Anderson v. City of Dallas Texas

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
H IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 28, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-11229
LORETTA ANDERSON
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
CITY OF DALLAS, doing business as Communication and
Information Services Department; MARY K SUHM, Individually;
CHARLES W DANIELS, Individually; RYAN S EVANS, Individually;
BRUCE MEEKS, Individually; MICHAEL PUENTE, Individually; JASON
MCCLAIN, Individually; MELVYN BERKE, Officially and Individually;
MADOKA ARMSTRONG, Officially and Individually
Defendants - Appellees
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Loretta Anderson, acting pro se, filed suit against the City
of Dallas and eight individual defendants after the City of
Dallas terminated her employment in June 2000. In her lawsuit,
Anderson alleged numerous federal and state law claims, including
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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racial discrimination, sex discrimination, age discrimination,
disability discrimination, retaliation, defamation, invasion of
privacy, violations of her equal protection and due process
rights, and conspiracy. The district court subsequently granted
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and entered final judgment. Anderson now alleges that
the district court erred when it granted these motions. For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of events leading up to and
including the termination of Loretta Anderson’s employment with
the City of Dallas (the “City”) on June 27, 2000. Prior to her
termination, Anderson, an African-American female, worked as a
shift supervisor in the City’s Communication and Information
Services (“CIS”) department. At the time of her termination, she
had worked in the CIS department for sixteen of her twenty-nine
years with the City.
On March 17, 2000, Bruce Meeks, the Assistant Director of
CIS-Information Services for the City, placed Anderson on
administrative leave because of concerns about her fitness for
duty. On March 21, 2000, Michael Puente, Anderson’s direct
supervisor, instructed her to report to Dr. Melvin Berke, a
psychologist working with the Holiner Psychiatric Group, for a
fitness for duty exam. Anderson reported to Dr. Berke on March
23, 2000 and completed an MMPI evaluation. However, she refused
2
to sign a “clean” medical release form, instead writing on the
release form that she had been ordered by her employer to undergo
the examination and to permit the release of her records. As a
result, Dr. Berke would not release information about her exam to
the City. This refusal by Anderson to sign a clean medical
release form began a lengthy chain of events involving her
refusal to sign other clean release forms--a chain of events that
ultimately lead to her discharge.
On May 1, 2000, approximately one month after Anderson first
refused to sign a clean medical release form, Bruce Meeks issued
a Direct Order to her instructing her to report for a fitness for
duty evaluation and to sign, without alteration, any necessary
medical release forms. Four days later, on May 5, 2000, Meeks
sent Anderson a letter explaining why she was referred for a
fitness for duty evaluation. He also issued that same day
another Direct Order instructing her to report for a fitness for
duty examination and to sign, without alteration, any necessary
medical release forms.
On May 8, 2000, Anderson signed a form releasing
confidential information from the Holiner Psychiatric Group.
However, she wrote on the authorization form, “Order from my Dept
ECI (Meeks).” That same day, she signed another version of this
same form (releasing information from the Holiner Psychiatric
Group), but wrote “2 attach” next to her signature and attached
to it the May 5, 2000 letter and memorandum from the City to her.
3
Similarly, on May 15, 2000, she reported for another appointment
with a physician as part of her fitness for duty exam. At this
appointment, she wrote “order attached” to the right of her
signature on her insurance consent form. Additionally, she
signed a medical release authorization form, but crossed out the
word “patient,” failed to fill it out completely, and wrote
“order attached” to the right of her signature. As a result, the
physician conducting the examination would not release Anderson’s
records to the City or to the psychologist who was evaluating
her.
On June 12, 2000, the City sent Anderson a pre-termination
letter stating that, as a result of her refusal to sign clean
consent forms, disciplinary action, up to and possibly including
termination, was possible. On June 27, 2000, the City held a
pre-termination hearing. Defendants Suhm, Daniels, Evans, and
McClain constituted the hearing panel. Following the hearing,
Bruce Meeks sent Anderson a termination letter stating that she
was being terminated for violating personnel rules.
Subsequently, Anderson filed a grievance challenging her
termination, and she was granted a grievance hearing. Dr. Berke,
among others, testified at this hearing. The hearing did not,
however, lead to Anderson’s reinstatement.
On January 28, 2000, before being terminated, Anderson filed
a charge of discrimination against the City with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in which she alleged
4
retaliation and racial discrimination. On February 3, 2000,
Anderson received a right to sue notice on this charge of
discrimination. On February 1, 2001, Anderson filed another
charge of discrimination against the City, in which she alleged
retaliation and disability discrimination. Anderson received a
right to sue letter on this charge on February 7, 2001.
On May 7, 2001, Anderson, acting pro se, filed the present
lawsuit, alleging that she was retaliated against and that the
defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race,
sex, age, and disability. She also claimed that the defendants
violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), and her due process
rights by ordering her to sign medical releases and by
disciplining her. Finally, she asserted libel, slander, and
invasion of privacy claims under Texas law.
On September 18, 2001, the district court granted a motion
to dismiss filed by Dr. Berke, thereby dismissing all claims
against him. The district court simultaneously dismissed all of
Anderson’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Madoka
Armstrong, a nurse practitioner with the Holiner Psychiatric
Group. Subsequently, on July 17, 2003, the district court
granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the City, Suhm,
Daniels, Evans, Meeks, Puente, and McClain. The district court
then dismissed without prejudice Anderson’s remaining state-law
claims and entered final judgment.
On November 12, 2003, Anderson filed a Notice of Appeal. On
5
appeal, Anderson challenges the district court’s decision to
dismiss her claims against Dr. Berke. She also appeals most,
though not all, aspects of the district court’s decision granting
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district
court. See Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 190
(5th Cir. 2001). According to the Supreme Court, “summary
judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C)). The party moving for
summary judgment “must merely demonstrate an absence of
evidentiary support in the record for the non-movant’s case.”
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir.
2000). Conversely, the nonmoving party must come forward with
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248-49 (1986) (holding that no issue for trial exists unless
there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party). When a district court reviews the support
for a nonmovant’s case, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be
6
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its]
favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Similarly, this court reviews de novo a district court’s
dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Walker v. South
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 276 (5th Cir. 1990). In so
doing, this court considers all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Id. A dismissal was proper if the
plaintiff’s allegations were merely conclusory or if “the
complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element
necessary to obtain relief.” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42
F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court holds her
pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Likewise, this court considers pro se complaints
liberally, taking all well-pleaded facts as true. Brinkmann v.
Johnston, 793 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Anderson argues that the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment regarding her: (1) Title VII claims (sex
discrimination, age discrimination, race discrimination, and
retaliation); (2) ADA claims; (3) defamation and invasion of
privacy claims; (4) equal protection claims; (5) due process
claims; and (6) § 1985(3) claims. She also argues that the
district court improperly dismissed her claims against Dr. Berke.
7
We examine each of these claims in turn.
A. Title VII Claims
1. Sex and Age Discrimination
Anderson begins by arguing that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
her sex and age discrimination claims brought under Title VII.
According to Anderson, the district court erred when it found
that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies with
respect to these claims. Anderson contends that she discussed
sex and age discrimination with the EEOC in connection with her
January 28, 2000 charge of discrimination but that EEOC
representatives chose not to mark the boxes for sex and age
discrimination on her charge. She also claims that this charge
of discrimination referenced other charges previously filed by
her--charges that explicitly raised sex and age discrimination
claims. Anderson’s sex and age discrimination claims fail
because she did not exhaust her administrative remedies with
respect to them. In this circuit, a plaintiff must exhaust her
administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC prior to seeking judicial relief. Dollis v. Rubin, 77
F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1995). Anderson, however, provided the
district court with no evidence that she filed a sex or age
discrimination complaint with the EEOC before filing suit. The
January 28, 2000 charge of discrimination upon which she relies
does not mention these types of discrimination--instead, it
8
alleges racial discrimination and retaliation. While it does
mention that Anderson previously filed other charges of
discrimination, the January 28, 2000 charge does not state what
these prior charges were about; it only references them as
possible evidence of retaliation. Moreover, while Anderson
implies that the EEOC did not include all of her complaints in
the January 28, 2000 charge, Anderson herself signed the charge
and did not file another charge alleging age or sex
discrimination, as she could have done. Accordingly, because
Anderson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with
respect to her sex and age discrimination claims, the district
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on them.
2. Retaliation
Anderson next argues that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her
various retaliation claims. In her amended complaint, she
alleged thirteen different retaliatory acts against her. First,
she claimed that she was retaliated against on April 19, 1999 and
May 18, 1999 when she was reprimanded and suspended. She
included these claims, along with a claim of racial
discrimination claims, in her January 28, 2000 charge of
discrimination. In her appeal, Anderson admits that on February
3, 2000, she received a right to sue letter pertaining to this
charge of discrimination. She claims that she did not file suit
9
on this charge of discrimination until March 7, 2001 because she
was confined to her residence from March 18, 2000 until June 27,
2000 and because she was ordered not to enter City property while
on administrative leave. Additionally, she cites Waltman v.
International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1989), and
Glass v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1561 (5th Cir.
1985), for the proposition that an equitable exception to the
limitations period exists when an unlawful employment practice
manifests itself over time. She claims that even if certain of
her retaliation claims are time-barred, the district court still
should have allowed her to proceed under this equitable
exception.
Anderson next claims that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment against her with respect to two of her
other retaliation claims--claims pertaining to suspensions by the
City on February 20, 2000 and March 17, 2000. In support of this
claim, she states that the district court erred when it found
that she had not filed a timely charge of discrimination with the
EEOC regarding these suspensions. According to Anderson, she
filed a charge of discrimination on February 1, 2001, which
pertained to her termination on June 27, 2000. She appears to
imply that since the February 20, 2000 and March 17, 2000
suspensions were related to her termination, and since the charge
of discrimination regarding her termination was timely, her
claims regarding these suspensions were also timely.
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Anderson further contends that the district court
incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
on her remaining retaliation claims on the basis that she did not
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. According to
Anderson, she established her prima facie case. In support of
this claim, she states that the City had no lawful reason for
ordering her to undergo a fitness for duty exam, could not show
that she committed any rules violations justifying her placement
on administrative leave, and could not prove that she presented a
threat or was violent. She also contends that she went to all of
her medical appointments, signed all forms she was ordered to
sign, and never improperly modified or altered medical release
forms in violation of the May 5, 2000 Direct Order. Thus, she
concludes that the City acted maliciously and in bad faith when
it took action against her.
Finally, Anderson contends that, contrary to the district
court’s findings, the City’s allegedly legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her (i.e., that she
repeatedly refused to obey her superiors’ orders) was pretextual.
According to Anderson, she completed the fitness for duty exam
and signed all medical release forms that she was asked to sign.
Furthermore, she argues that the district court was incorrect
when it found that Bruce Meeks, the individual who terminated
her, did not know about her protected activities when he
terminated her. In support of this claim, she states that on
11
February 25, 2000, she sent a letter to Meeks, in which she
complained about unfavorable employment actions taken against
her. Additionally, she notes that Meeks was the supervisor of
Michael Puente--the individual who initially decided to have her
take a fitness for duty exam--and therefore must have known about
grievances she had previously filed. Thus, she concludes that
the district court erred when it found that the City had a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.
The court begins with Anderson’s argument about the
timeliness of the claims raised in her January 28, 2000 charge of
discrimination. On February 3, 2000, the EEOC provided Anderson
with a right to sue letter pertaining to this charge. A
plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII must file a
lawsuit within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000); Ringgold v. Nat. Maint. Corp.,
796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986); Butler v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 2001 WL 1135616 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2001) (dismissing a
Title VII claim where a pro se Appellant filed her complaint one
day beyond the ninety-day period because of family illnesses).
Anderson, however, did not file suit on the claims contained in
her January 28, 2000 charge of discrimination until March 7,
2001, well after the ninety-day period had expired. While
Anderson suggests that she could not file suit during this period
because she was confined to her residence between March 7, 2000
and June 27, 2000, she does not explain this claim or offer any
12
evidence in support of it. Similarly, she does not explain how
being barred from city property while on administrative leave
prevented her from filing suit in federal court. As for
Anderson’s invocation of Waltman and Glass to save her otherwise
time-barred claims, these cases provide for an equitable
exception to the limitations period when a plaintiff was unaware
of discriminatory conduct that was part of a pattern of
discrimination. See Glass, 757 F.2d at 1560-61 (holding that
“[e]quitable considerations may very well require that the filing
periods not begin to run until facts supportive of a Title VII
charge or civil rights action are or should be apparent to a
reasonably prudent person similarly situated” and that “[t]he
focus is on what event, in fairness and logic, should have
alerted the average lay person to act to protect his rights.”
(internal quotations marks omitted)). Anderson has put forward
no evidence of any alleged discriminatory conduct of which she
was unaware. Accordingly, the equitable principles of Waltman
and Glass do not save her otherwise time-barred claims based on
the January 28, 2000 charge of discrimination, and the district
court properly granted summary judgment on them.
The court next turns to Anderson’s claim that the district
court improperly granted summary judgment on her retaliation
claims pertaining to her February 20, 2000 and March 17, 2000
suspensions. An individual alleging discrimination under Title
VII must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300
13
days of learning of the allegedly adverse employment action.
Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1989).
However, as the district court correctly noted, Anderson did not
file a charge with the EEOC regarding these suspensions until
February 1, 2001, more than 300 days after she received notice of
them. Anderson does not dispute this fact, nor does she discuss
the 300-day limitations period in her appellate brief. Instead,
she says that these suspensions were related to her termination,
and she implies that her claims regarding them are timely since
she filed a charge of discrimination within 300 days of being
terminated. She does not, however, provide any case law
supporting this claim, and none exists. Regardless of whether
Anderson filed a timely charge of discrimination regarding her
termination, she clearly did not file a timely charge regarding
the February 20, 2000 and March 17, 2000 suspensions.
Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims.
Finally, Anderson’s remaining retaliation claims fail
because she has not established a prima facie case regarding
them. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a
causal connection existed between the adverse action and the
protected activity. Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 724-
25 (5th Cir. 1986). In this circuit, an adverse employment
14
action is an “ultimate employment decision,” such as being fired,
hired, discharged, promoted, compensated, or granted leave.
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997). Anderson alleges that she was
retaliated against by being terminated, forced to undergo a
fitness for duty evaluation, forced to sign a medical release
form, classified as a danger, and classified as a “no rehire”
with a poor performance rating. With the exception of being
terminated, none of these activities constitutes an ultimate
employment action and, accordingly, these claims fail. With
respect to Anderson’s termination, she did not argue below that
Bruce Meeks, the individual who decided to terminate her, knew
that she had engaged in any protected activities when he
terminated her. Accordingly, the district court properly granted
summary judgment on this basis. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health
Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, even
if Anderson had established a prima facie case of retaliation--
something she did not do--her retaliation claims pertaining to
her termination still fail because, as the district court
correctly found, she never rebutted the City’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). According to
the City, Anderson repeatedly disobeyed her superiors’ Direct
Orders, and she refused to sign clean release forms. While
Anderson tried to justify her behavior regarding the release
15
forms in her response to the City’s motion for summary judgment,
the evidence clearly shows that she consistently refused to sign
clean release forms as she was ordered to do. Accordingly,
Anderson has offered no evidence whatsoever that the City’s
reason for terminating her was pretextual, and the district court
properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on her
remaining retaliation claims.
B. ADA Claims
Anderson next claims that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). According to Anderson, she suffered a
fall on the job on May 3, 1999 and, as a result, was placed on
limited physical duty from July 1999 until October 1999. On
January 24, 2000, her physician released her to regular duty.
Accordingly, Anderson claims that she was substantially limited
in a major life activity between May 3, 1999 and January 24,
2000. She argues, therefore, that the district court erred when
it found that she was not disabled and granted summary judgment
for the defendants on her ADA claims.
Anderson’s ADA claims fail because she has not established
that she was disabled. In order to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she
is disabled; (2) she was qualified for the job in question; and
(3) an adverse employment action was taken because of her
16
disability. Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024
(5th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff is disabled under the ADA when she
is substantially limited in the performance of a major life
activity. Rogers v. Int. Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755,
758 (5th Cir. 1996). “Major life activities” are things such as
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” McInnis v.
Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2). Anderson has offered no evidence
that she was ever substantially limited in the performance of any
of these major life activities. She merely claims that she was
placed on limited duty for a short period of time as the result
of her fall. With respect to this claim, the Supreme Court has
held that an “impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or
long-term” to qualify as a disability. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). Moreover, “[t]he inability
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d
471, 481 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999).
Likewise, this court has held that “[a]n employer’s belief that
an employee is unable to perform one task with an adequate safety
margin does not establish per se that the employer regards the
employee as having a substantial limitation on his ability to
work in general.” Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390
17
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d
329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997).
Accordingly, the fact that Anderson was on limited duty for a
short period of time is not enough for her to qualify as a
disabled individual under the ADA. Since she has offered no
other evidence that she was substantially limited in a major life
activity, her ADA claims fail.
Moreover, even if Anderson was substantially limited in a
major life activity, her ADA claims would still fail because, as
discussed previously, the City proffered a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her, and Anderson has
offered no evidence that this reason was pretextual. As such,
the district court properly granted summary judgment on
Anderson’s ADA claims.
C. Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Claims
Anderson next contends that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment for the defendants on her defamation
(slander) claims against them. In support of this claim, she
first argues that the City is not immune from her tort claims
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Her arguments on this
topic are copied verbatim from her original response to the
City’s motion for summary judgment. She argues, inter alia, that
she has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and she
claims that under the Texas Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity
is waived when an injury is caused by a condition or use of
18
tangible personal property. She then concludes that the City is
not immune from her tort claims because she had a property
interest in her employment.
Second, Anderson argues that her defamation claims against
defendants McCain, Puente and Meeks are not barred by the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. She claims, inter alia,
that judges and other public servants can be held liable for
tortiously injuring other citizens by acting in violation of
specific constitutional provisions. She then notes that the City
convened a threat assessment meeting regarding her on March 16,
2000, at which members of the committee stated that Anderson was
a threat. Based on these statements, she concludes that certain
city employees defamed her and engaged in a conspiracy to deprive
her of her constitutional rights.
Finally, Anderson argues that her invasion of privacy claim
against Meeks is not barred by official immunity because, inter
alia, he acted in bad faith by requiring her to submit to an
involuntary fitness for duty exam.
The court first turns to Anderson’s claim that the City is
not immune from her torts claims because she had a property
interest in her employment. Anderson is correct that under the
Texas Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity is waived for “injury
caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real
property.” Medrano v. City of Pearsall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144
(Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no pet.). “Tangible property,”
19
however, is defined as “property that is capable of being
handled, touched, or seen.” Birdo v. Williams, 859 S.W.2d 571,
573 (Tex. App.--Houston 1993, no writ); see also Thomas v. Brown,
927 S.W.2d 122, 128 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ
denied) (“Tangible personal property refers to something that has
a corporeal, concrete, and palpable existence.”). Anderson’s
employment is not corporeal, concrete property of this sort.
Accordingly, the City’s sovereign immunity is not waived with
respect to Anderson’s tort claims, and the City is entitled to
summary judgment on them.
With respect to Anderson’s defamation (slander) claims
against McClain, Puente and Meeks, Anderson has pointed to no
specific statements about her made by them during the March 16,
2000 threat assessment meeting. Similarly, while Anderson
vaguely alludes to a conspiracy to deprive her of unspecified
constitutional rights, she points to no statements that McClain,
Puente, or Meeks made in furtherance of this conspiracy.
Moreover, as the City correctly notes in its response, Anderson
only alleged in her amended complaint that McClain, Puente, and
Meeks defamed her during the July 27, 2000 pre-termination
hearing. As to this claim, McClain, Puente, and Meeks’s
participation in this administrative hearing was quasi-judicial
in nature. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1978);
O’Neal v. Miss. Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65, 67 (5th Cir.
1997). Accordingly, they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
20
with respect to their activities at this administrative hearing,
and the district court properly granted summary judgment in their
favor on this claim.
Finally, as for Anderson’s invasion of privacy claim against
Meeks, the doctrine of official immunity protects government
officials in Texas from suit for acts done in good faith as part
of their official duties. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883
S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). Likewise, the Supreme Court has
held that “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Anderson cites no evidence or authority for her claim
that Meeks violated a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right of hers, nor has she offered any evidence
that he acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the district court
properly granted summary judgment in his favor on this claim.
D. Equal Protection Claims
Anderson next alleges that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the City on her equal
protection claim against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Anderson
appears to base this argument on her contention that she had a
property interest in her continued employment with the City--an
interest that it infringed when it fired her. Anderson also
21
argues that Suhm, Daniels, and Evans violated her equal
protection rights by refusing to allow her to present fully her
side of the story at administrative hearings and by arbitrarily
and capriciously dismissing her grievances.
A municipality like the City cannot be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal
policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell v.
New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In
this circuit, an official municipal policy is “[a] policy
statement, ordinance, regulation or decision that is officially
adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers
or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-
making authority.” Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 358
(5th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. City
of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). As the
district court correctly noted, Anderson has not pointed to any
policy of the City that led to a violation of her rights.
Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of the City on her equal protection claim against it.
With respect to Anderson’s claim that Suhm, Evans, and
Daniels violated her equal protection rights during
administrative hearings, these individuals’ actions occurred
during hearings where witnesses were called, evidence was
presented, and findings of fact were made. Accordingly, their
actions were quasi-judicial in nature, they are entitled to
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quasi-judicial immunity, and the district court properly granted
summary judgment in their favor on these claims. See Butz, 438
U.S. at 511-17; O’Neal, 113 F.3d at 65, 67.
E. Due Process Claims
Anderson next argues that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on her due
process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, she contends that
the City should be held liable for violating her due process
rights under the theory of respondeat superior. In support of
this claim, she states, inter alia, that city employees
improperly reprimanded and suspended her. She also contends that
the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously, intentionally harmed
her, and discriminatorily placed her on leave. Second, Anderson
argues that Suhm, Evans, Daniels, and McClaim are not entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity with respect to her due process claims
against them since they permitted the City to illegally terminate
her. Finally, she argues that Meeks is not entitled to qualified
immunity as to her due process claim against him because he knew
or should have known that certain communications he sent (e.g., a
letter he faxed to the Holiner Psychiatric Group in March 2000)
contained false information.
A municipality like the City cannot be held liable for
violating Anderson’s due process rights under the theory of
respondeat superior. As previously discussed, a municipality
like the City can only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a
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municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional tort. Monell,
436 U.S. at 691. Since Anderson does not point to any policy of
the City that led to a violation of her due process rights, the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
City on this claim.
As for whether Suhm, Evans, Daniels, and McClain are
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for their actions at
administrative hearings, their actions in these proceedings were
quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, they are entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity, and summary judgment was properly granted in
their favor as to Anderson’s due process claims against them.
See Butz, 438 U.S. at 511-17; O’Neal, 113 F.3d at 65, 67.
Finally, Anderson has offered no evidence that Meeks
violated her due process rights, nor has she offered any evidence
that he acted in bad faith. Thus, for the reasons discussed
previously, he is entitled to qualified immunity, and summary
judgment in his favor on her due process claim against him was
appropriate. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Chambers, 883 S.W.2d
at 653.
F. Section 1985(3) Claim
Anderson next argues that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the City on her
§ 1985(3) claim against it.12 In a one-paragraph argument in
1
Below, Anderson pursued claims against the City, Dr.
Berke, and Madoka Armstrong under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
24
support of this contention, she repeats her claim that the City,
inter alia, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, intentionally
harmed her, deprived her of her privacy rights, violated her
equal protection rights, and discriminatorily placed her on
leave.
In order to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a
plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy between two or more
individuals; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class
of people of the equal protection of the laws or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that injures a person
or deprives him of a right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States. See Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Savings Bank, 820 F.2d
754, 757 (5th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, the only type of
conspiracy actionable under § 1985(3) is one motivated by racial
animus. Id.; Daigle v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 794 F.2d 974,
979-80 (5th Cir. 1986). In the present case, Anderson presented
the district court with no evidence whatsoever of a race-based
conspiracy, discriminatory intent, or an act committed in
Similarly, she pursued claims against certain defendants under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2). She does not, however, appeal the district
court’s dismissal of her § 1985 claims against Berke and
Armstrong, nor does she appeal its decision granting summary
judgment against her on her § 1985(2) claims. Hence, this court
will not examine her § 1985(2) claims, nor will it examine her
§ 1985(3) claims against any party other than the City.
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furtherance of a conspiracy. Accordingly, the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City on this
claim.
G. Dr. Berke’s Motion to Dismiss
Finally, Anderson argues that the district court improperly
dismissed her defamation (slander) claim against Dr. Berke.
Anderson claims that, contrary to what the district court found,
she properly alleged the elements of a defamation claim against
him. First, she claims that Dr. Berke stated that she “altered a
medical release form rendering it invalid to release confidential
medical information.” Second, she argues that she “self-
published” Dr. Berke’s statements to third parties when
explaining to them why she was fired. Third, she argues that she
was harmed by Dr. Berke’s statements because, as a result of
them, the City fired her. Finally, she claims that she was
further harmed because prospective employers are now reluctant to
hire her.
Dr. Berke responds that the statements that Anderson says
are defamatory were made by him during a grievance hearing on
Anderson’s discharge by the City. As such, Dr. Berke contends
that his testimony is absolutely privileged under Texas law.
Additionally, he claims that the district court properly
dismissed Anderson’s defamation claim because the testimony that
he gave--including the statement about Anderson altering a
medical release form--was true.
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The district court properly dismissed Anderson’s defamation
claim against Dr. Berke. First, under Texas law, statements made
during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings may not serve as
the basis for a defamation claim. See Putter v. Anderson, 601
S.W.2d 73, 76-77 (Tex. App--Dallas 1980). Since Dr. Berke’s
allegedly defamatory statements were made during a quasi-judicial
administrative hearing regarding Anderson’s termination, they
cannot serve as the basis of a defamation claim against him.
Second, as the district court properly concluded, Anderson never
alleged that Dr. Berke’s statements were false, and her own
version of the facts of the case demonstrates that they were true
(e.g., Anderson admits to not signing clean medical release
forms). Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed
Anderson’s defamation claim against Dr. Berke. See Reeves v.
Western Co. of North America, 867 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. App.--San
Antonio 1993, writ denied) (holding that only a false statement
can constitute actionable slander).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment. Costs are assessed against Anderson.
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