US Bank National Association v. John Richardson, e

Case: 20-10244 Document: 00515578369 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/24/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 24, 2020
No. 20-10244 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
US Bank National Association, as Trustee for the
Registered Holders of Aegis Asset Backed Securities
Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2005-1,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
John Harry Richardson; Linda Richardson,
Defendants—Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:17-CV-2271
Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
U.S. Bank National Association brought judicial foreclosure actions
against John and Linda Richardson, using its rights under a mortgage on the
borrowers’ home. The Richardsons counterclaimed that their mortgage had
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-10244 Document: 00515578369 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/24/2020
No. 20-10244
been illegally serviced. The district court dismissed the counterclaim and
granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank. We AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, the Richardsons borrowed $1,280,000.00, signing a home
equity note in that amount secured by a mortgage on their home in Dallas,
Texas. U.S. Bank is the current owner and holder of the note and beneficiary
of the mortgage. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC services the mortgage.
In 2012, the Richardsons failed to make payments required under the
note. After being notified of their default, the Richardsons were unable to
cure. U.S. Bank brought suit to foreclose on the mortgage. The Richardsons
counterclaimed that Ocwen had illegally serviced their mortgage. The
district court granted U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim. After
the close of discovery, the Richardsons moved to compel U.S. Bank to
produce documents. The district court denied that motion.
U.S. Bank filed a motion for summary judgment that would allow
foreclosure on the property. After the district court granted the motion, the
Richardsons filed a motion for a new trial and to add indispensable parties.
The district court denied their motion. The Richardsons appealed.
DISCUSSION
The Richardsons proceeded pro se in the district court and are
continuing to do so here. We liberally construe arguments in a pro se brief.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). The Richardsons challenge
several of the district court’s rulings, including the dismissal of their
counterclaim, the denial of their motion to compel, the grant of summary
judgment to U.S. Bank, and the denial of their motion for a new trial and to
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add indispensable parties. They also argue that they have a right to a jury
trial and that the district court was predisposed to rule against them. We
begin our analysis with the discovery dispute.
I. Discovery
The Richardsons argue that the district court erred in denying their
motion to compel production of documents. We review that decision for a
clear abuse of discretion. Marathon Fin. Ins., Inc., RRG v. Ford Motor Co., 591
F.3d 458, 469 (5th Cir. 2009).
The magistrate judge entered a scheduling order that required all
discovery to be finished by April 30, 2018. The Richardsons served a request
for production of documents just before the discovery deadline, making U.S.
Bank’s responses due sometime after the deadline. When U.S. Bank did not
produce documents, the Richardsons filed their motion to compel. The
district court denied the motion because both the underlying discovery
request and motion to compel were untimely.
We “exercise minimal interference” with the district court’s pretrial
orders. Hodges v. United States, 597 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1979). The
Richardsons do not argue that their discovery request and motion to compel
were timely. They also do not offer any excuse for their delay, nor do they
explain why discovery should have been extended. Given the latitude
afforded to the district court’s scheduling orders, the district court did not
clearly abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel.
II. Dismissal of the Counterclaim
We review de novo the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Wampler v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 597 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2010). A party’s
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pleading must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In their counterclaim, the Richardsons alleged that Ocwen illegally
serviced their mortgage in violation of a December 2013 consent judgment
entered in another federal case to which neither the Richardsons nor U.S.
Bank were party. The Richardsons did not allege specific facts describing the
violations of the consent judgment. The Richardsons also did not allege facts
or explain a legal theory supporting U.S. Bank’s liability for Ocwen’s
conduct. We agree with the district court that the Richardsons failed to allege
sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief.
The district court dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice and
denied the Richardsons leave to amend. The Richardsons then filed a motion
to amend the counterclaim which the district court denied as well. We review
for abuse of discretion the district court’s decisions regarding the
amendment of pleadings. Crostley v. Lamar Cnty., 717 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir.
2013).
Pro se parties generally are allowed to amend their pleadings “unless
it is obvious from the record that the [party] has pled his best case.” Hale v.
King, 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011). The district court held that granting
leave to amend the counterclaim would be futile because the Richardsons
lacked standing to state a claim arising from violations of consent judgments
to which they were not party. The district court relied on Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975) among other decisions. In
response, the Richardsons refer to an out-of-circuit case, Saccameno v. U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 206 L. Ed. 2d 825 (Apr. 20, 2020).
In that case, Ocwen was a defendant. Although that plaintiff pled violations
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of various consent judgments, she did so in the context of an Illinois statute.
Id. at 1080. The plaintiff also alleged detailed facts regarding wrongful
servicing of her loan, including that Ocwen demanded payment for amounts
not owed. Id. at 1077. The Richardsons do not allege any such facts or claims
here. Saccameno is of no assistance.
The Richardsons do not make any other arguments against the district
court’s conclusion regarding futility. Because any amendment would be
futile, the Richardsons pled their best case. We find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
A procedural issue is also presented, arising from the following. A
magistrate judge initially entered findings, conclusions, and a
recommendation on U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss. The district court
accepted those before receiving the Richardsons’ objections. After receiving
the objections, however, the district court reviewed de novo those portions of
the magistrate’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which the
Richardsons objected. A district court does not commit error by accepting a
magistrate report before receiving objections unless the objecting party
suffers prejudice. Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634,
646–47 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court considered the objections and
reevaluated its rulings. There was no prejudice arising from the district
court’s actions.
III. Summary Judgment
We review the district court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo.
RSUI Indem. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2014).
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute
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of material fact exists only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Richardsons do not identify any reason that U.S. Bank would not
be entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. The debt, the security interest, the
default, and proper notice to the debtors were all shown. See Tex. Prop.
Code § 51.002. The Richardsons do not raise any genuine dispute of
material fact as to them. In fact, the Richardsons concede in their opening
brief that they “are in default of their loan.”
The Richardsons do argue that Ocwen illegally serviced their
mortgage. Beyond conclusory statements, they fail to explain how such
illegal servicing would preclude U.S. Bank from foreclosing on their
property. Furthermore, their counterclaim for illegal servicing was
dismissed with prejudice. The district court properly granted summary
judgment to U.S. Bank.
IV. Post-judgment Motion
After entry of judgment, the Richardsons filed a motion for a new trial
and to add indispensable parties. Since there was no trial, the district court
characterized the motion as a request, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), to alter or amend the judgment. We review the district court’s ruling
for abuse of discretion. Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 353
(5th Cir. 1993).
The district court found that in their motion the Richardsons merely
reiterated arguments previously rejected. Although the Richardsons claimed
to have found new evidence, they did not justify why the evidence could not
have been presented prior to judgment, and it was unclear how the new
evidence would change any previous rulings. The district court acted within
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its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and to add indispensable
parties.
V. Other arguments
The Richardsons argue that they are entitled to a jury trial. Summary
judgment, though, is an available and valid procedure that allows the court to
grant a judgment when there are no issues to present to a jury. Barrett v.
Indep. Order of Foresters, 625 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Richardsons also argue that the district court treated them
unfairly. The Richardsons principally complain about district court rulings
that we already addressed. They do not identify any action by the district
court that constitutes unfair treatment of either party.
AFFIRMED.
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