United States v. Rigsby

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 15, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-11305
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
FLOYD DOUGLAS RIGSBY
Defendant - Appellant
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:06-CR-120-1
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Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Floyd Douglas Rigsby pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(b), (b)(1)(A).
The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Rigsby
now appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a
downward deviation of two levels from the advisory guideline
range, a deviation Rigsby contends was warranted because he
provided assistance to the Government.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-11305
-2-
We review the district court’s sentence for reasonableness.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005). When a
sentencing court imposes a sentence within the guideline range,
we will infer “that the judge has considered all the factors for
a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. Given the deference
due the sentencing judge’s discretion under the Booker/Fanfan
regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say such a
sentence is ‘unreasonable.’” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d
511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).
The court concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the
range would be appropriate. The court considered and rejected
Rigsby’s assertions that his efforts to assist the Government
merited an adjustment, noting that Rigsby offered only
allegations and not evidence. Nevertheless, the district did
consider his arguments in determining where within the range to
sentence Rigsby. Further, the sentence of 262 months overlapped
with the top of the range that Rigsby requested. Given these
facts, and in light of the deference owed the sentencing court,
Rigsby has not shown that the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
Rigsby has also filed three pro se motions in which he asks
us to hold the appeal in abeyance and to appoint new counsel or,
alternatively, allow him to proceed pro se. Counsel, in response
to these motions, has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
Appointed counsel may be relieved “upon a showing that there
is a conflict of interest or other most pressing circumstances or
No. 06-11305
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that the interests of justice otherwise require relief of
counsel.” FIFTH CIRCUIT PLAN UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, § 5(B).
Rigsby’s unsupported and conclusory expressions of
dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance are insufficient to
satisfy this standard.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED. The motion to appoint new counsel and the
alternative motion to proceed pro se filed by Rigsby, along with
counsel’s motion to withdraw, are DENIED. Rigsby’s motion to
hold the appeal in abeyance is DENIED as moot.