United States v. Mayfield

Case: 19-51170 Document: 00515698340 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 7, 2021
No. 19-51170 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Stuart Kyle Mayfield,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:19-CR-173-2
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Stuart Kyle Mayfield appeals his sentence of 57 months of
imprisonment following his guilty plea conviction of possession of a firearm
by a felon. He contends that the district court erred by (1) applying the two-
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for possession of three
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 19-51170
firearms and the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for
possession of any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony
offense. This court reviews the district court’s “application of the
Guidelines de novo and [its] factual findings—along with the reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts—for clear error.” United States v.
Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). “A factual finding is not clearly
erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mayfield lived in a home with his girlfriend, Brandi Moore, where they
shared a bedroom. Mayfield argues that the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) enhancement
is inappropriate because his constructive possession over the two additional
firearms found in that bedroom was never established. When determining
how many firearms were involved in an offense, the district court should
include all “firearms that were unlawfully sought to be obtained, unlawfully
possessed, or unlawfully distributed[.]” § 2K2.1, comment. (n.5).
“Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive.” United States v.
Hagman, 740 F.3d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 2014). “In cases of joint occupancy,
this court will find constructive possession only when there is some evidence
supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of
and access to the illegal item.” United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 419 (5th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have
recognized that determination of constructive possession is fact-specific and
requires application of commonsense. Id.Here, a commonsense, fact-based approach supports the conclusion
that Mayfield had constructive possession over the two additional firearms.
The two firearms were located in a cabinet in his bedroom that he shared with
his girlfriend, a room that he likely utilized on a daily basis and the contents
of which were unlikely to have escaped his knowledge. See United States v.
Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979) (firearms located in the drawer of
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No. 19-51170
a nightstand in the bedroom he shared with his wife). While the firearms were
located in a cabinet in the bedroom (and, therefore, not visible to a passing
stranger), there is nothing in the record that suggests the firearms were
inaccessible or hidden from Mayfield’s view were he to open the cabinet or
evidence specifically showing that Mayfield’s girlfriend was the owner of the
firearms (unlike a rifle which she contended was hers). Cf. United States v.
Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 348-49. Furthermore, the firearms were located in
close proximity to 37 grams of methamphetamine, a distributable amount, as
well as methamphetamine distribution supplies. Mayfield does not deny
knowledge of the methamphetamine and distribution supplies. In cases of
drug distribution, a firearm in close proximity to a quantity of drugs supports
the reasonable inference that possession of the firearm was to protect the
drugs kept. United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198-200 (5th Cir. 1994).
Thus, it is plausible that Mayfield had knowledge of and access to the
firearms that were located in his bedroom. See Meza, 701 F.3d at 419. As a
result, the application of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) was not clearly erroneous. See
Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 146.
Mayfield further argues that because he did not constructively possess
the firearms found in the bedroom that were in close proximity to drugs, the
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement does not apply. However, because the
district court did not clearly err in determining that Mayfield had
constructive possession of the two firearms found in his bedroom, Mayfield’s
argument fails. The methamphetamine and distribution supplies were in
close proximity to the firearms because they were found in the same
bedroom. See Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 147-48. Thus, application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was not clearly erroneous. See § 2K2.1, comment.
(nn.14(B)(ii), (C)); Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 146; United States v. Jeffries, 587
F.3d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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