Bustinza v. Lucio

Case: 22-40312 Document: 00516720028 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-40312
April 20, 2023
Summary Calendar
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Rogelio Roel Bustinza,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Omar Lucio, Cameron County Sheriff; Sergeant A. Delgado,
Jailer; Sergeant J. Ybarra, Jailer; D (CPL) Castillo, Jailer;
Sergeant Rodriguez, Jailer; G. Santos, Jailer; Dean Garza,
Medical Doctor; Sergeant Ayala, Jailer; Juan Moya, Jailer; Noe
Santibanez, Jailer; Julie Pena, Nurse,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:19-CV-36
______________________________
Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Proceeding pro se, former Texas prisoner Rogelio Roel Bustinza filed
a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40312 Document: 00516720028 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/20/2023
No. 22-40312
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Freedom of Information
Act, alleging myriad claims against various defendants based on events that
occurred during his time in custody in the Cameron County Jail (“CCJ”).
He sued defendants in their individual and official capacities and sought both
monetary damages and injunctive relief. Most of his claims were dismissed
by the district court under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court later granted
summary judgment for the defendants with respect to his remaining claims.
Liberally construing Bustinza’s pro se appeal, he challenges the district
court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of his claims concerning religious freedom, access
to the courts, and conditions of confinement, as well as the district court’s
denial of additional discovery at summary judgment. Finding no error with
the district court’s judgment, we AFFIRM.
We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Magee v. Reed, 912
F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d
287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017)). We also review grants of summary judgment de
novo. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Bustinza challenges the dismissal of his claim that his religious
freedom was violated because CCJ denied him meat-free meals during Lent.
Individual-capacity claims are not supported by RLUIPA; as such, we only
consider Bustinza’s official-capacity claim. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of
Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sossamon v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277 (2011). Bustinza does not contest that his claim for injunctive relief
is moot—he was transferred from CCJ and eventually released, and he makes
no argument that he is at risk of returning. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d
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660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (RLUIPA claim is moot where “the possibility of
transfer back . . . is too speculative”). And his claim for monetary damages
fails because sovereign immunity bars such suits under RLUIPA. Sossamon,
563 U.S. at 293. Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed.
Bustinza’s challenge to the dismissal of his court-access claim also
fails. He summarily alleges that his constitutional right to access the courts
was violated because CCJ did not provide him access to a law library. But he
must also demonstrate “a relevant, actual injury stemming from the
defendant’s unconstitutional conduct.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 769
(5th Cir. 2009). In other words, “[t]he inmate must describe the underlying
claim well enough to show that its ‘arguable nature . . . is more than hope.’”
Id. (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002)). Here,
Bustinza fails to allege how he was injured by the lack of access to a law
library—at most, he claims that his ability to challenge his underlying
conviction was hindered. But he fails to identify any legal issue that he would
have brought in his criminal appeal, and this is fatal to his claim. Id.Bustinza also claims that his conditions of confinement at CCJ were
unconstitutional. His most extreme allegations are that the cells were very
cold, that one of three toilets of his cell block was broken for approximately
one week and dripped human waste onto the floor, and that inmates were not
provided gloves to clean toilets or disinfectant for hair clippers or nail cutters.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Bustinza must plead facts
establishing: (1) “that the deprivation alleged was sufficiently serious (i.e., an
official’s act or omission must have resulted in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities’),” and (2) “that the prison official
possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Herman, 238 F.3d at 664
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Bustinza does not
allege sufficiently serious deprivations to establish a constitutional violation.
We have previously held that allegations of “uncomfortable” temperatures,
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without more, cannot support a finding that a plaintiff was subject to cruel
and unusual punishment, Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995),
and that a toilet leaking for an insubstantial amount of time is not a
constitutional violation, see Davies v. Fuselier, 252 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (unpublished). Moreover, Bustinza admits in his complaint
that, while he did not receive his preferred cleaning materials, he received
alternative supplies (a mop bucket and water) to disinfect his cell and the
toilets. Taken as true, these allegations are insufficient to show an Eighth
Amendment violation.
Finally, Bustinza challenges the district court’s denial of his request
for additional discovery. He sought discovery in relation to two retaliation
claims that were dismissed by the district court at summary judgment.
Specifically, he sought sworn statements from defendants, access to the
docket to recover witness information, and video camera recordings from
CCJ, which he alleges would show that defendants were lying to the court
and that the alleged retaliation occurred. To support this request, Bustinza
was required to specify how the “additional discovery [would] defeat the
summary judgment motion.” King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
As the district court recognized, Bustinza failed to explain how this
evidence would create a material factual dispute to defeat summary
judgment. His first retaliation claim for retaliatory assault was dismissed at
summary judgment because he did not allege that he exercised a
constitutional right, which is a necessary element for retaliation claims. See
Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that, for a
retaliation claim, a prisoner must prove that “he or she exercised a
constitutional right”). Additional evidence cannot change this legal
conclusion, which Bustinza does not dispute. And Bustinza’s second
retaliation claim, which concerned a retaliatory shakedown, was dismissed
because, inter alia, he presented no evidence of the grievances that allegedly
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precipitated the shakedown. The additional discovery would not uncover
anything that would create a material factual dispute with respect to this
issue. Defendants have already produced Bustinza’s entire prisoner file,
which included any grievances and inmate request forms filed by him, and
provided those records to Bustinza. Any further discovery in this case would
have amounted to a fishing expedition, and the district court properly denied
Bustinza’s request for additional discovery.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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