the nonmovant then fails to set forth spe- male employee in that position. Peters v. City cific facts to support its allegations, summary of Shreveport,818 F.2d 1148
, 1153 (1987). If judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Reznick makes a prima facie case, AOSM Catrett,477 U.S. 317
, 325 (1986). The non- may still prevail provided it can demonstrate movant must “go beyond the pleadings . . . and one of the four affirmative defenses specified designate specific facts showing that there is a under the Act.4 genuine issue for trial.”Id. at 324
. Summary judgment is proper even if the nonmovant AOSM contends that Reznick fails to es- brings forth evidence in support of his allega- tablish element two in her claim. To prove tions, so long as the evidence is insufficient for that her position is “substantially equal” to a reasonable jury to find for that party as Schwartz’s, Reznick must show that her job “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence requirements and performance were substan- in support of plaintiff’s position” is insuffi- tially equal, though not necessarily identical, to cient. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 those of a male employee.29 C.F.R. § 1620
.- U.S. 242, 252 (1986). We review a summary 13(e). Reznick argues that this issue is a judgment de novo. Meditrust Fin. Serv. Corp. question of fact for the jury and that because v. Sterling Chem., Inc.,168 F.3d 211
, 213 she and Schwartz were trained orthopedic sur- (5th Cir. 1999). geons, and were required to perform surgery and work in the clinic, Schwartz’s job is sub- III. stantially similar to hers. Reznick makes two independent accusa- tions against her former employer. She main- Schwartz, however, was trained in the sub- tains that AOSM violated the Equal Pay Act speciality of sports medicine, while Reznick by paying Schwartz a substantially higher sal- was trained as a hand surgeon. AOSM main- ary, despite the fact that he held an identical tains that sports medicine specialists generate position and performed similar duties. Addi- more revenue than do hand surgeons and that tionally, she argues that AOSM’s, and specifi- cally Glogau’s, sexist behavior and sex-based discrimination resulted in her constructive dis- 4 Disparities in salary are allowed where pay- charge, thereby violating title VII. ment is made pursuant to “(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures A. earnings by quantity or quality of production; or Under the Equal Pay Act, an employer is (4) a differential based on any other factor other prohibited from sex-based discrimination than sex.” Plemer v. Parsons-Bilbane,713 F.2d 1127
, 1136 (5th Cir. 1983). 4 Schwartz’s higher pay was a reflection of his salary disparit y between Reznick and greater economic value. Evidence provided by Schwartz. AOSM’s office manager confirms this. Reznick and Schwartz negotiated indepen- In 1999, during Schwartz’s first full year as dent contracts. In this arms’ length transac- an associate, he generated nearly twice the tion, Reznick was assisted by counsel and suc- amount of revenue as did Reznick, who does cessfully negotiated her own terms, which put not dispute this fact. Because Reznick and her in a better financial position than that of Schwartz specialized in different areas of or- the male associate currently working at thopedic medicine, and Schwartz generated far AOSM. When AOSM accepted her counter- more revenue for AOSM than did Reznick, the offer, Reznick got exactly what she asked for. two cannot be said to have held “substantially Although she maintains that she was expected equal” positions, so element two of Reznick’s to stay in line with Kwong’s salary, but claim fails as a matter of law. Schwartz was not bound by hers, her willing- ness to accept this indicates only the success of Let us assume, arguendo, that Reznick and AOSM’s bargaining power. After all, Reznick Schwartz performed substantially similar jobs, could have held out for more, hoping AOSM’s and Reznick can make a prima facie case. desire for a hand surgeon would force it to The disparity between Reznick’s and offer better terms, but instead she was satisfied Schwartz’s salaries is primarily a result of enough with her counteroffer to accept em- Schwartz’s higher production, and this reason ployment. falls under exception three of the Equal Pay Act.5 The remainder of the differential can be Negotiating his own contract a year later, explained by separate and distinct circumstanc- Schwartz was more successful than was Rez- es that led to differences in their employment nick in negotiating favorable terms for a varie- contracts (which may be said to fall under the ty of reasons that have nothing to do with his “catch all” exception four). Thus, AOSM can sex. Firstly, as discussed above, Schwartz, a make out valid affirmative defenses to the sports medicine physician, could be expected to generate higher revenue. Secondly, he had spent his internship with AOSM, which thus 5 Let us compare Schwartz’s salary with Rez- already knew him and was familiar with his nick’s from approximately September 1998 to work. Reznick, on the other hand, had never September 1999 (roughly Schwartz’s first year as worked for AOSM and came with some nega- an associate and Reznick’s second). Based on the tive recommendations from her previous em- data provided by AOSM, Schwartz’s salary would ployer. Schwartz’s potential value to AOSM have been roughly $265,000, of which nearly was therefore less of an unknown variable than $90,000 would have come from bonuses alone. was Reznick’s. Reznick, comparatively, made approximately $160,000 that year, only $19,000 or so coming from bonuses. T hus, the disparity of over Thirdly, Schwartz was in greater demand $100,000 in gross yearly income comes almost and was able to use outside offers with higher wholly from a bonus structure that rewards pro- base salaries as leverage against AOSM. Rez- ductivity. Had Reznick equaled her associate in nick had no other offers to press for higher pay collections, her salary would have been approxi- and was not employed at the time. Reznick mately $253,000 in year two of her contract. 5 argues that these reasons were not the true adverse employment action, and the district motivating factors behind AOSM’s decision to court found for AOSM and granted summary make Schwartz’s pay substantially higher than judgment accordingly. This court does not hers; Reznick, however, offers no evidence to recognize interim measures to be adverse em- raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the ployment actions; rather, we look to ultimate legitimacy of these defenses, all of which are employment decisions such as termination. valid exceptions under the Act; therefore, even Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,104 F.3d 702
, if she were able to make out a prima facie 708 (5th Cir. 1997). To qualify as an adverse case, she could not prevail. employment action, the decision must effect a material change in the terms or conditions of B. the employment. Eugene v. Rumsfeld, 168 A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination under F. Supp. 2d 655, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2001). title VII in the absence of direct evidence must make out a prima facie case for discrimina- In light of these considerations, Rez- tion. Molnar v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., nickSSbecause she was not firedSSmust show986 F.2d 115
, 118 (5th Cir. 1993). Reznick that she was constructively discharged. To can establish a prima facie case if she shows prove her claim, she must demonstrate that that she (1) was a member of a protected class; working conditions were “so intolerable that a (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered reasonable person would feel compelled to adverse employment action; and (4) was re- resign.” Faruki v. Parson S.I.P., Inc., 123 placed by someone outside the protected class F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997). The following or that similarly situated individuals outside the factors must be considered: (1) demotion; protected class were treated more favorably. (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,138 F.3d 204
, responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or 206 (5th Cir. 1998). degrading work; (5) reassignment to work un- der a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, har- Under the framework of McDonnell Doug- assment, or humiliation by the employer cal- las Corp. v. Green,411 U.S. 792
, 802 (1973), culated to encourage the employee’s resigna- once Reznick has established a prima facie tion; and (7) offers of early retirement on case, the burden of production is on AOSM to terms that would make the employee worse “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory off. Barrow v. New Orleans SS. Ass’n, 10 reason” explaining its conduct. If AOSM is F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). able to articulate such a reason, Reznick must make a showing sufficient for a jury to find Reznick offers the following nineteen facts that the reason was mere pretext and discrimi- to support her claim of constructive discharge: nation was the true motivation. Bodenheimer v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc.,5 F.3d 955
, 957 (5th (1) Glogau’s humiliating public statement Cir. 1994). If Reznick fails to satisfy her bur- conditioning advertising for Reznick upon her den of proof in the first or third step, her claim “getting laid.” fails as a matter of law. (2) Glogau’s questioning Reznick’s sexual The parties dispute only Reznick’s ability to orientation. prove element three, that she suffered an (3) Glogau’s statements questioning Rez- 6 nick’s selection of apparel; (16) Glogau’s significant social interaction with Schwartz as compared to Reznick; (4) AOSM’s unwillingness to advertise for Reznick; (17) Glogau’s refusal to meet with Reznick unless someone else was present; (5) AOSM’s hosting an open house for Schwartz when it did not host one for Rez- (18) Glogau’s inclusion of Schwartz as an nick; associate in business decisions; and (6) Glogau’s refusal to include Reznick on (19) Glogau’s sharing of professional op- Schwartz’s open house invitation; portunities with Schwartz but not with Rez- nick. (7) AOSM’s failure to provide Reznick with a solely assigned assistant; Reznick did not experience a demotion6 or reduction in salary or job responsibilities. Fur- (8) AOSM’s hiring a PA for Schwartz six thermore, she was not assigned to either de- months into his position; grading work or a younger supervisor, and early retirement was not an issue. Therefore, (9) AOSM’s citing Kwong’s contract as a the only factor relevant to Reznick’s claim of reason for its inability to offer more compensa- constructive discharge is (6), “badgering, har- tion to Reznick, but not telling Schwartz that assment or humiliation by the employer calcu- his salary must take Reznick’s compensation lated to encourage the employee’s resigna- into consideration; tion.” Barrow, 10 F.3d at 297. (10) AOSM’s decision to pay Schwartz sig- The nineteen facts offered by Reznick, even nificantly more than it paid Reznick; when construed in a light most favorable to her, do not support the finding that she was (11) Starnes’s inactions as AOSM’s Equal Pay Act compliance officer; 6 Reznick argues that failure to be made partner (12) AOSM’s decision that Reznick would constituted a de facto demotion. Firstly, by de- not be considered for partner; finition a demotion cannot be considered a failure to be promoted. Reznick remained in the same (13) AOSM’s financial arrangement where- position to which she was hired for her entire by Small referred patients to Schwartz and not tenure at AOSM. Additionally, Reznick was never to Reznick; promised that making partner was a guarantee should she become an associate. (14) Small’s and Glogau’s refusal to refer Furthermore, Kwong, a male physician, was al- hand cases to Reznick; so not selected to become a partner, indicating that Reznick was not excluded from the partnership (15) Small’s weekly physician basketball based on sex alone. A reading of the employment games to which Reznick was not invited; contract suggests that joining the partnership was left wholly up to the discretion of the existing part- ners and was in no way automatic. 7 badgered, harassed, or humiliated into quitting. Above all, she is unable to establish a causative link between AOSM’s allegedly discriminatory actions and her resignation. Facts one through thirteen all occurred two to three years before Reznick’s resignation, and constructive dis- charge cannot be based on facts that are re- mote in time. See Hill v. K-Mart Corp.,699 F.2d 776
, 779 (5th Cir. 1983). Events that occurred several years before resignation cannot be said to have been “so intolerable” as to force a reasonable person to leave. See Faruki at 319. The rest of Reznick’s allegations deal more with favorable treatment of Schwartz than with treatment of her, and this disparate treat- ment alone cannot constitute constructive dis- charge. See Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,237 F.3d 556
, 566 (5th Cir 2001). Preferential treatment of Schwartz alone, without other events occurring during the period leading up to Reznick’s resignation, do not create a fact issue that she was subjected to an intolerable work environment that compelled her to re- sign. Because she is unable to establish a pri- ma facie case, and thereby satisfy her initial burden of production under McDonnell Doug- las, we need not explore the question whether AOSM has an adequate defense to Reznick’s allegations, nor the question whether she can demonstrate that AOSM’s reasons are mere pretext. AFFIRMED. 8
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