Breedlove v. Sanchez

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 11, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-50547
Summary Calendar
EDGAR LEE BREEDLOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RUDY SANCHEZ, Assistant Warden; JUANITA DORMAN,
Class Supervisor; PAUL WEATHERBY, Building Captain
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 4:99-CV-35
--------------------
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Edgar Lee Breedlove, Texas state prisoner # 637597, sued the
defendants, employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he suffered injuries from
performing manual labor in violation of his medical restrictions.
Breedlove appeals the district court’s entry of judgment in favor
of the defendants following a jury trial.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court referred to a magistrate judge. The magistrate
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-50547
-2-
judge issued a report and recommendation that the motion be denied.
After no objections were filed, the district court adopted the
report and recommendation and denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. At trial, Breedlove repeatedly sought to
introduce into evidence the magistrate’s report and recommendation,
claiming that the magistrate judge made specific factual
conclusions that the district court adopted when it denied the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district court
refused to admit the report. After the jury returned a verdict for
the defendants, the district court entered a take-nothing judgment
against Breedlove.
Breedlove argues on appeal that the district court committed
reversible error in permitting the jury to make fact findings that
had already been made by the magistrate judge and adopted by the
district court. Breedlove also contends that the district court
plainly erred in failing to submit a jury instruction on
supervisory liability.
If a summary judgment motion is granted, there is a finding
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 However, in
recommending a denial of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the magistrate judge, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Breedlove, found that there were genuine
1
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Wallace v. County of Comal, 400
F.3d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2005).
No. 04-50547
-3-
issues of material fact that must be determined at trial.2 In
denying the summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge did not
make any dispositive credibility findings, nor did he make any
determinative findings on the issues presented in this case.3
Moreover, the only order the district court entered on the motion
for summary judgment was an order denying the motion; the district
court did not enter any kind of judgment in Breedlove’s favor.
Thus, the district court did not err in permitting the jury to make
the requisite fact findings.
Breedlove also argues on appeal that the district court
plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on supervisory
liability. Breedlove did not request an instruction on supervisory
liability and did not object to the charge. Breedlove’s failure to
submit to the district court a specific written instruction on
supervisory liability precludes him from complaining on appeal that
the instruction was not given.4 Thus, the district court’s
2
See Estate of Davis ex rel McCully v. City of N. Richland
Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2005) (“‘When a district court
denies summary judgment on the basis that genuine issues of
material fact exist, it has made two distinct legal conclusions:
there are ‘genuine’ issues of fact in dispute, and that these
issues are ‘material’.’” (quoting Reyes v. City of Richmond, 287
F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2002))).
3
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)
(“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).
4
See Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 580
(5th Cir. 2004).
No. 04-50547
-4-
omission of a specific instruction on supervisory liability is not
subject to our review.5
Insofar as Breedlove’s argument can be construed as a
challenge to the jury instructions, his failure to object limits
our review of the instructions to plain error review.6 Under plain
error review, an appellate cannot correct an error not raised at
trial unless there is (1) error, (2) that is plain,(3) that
affected the complaining party’s substantial rights, and (4) that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.7 Although upon request Breedlove could have
obtained a more specific instruction on supervisor liability, the
instructions given on deliberate indifference, personal
participation, and participation in another’s wrongful conduct were
sufficient for the jury to determine whether the defendants acted
with deliberate indifference.8 If any error occurred, Breedlove
has not shown that it affected his substantial rights or seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
5
Id.
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (“A court may consider a plain error
in the instructions affecting substantial rights that has not been
preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1)(A) or (B).”); see also
Kanida, 363 F.3d at 581.
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2); see also Taita Chem. Co. v. Westlake
Strene, LP, 351 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2003)(internal citations
and quotations omitted).
8
See Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1340 (5th Cir. 1977).
No. 04-50547
-5-
proceedings.9 Thus, Breedlove has failed to show plain error in
the district court’s jury instructions.10
The judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
9
Taita Chem. Co., 351 F.3d at 668.
10
See Tilmon v. Prator, 368 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2004).