Clark v. Huntleigh Corp.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 12, 2005
_______________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 04-30836 Clerk
Summary Calendar
_______________________
THOMAS L. CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
HUNTLEIGH CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(04-CV-671)
_______________________
Before JONES, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Thomas Clark appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Because the attachments to Clark’s
pro se complaint set out a claim for age and race discrimination,
we reverse the dismissal of those two claims.
Clark worked for Appellee Huntleigh USA as a security
supervisor. Clark, who is white, alleges that other Huntleigh
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
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employees once subjected him to racial name calling. Shortly
after the name-calling incident, Clark was laid off. He contends
that he was laid off because of discrimination based on his race
and age.
Clark took his concerns to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), where he filed a charge that alleged age and
race discrimination. The EEOC issued Clark a right-to-sue
letter, and shortly afterward, Clark, acting pro se, filed his
original complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Clark’s original complaint was brief, mainly containing a
description of what happened to him after Huntleigh laid him off.
Clark later filed an amended complaint, which on its face
included only hints of claims but included no real factual or
legal allegations. Attached to the complaint, however, were
documents that provided some more information about his claims.
One of those attachments was Clark’s EEOC charge of
discrimination, which set out his race and age discrimination
allegations.
After being served with Clark’s amended complaint, Huntleigh
filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. This motion discussed the allegations in the amended
complaint, but did not address any of the documents attached to
it. The district court granted Huntleigh’s motion, and this
appeal followed.
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Rule 12(b)(6)
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Calhoun
v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002). Such a motion is
only properly granted when “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take all
pleaded facts as true and view those facts in favor of the
plaintiff. Calhoun, 312 F.3d at 733.
In this case, we must also consider that Clark is proceeding
pro se. Thus, his complaint is “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Calhoun, 312 F.3d at
733 (quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378
(5th Cir. 2002)). Significantly, because of Clark’s pro se
status, our precedent compels us to examine all of his complaint,
including the attachments. In Howard v. King, we concluded that
the district court erred in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion by not
considering other documents as part of pro se inmates’ complaint:
Most importantly, however, the court was required to look
beyond the inmates' formal complaint and to consider as
amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently
filed. The court failed to consider the inmates' motion,
memorandum in support, and affidavit, as amendments to
the complaint. These documents embellished the original
complaint's averments, and each should have been
considered.
707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983)(citation omitted).
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When we examine the attachments, we have no choice but to
conclude that Clark has stated a claim for age and race
discrimination. His EEOC charge sets out the parameters of this
claim: he was selected for layoff in December 2002 for
discriminatory reasons, while other employees remained on the
job.
We agree with Huntleigh, however, that Clark has failed to
plead any other claims, such as claims about the EEOC’s treatment
of him or claims for fraud or slander. The district court
properly dismissed those claims.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court only to the
extent it ruled that Clark failed to state an age or race
discrimination claim. Our opinion does not excuse Clark from
future compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For
example, he must properly respond, and provide his own suitable
evidence, to any future motion for summary judgment that
Huntleigh might file. We merely hold that Clark adequately
pleaded his discrimination claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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