Ray v. Edgar

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT December 17, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20415
Conference Calendar
JASON LEON RAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
S. EDGAR, Deputy Sheriff; TOMMY THOMAS, Sheriff; HARRIS COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF HARRIS, TEXAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:03-CV-2913
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Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jason Leon Ray, Texas prisoner # 955809, appeals from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants
S. Edgar and Tommy Thomas on Ray’s excessive force claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ray argues that the district court erred in
granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion prior to
receiving his response. Ray notes that he was proceeding pro se
in the district court, and he contends that he was never informed
of a time limit to respond to the defendants’ motion for summary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-20415
-2-
judgment and that he was ignorant of the local rules of the
district court.
The sole notice requirement when a motion for summary
judgment has been filed is that the motion must be served at
least 10 days before the summary judgment hearing is held. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284,
1293 n.11 (5th Cir. 1994). A court satisfies the notice
requirements of Rule 56 if local rules require that a response to
a summary judgment motion be filed within a specified period.
See Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1020
(5th Cir. 1993). The local rules of the district court provide
sufficient notice for a pro se litigant such as Ray. See
S.D. TEX. CIV. R. 7.3 & 7.4; Martin v. Harrison County Jail,
975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992).
Ray also argues that the district court would not have
granted summary judgment had it considered the evidence presented
in his late-filed response to the defendants’ summary judgment
motion. In considering an argument that the grant of summary
judgment was improper, this court considers “only the evidence
that was in front of the district court.” Wallace v. Texas Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). Because Ray has
failed to provide a “valid excuse” for his failure to produce the
evidence prior to the district court’s ruling on the summary
judgment motion, he has not shown that he is entitled to relief.
See id. at 1052.
 No. 04-20415
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.