United States v. Singh

Case: 20-40515 Document: 00515747326 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 17, 2021
No. 20-40515 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Manpreet Singh,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CR-193
Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
The district court denied Manpreet Singh’s petition for writ of coram
nobis. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-40515
I
In November 2017, a grand jury indicted Singh on two counts of bank
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), accusing him of fraudulently inducing
several banks to issue loans to companies he owned or controlled. In February
2018, Singh pled guilty to one of the counts in exchange for dismissing the
other. In his plea agreement, Singh agreed not to contest the amount of
restitution on the pled count and acknowledged that the government might
seek restitution for the dismissed count. He also waived his right to appeal,
reserving only the right to challenge any punishment beyond the statutory
maximum and to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Singh’s presentence investigation report (PSR) ultimately
recommended he pay $3,430,947.53 in restitution, reflecting the total loss
suffered by the banks after Singh defaulted on the fraudulently induced loans.
Singh initially objected to this amount but dropped his objection at
sentencing. The court ordered Singh to pay the PSR-recommended amount
in restitution. Singh subsequently appealed. See United States v. Singh, No.
18-40817 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 2018). He did not challenge the restitution award
but only several special conditions of his supervised release. We dismissed
his appeal based on the appeal waiver in his plea agreement.
Singh then petitioned the district court for a writ of coram nobis. See
Puente v. United States, 676 F.2d 141, 145 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining coram
nobis is a “writ of ancient common law origin . . . still available in criminal
matters under the All Writs Statute” that permits an individual to challenge
the “adverse collateral consequences” of a conviction “even though his
sentence ha[s] already been served”). Singh’s petition challenged only the
restitution award, arguing a significant portion was a “windfall to successor
banks who were not harmed by Singh’s conduct.” It also attacked his trial
counsel for failing to adequately investigate the facts pertinent to restitution
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No. 20-40515
and failing to object to the amount at sentencing. The district court denied
Singh’s petition and he appeals.
II
“On appeal from a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of
coram nobis, we review factual findings for clear error, questions of law de
novo, and the district court’s ultimate decision to deny the writ for abuse of
discretion.” Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir.
2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1046 (2010).
III
We find no reversible error in the district court’s denial of Singh’s
petition.
First, the court correctly noted that the Mandatory Victim’s
Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o), the statute that governs
federal restitution, “‘sharply limit[s] a district court’s discretion” to modify
restitutionary orders. United States v. Singh, No. 4:17-CR-193, 2020 WL
4192899, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2020) (quoting United States v. Puentes,
803 F.3d 597, 607 (11th Cir. 2015)). The court explained that the MVRA
permits “a downward adjustment to a restitution order” only by way of a
motion made pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
or after a successful direct appeal. Id. This conclusion is consistent with our
precedents rejecting the possibility of collateral attacks on restitution awards.
See United States v. Parker, 927 F.3d 374, 381 n.9 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting
authorities rejecting various collateral attacks on restitution orders, including
via garnishment, audita querela, and an immigration law petition for review);
see also United States v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“[R]estitution may not be addressed in § 2255 [habeas] proceedings.”).
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Second, as the court noted, Singh is currently incarcerated, and “it is
well established that a writ of coram nobis is not available to a petitioner who
is in custody.” Singh, 2020 WL 4192899, at *3 (citing, inter alia, Duckett v.
Davis, 800 F. App’x 289, 290 (5th Cir. 2020)); see also Chaidez v. United
States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 n.1 (2013) (“A petition for a writ of coram nobis
provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person . . .
who is no longer ‘in custody’ and therefore cannot seek habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2241.”); accord Jimenez v. Trominski, 91 F.3d 767, 768
(5th Cir. 1996) (“The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available
to a petitioner no longer in custody . . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
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