Reynaud v. Astrue

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the April 16, 2007
United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III
for the Fifth Circuit Clerk
_______________
m 06-31126
Summary Calendar
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SHIRLENE REYNAUD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
m 1:05-CV-194
______________________________
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Shirlene Reynaud challenges a judgment af-
Circuit Judges. firming a decision of the Commissioner of So-
cial Security (the “Commissioner”) denying
PER CURIAM:* her claim for social security disability benefits.
Because the Commissioner’s decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and comports
with the relevant legal standards, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published I.
and is not precedent except under the limited cir- We review a denial of social security bene-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. fits “only to ascertain whether (1) the final de-
cision is supported by substantial evidence and ficient medical evidence, the ALJ may make a
(2) whether the Commissioner used the proper decision based on the evidence available.
legal standards to evaluate the evidence.” Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir.
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 1991). Though the decision to order a CE is
2000). Substantial evidence is more than a in the discretion of the ALJ, Anderson v. Sulli-
scintilla, but less than a preponderance, Spell- van, 887 F.2d 630, 634 (5th Cir. 1989), such
man v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. an examination must be ordered when a CE “is
1993), and a decision is supported by substan- necessary to enable the administrative law
tial evidence if we find evidence sufficient to judge to make the disability decision,” Pierre
establish that a reasonable mind could reach v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 1989)
the Commissioner’s conclusion, Ripley v. Cha- (quoting Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669,
ter, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). 671 (5th Cir. 1977)).
We do not substitute our judgment for the It is not disputed that Reynaud did not
Commissioner’s, even if the evidence weighs claim that she was mentally retarded or de-
against his decision. Newton, 209 F.3d at 452. pressed. Instead, her claim stems from a med-
If we find conflicts in the evidence, we accept ical report by her personal physician, Dr. May-
the Commissioner’s resolution of the conflicts eaux, that included a statement that Reynaud
so long as that resolution is supported by sub- was “somewhat mentally compromised.” A
stantial evidence. Id. state agency worker called the doctor to in-
quire about the statement, and the worker’s
II. notes from the call indicate that the doctor
Reynaud alleges that the administrative law stated that Reynaud “has a long standing de-
judge (“ALJ”) did not fully develop the record pression which has been treated in the past
and consider all relevant evidence before find- with prozax and celexa” and that he “thinks
ing that she did not qualify for disability pay- that [Reynaud] has a very low IQ.”
ments. Specifically, Reynaud claims the ALJ
should have ordered a consultative examina- The above entry in Reynaud’s file is fol-
tion (“CE”) to determine whether she suffered lowed by the recommendation of an agency
from mental retardation or depression. worker that a CE be ordered to ascertain
whether Reynaud suffered from mental retar-
An ALJ must fully and fairly develop the dation or depression. That entry is followed
facts relative to a claim for disability benefits. by another, presumably from a different agen-
Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. Reversal is appropri- cy worker, stating that
ate, however, only if the applicant shows that
she was prejudiced. Id. Prejudice can be es- Dr. Mayeaux’s statements are not support-
tablished by showing that had the ALJ ade- ed by the file evidence. There is no evi-
quately performed his duty, he “could and dence that the claimant is under any current
would have adduced evidence that might have treatment for depression. There was no ev-
altered the result.” Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d idence of depression at the internist CE.
1216, 1220 (5th Cir. 1984). She gives no limitations from depression on
her ADL’s. As far as her IQ, she graduated
Reynaud bears the burden of proving her from high school and was not in special ed.
disability, and if she is unable to provide suf- She raises her 13 yr. old son, shops unas-
2
sisted, reads newspapers and magazines, Further, the administrative record includes the
and performs all household chores indepen- opinion of a state agency psychologist that
dently. There is no MDI for depression or Reynaud did not suffer from a mental impair-
mental retardation and no CE is needed. ment.
The record also includes a Psychiatric Review “When there is no contention [by the claim-
Technique form completed by a state agency ant] that a claimant is mentally retarded, a few
psychologist, Dr. Spurrier, noting that Rey- instances in the record noting diminished in-
naud does not suffer from any “medically de- telligence do not require that the ALJ order an
terminable impairment.” I.Q. test in order to discharge his duty to fully
and fairly develop the record.” Pierre, 884
The district court found that the ALJ had F.2d at 803. The ALJ was within in his discre-
fairly and fully developed the record, because tion in relying on the medical evidence pre-
Reynaud did not submit any evidence of her al- sented.
leged mental disability, and the record did not
contain evidence that required the ALJ to or- III.
der a CE. We agree. Reynaud did not provide Reynaud argues that the testimony by the
any evidence of a mental impairmentSSshe re- vocational expert (“VE”) does not constitute
lies instead on an analysts’s notes from a substantial evidence. She contends that the hy-
phone call with Mayeaux, and the analyst’s pothetical question to the vocational expert
recommendation, based on that phone call, was flawed because the question omitted con-
that a CE be administered. As found by the sideration of the impairments recognized by
district court, however, there are no medical the ALJ: diabetes mellitus, hypertension, obes-
records to support Mayeaux’s statement.1 ity, and degenerative joint disease. This argu-
ment appears to be based on the fact that the
specific impairments were not mentioned by
1
name in the hypothetical question. But, the
Reynaud correctly notes that we accord con-
ALJ considered Reynaud’s testimony as well
siderable weight to opinions of the claimant’s per-
sonal physician. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617,
as the impairments evident in her medical rec-
621 (5th Cir. 2001). It is also true, however, that ords to ascertain her residual functional capac-
ity, which was included in the hypothetical
when good cause is shown, less weight, little question.2 Further, Reynaud’s representative
weight, or even no weight may be given to the
physician’s testimony. The good cause excep-
tions we have recognized include disregarding 1
(...continued)
statements that are brief and conclusory, not evidence and may choose whichever physician’s
supported by medically acceptable clinical lab- diagnosis is most supported by the record.”) (citing
oratory diagnostic techniques, or otherwise un- Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir.
supported by the evidence. 1987)). Mayeaux’s statements are both conclu-
sional and unsupported by the evidence.
Id. (citing Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237
2
(5th Cir.1994)). See also Muse v. Sullivan, 925 The disputed hypothetical question was, in
F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The ALJ as fact- full, as follows:
finder has the sole responsibility for weighing the
(continued...) (continued...)
3
thoroughly cross-examined the VE and had
ample opportunity to pose an alternative hypo-
thetical question. Because the hypothetical
question reasonably incorporated the impair-
ments and limitations recognized by the ALJ,
and because Reynaud had the opportunity to
add consideration of other asserted limitations,
there is no error. See Morris v. Bowen, 864
F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1988).
Because the Commissioner’s decision deny-
ing Reynaud benefits is supported by substan-
tial evidence and comports with the relevant
legal standards, we AFFIRM the district
court’s decision upholding the decision of the
Commissioner.
2
(...continued)
For each question, please assume that I’m ask-
ing about someone who has, who is the same
age and has the same education, the same vo-
cational background as Ms. Reynaud. For the
first hypothetical, if I were to find that she has
the residual functional capacity to perform sim-
ple, unskilled light work with no detailed in-
structions, that does not require climbing of lad-
ders, ropes or scaffold, requires only occasional
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and
crawling with mild limitations in concentration
and attention, would there be any jobs that she
could perform in the national or regional econ-
omy?
4