Teague v. Williamson County

Case: 22-50202 Document: 00516546756 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 16, 2022
No. 22-50202
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar
Clerk
Officer Mary Teague, formerly known as Mary
Werchan,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Williamson County,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:18-CV-1098
Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff Mary Teague (“Teague”) worked as a deputy for the
Williamson County Sheriff’s Office (“Williamson County”) from January
2011 until her honorable discharge in November 2013. Teague later applied
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-50202 Document: 00516546756 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/16/2022
No. 22-50202
to work for the Travis County Constable Precinct Two (“Travis County”)
in 2016 and the Giddings Police Department (“Giddings”) in 2017, but
neither department hired her. Teague claims that Williamson County
retaliated against her by providing negative references to Travis County and
Giddings in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”).
The district court granted Williamson County’s motion for summary
judgment as to these claims. Applying the elements of a prima facie
retaliation claim, 1 the district court concluded that Teague failed to satisfy
the second prong: an adverse employment action. While the provision of a
negative reference may form the basis of a retaliation claim, the district court
found that Teague offered no competent summary judgment evidence that
Williamson County provided a negative reference to either Travis County or
Giddings.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 2003). We view the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Id. at 541. As a corollary, unsubstantiated
assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.The factual background of this appeal is sufficiently set forth in the
district court’s order, and we incorporate it here by reference.
1
To make a prima facie retaliation claim, Teague must demonstrate that: “(1) [she]
engaged in a protected activity pursuant to one of the statutes, (2) an adverse employment
action occurred, and (3) there exists a causal link connecting the protected activity to the
adverse employment action.” Badgerow v. REJ Properties, Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 618 (5th Cir.
2020). The elements are identical for a retaliation claim under TCHRA. Gorman v. Verizon
Wireless Texas, L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2014).
2
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No. 22-50202
On appeal, Teague argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Williamson County provided a negative reference to Travis
County and Giddings. As in her briefing before the district court, Teague
premises this argument on Texas Government Code § 614.023. Section
614.023 provides that a signed complaint must be given to a law enforcement
officer within a reasonable time and no disciplinary action may be taken
against the officer unless the signed complaint is given. Tex. Gov’t Code §
614.023(a)-(b). Additionally, an officer may not be indefinitely suspended or
terminated unless the complaint is investigated and there is evidence to prove
the allegation of misconduct. Id. § 614.023(c). The district court found this
provision “inapplicable to the current case given that neither party contends
that Teague ever sustained a complaint while employed at Williamson
County or that Williamson County told Teague’s prospective employers that
she had.” Teague disputes this finding and repeatedly asserts in her briefing
that she was subject to three sustained misconduct complaints for
insubordination, endangerment, and untruthfulness during her employment
at Williamson County. She then insists that because she had complaints
lodged against her, she should have been afforded the procedural protections
of section 614.023. As Williamson County points out, there is simply no
record evidence of these complaints. To the contrary, Williamson County’s
Internal Affairs Lieutenant Storey Sherouse confirmed that the investigation
of another officer in which Teague served as a witness was not punitive
against Teague and did not involve investigations of Teague for any policy
violations. According to Williamson County’s form memorializing Teague’s
honorable discharge, she “[r]etired, resigned, or separated from employment
with or died while employed by a law enforcement agency while in good
standing and not because of pending or final disciplinary actions or a
documented performance problem.” On this record, any claim that Teague
was indeed subject to a disciplinary complaint is unsupported speculation
3
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No. 22-50202
and insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Brown, 337
F.3d at 541. Additionally, Teague alleged in her First Amended Complaint
that “no reprimands or disciplinary proceedings were ever conducted against
Officer Teague during her employment with [Williamson County].” Teague
is bound by the allegations in her live pleading, and she may not now seek
factual findings that would contradict them. Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 823 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Factual assertions in pleadings are
judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party that made them.”).
Teague’s arguments based on section 614.023 are unavailing. After
carefully reviewing the record and the remaining issues raised on appeal, we
agree with the district court that Teague has failed to present summary
judgment evidence to establish the second element of her retaliation claims.
Therefore, we AFFIRM for the reasons discussed above in addition to the
reasons set forth by the district court, and we incorporate its order in full by
reference.
AFFIRMED.
4