Williams v. Dickerson

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 27, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40931
Summary Calendar
LARRY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CAL WOOTEN, Warden; ET AL.,
Defendants,
DICKERSON; S. JONES,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:01-CV-290
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Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Larry Williams, a Texas prisoner (# 648392), appeals the
district court’s order dismissing his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights action as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
In his complaint, Williams alleged that, upon his transfer to
the Ramsey II Unit (“Ramsey”) in September 1998, defendant,
Classification Manager Dickerson, assigned him to work on a field
squad, although the duties involved in such work exceeded the work
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-40931
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restrictions that had been issued for Williams upon his entry into
the prison system. Williams asserted that both Dickerson and Field
Officer Jones were aware of such restrictions and also knew that
his health summary reflected that he had a prior leg injury and
surgery and that a surgical pin and rod remained in place in his
knee and thigh. He also suffers from emphysema. Williams appeared
to state that, in November 1998, the defendants acceded to the
“demands” of a physician’s assistant that he not be assigned to
such work. According to Williams, Dickerson nonetheless returned
him to the field work in May 1999, which aggravated the old injury
and required him to undergo surgery again in June or July 1999 in
order “to avoid an amputation of the entire leg.” He stated that
the work had caused the rod and pin to protrude into muscle tissue
in his thigh, resulting in severe swelling and an infection.
Williams alleged that Dickerson and Jones required him to return to
the field work even after the 1999 surgery. Williams argued that
these actions violated his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment.
A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
at any time that the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We review a dismissal as
frivolous for abuse of discretion, Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470,
472 (5th Cir. 2001), assuming that all of the plaintiff's factual
allegations are true. Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th
Cir. 1999). A complaint is “frivolous” if it lacks “an arguable
basis in law or fact.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.
1999).
No. 04-40931
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“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth
Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference “only if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at
847.
Prison work requirements that compel inmates to perform
physical labor that is beyond their strength, endanger their lives,
or cause undue pain also constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1983). “[T]he
constitutionality of a particular working condition must be
evaluated in the light of the particular medical conditions of the
complaining prisoner.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th
Cir. 1989). Work that is not cruel and unusual per se may violate
the Eighth Amendment if prison officials are aware it will
significantly aggravate a prisoner’s serious medical condition.
Id.The magistrate judge recommended that Williams’s complaint be
dismissed as frivolous, relying largely on “medical records
provided by” Williams. According to the magistrate judge, these
records showed that Williams had only a “sore” that was “cleaned
and dressed” and a “cyst” that tested positive for a staph
infection. These determinations suggest a far less serious medical
condition and surgical procedure than those alleged by Williams.
The record of the instant appeal, however, contains no medical
records from the surgery described by Williams. Williams has
No. 04-40931
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stated that he cannot afford to pay for his medical records or that
such records are missing.1
In the absence of such records, we must rely on Williams’s pro
se allegations, and we must liberally construe those allegations in
his favor. Moore, 168 F.3d at 236; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). Those allegations were sufficient to state a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim that the defendants knew that
forcing Williams to perform field work exceeded his work
restrictions and would worsen his medical conditions. Accordingly,
we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
The district court concluded that Williams’s claims with
respect to events in 1998 were barred by the applicable two-year
Texas limitations statute for personal-injury actions and that
allegations of verbal threats or abuse by Jones were not actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Williams has effectively abandoned any
direct challenge to these conclusions, see Yohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993), except to the extent that the
defendants’ actions in 1998 might relate to their knowledge and
intent regarding events in 1999.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
1
We can only speculate that the magistrate judge was
referring to medical records that might have been submitted by
Williams in another civil rights action, Cause No. 3:00-CV-436,
which was dismissed for want of prosecution in November 2000.