Navarro v. Excel Corporation

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 01-11508
_______________________
MARGARITA NAVARRO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EXCEL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division
01-CV-179
_________________________________________________________________
September 5, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Margarita Navarro contends that she was injured because
her employer, Excel Corporation, negligently failed to maintain a
reasonably safe workplace. The district court granted Excel’s
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Navarro’s state-law
negligence claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. We AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Margarita Navarro worked as an “arm-boner” in
a meat-packing plant in Plainview, Texas. Navarro alleges that the
repetitive movements required by her job caused her to develop
carpal-tunnel syndrome that required surgery on both hands.
Navarro filed this negligence action in state court
against her employer, Excel Corporation. Navarro alleged that
Excel negligently failed to provide a safe workplace by not
following various ergonomic guidelines for reducing stress
injuries. Excel removed the case to federal court.
As Excel is a nonsubscriber to the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act, benefits for occupational injuries are provided
according to a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between Excel
and the employees’ union. The CBA’s disability plan requires an
employee to waive her right to sue in return for Excel’s providing
a claims procedure for disability benefits.
The district court granted summary judgment for Excel on
the grounds that Navarro’s state-law claim is preempted by the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The
district court dismissed the case without prejudice, and Navarro
appeals.
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preemption
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Cupit v. Walts, 90 F.3d 107, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1996).
Section 301 of the LMRA2 vests jurisdiction in the
federal courts to hear claims for violations of labor contracts.
Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.
1994). The Supreme Court has long recognized that Section 301
preempts state-law claims, whether sounding in contract or tort,
where the resolution of the state-law claim “depends upon the
meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1881,
100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines,
Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996).
The question presented in this case is whether
adjudicating Navarro’s negligence claim would require a court to
interpret or apply the terms of the CBA. Navarro acknowledges that
2
Section 301 provides that
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
3
the CBA imposes duties on Excel with respect to workplace safety.
Among other things, the CBA requires Excel to create safety and
grievance committees, allow paid rest periods, and give employees
protective equipment. Procedurally, the CBA provides compensation
and remedial procedures, including arbitration, to resolve
workplace injury claims. Even though Navarro’s complaint does not
allege a breach of the CBA, a court still would have to determine
the scope of Excel’s duties and Navarro’s remedies under the CBA in
order to define the scope of Excel’s legal duty for purposes of a
negligence claim. The district court correctly ruled that, under
this circuit’s precedent, Navarro’s state-law claim is preempted by
Section 301 of the LMRA. See Cupit, 90 F.3d at 109-10; Richter, 83
F.3d at 97-98; Baker, 34 F.3d at 280-81.
B. Public Policy
Navarro’s alternative argument is that preemption under
Section 301 applies only where the underlying CBA is valid, and, in
this case, the CBA is void as against public policy.
Excel is a nonsubscriber to the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act (TWCA). The TWCA permits an employer to opt out
of the system, but it discourages this choice by abolishing the
traditional common law defenses, such as contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, where an employee sues her nonsubscribing
employer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d
504, 511 (Tex. 1995); TEX. LABOR CODE § 406.033(a). As a
4
nonsubscriber, Excel has chosen to administer its own plan for
providing compensation for injured employees.
Several appellate courts in Texas had held that where a
nonsubscribing employer’s disability plan provided benefits not
comparable to those available under the TWCA, the plan would be
declared void:
[P]ublic policy does not permit an employer to reap the
principal benefit of providing workers’ compensation
coverage -- the waiver of an injured employee’s common
law and statutory claims -- without also bestowing on the
injured employee the principal benefit for which that
waiver is the “quid quo pro” -- the limited but certain
benefits guaranteed by workers’ compensation insurance
coverage. If the “balance” between the extent of the
waiver and the receipt of benefits “is tipped so that the
employee’s benefits under the statute are substantially
reduced, the clear intent of the legislature is
thwarted.”
Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722, 727-28 (Tex.
App. -- San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)(citations omitted); see also
Castellow v. Swiftex Mfg. Corp., 33 S.W.3d 890, 901 (Tex. App. --
Austin 2000, no pet.)(“A waiver whereby an employee foregoes [sic]
more common-law remedies than are surrendered under the Act, in
exchange for fewer benefits than are afforded by the Act, must be
declared invalid as against public policy.”). Relying on similar
language in state court decisions, this court once described a
nonsubscribing employer’s plan as “valid and enforceable” where the
employer contractually obligated itself to pay benefits “equal to
or greater than those provided under the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act.” Cupit, 90 F.3d at 109.
5
The Texas Supreme Court, however, specifically overruled
Castellow and Reyes to the extent that they engaged in a
substantive comparison of benefits between the TWCA and a
nonsubscribing employer’s plan. Lawrence v. CDB Serv., Inc., 44
S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. 2001)(“We believe that courts engaging in
such a qualitative, plan-by-plan evaluation is ill-advised.”). In
Lawrence, the Texas Supreme Court upheld an employee benefit plan
that required employees to waive entirely the right to sue the
employer. Id. at 545-46.
Just a few months after the Texas Supreme Court had
decided Lawrence, the Texas Legislature amended the TWCA to provide
that a cause of action against a nonsubscribing employer “may not
be waived by an employee before the employee’s injury or death.
Any agreement by an employee to waive a cause of action . . .
before the employee’s injury or death is void and unenforceable.”
TEX. LABOR CODE § 406.033(e). But this statute does not aid Navarro,
whose injury predates the law’s effective date by nearly two years.
The law provides that it only applies to “compensable injury that
occurs on or after the effective date of this Act.”
Navarro does not contend that § 406.033(e) applies
retroactively to this case. Instead, her position is that, in
light of the current public policy against waivers, this court
should hold that the underlying CBA is void. If the underlying
labor agreement is void, Navarro continues, then her negligence
claim is not preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. This assertion
6
is, in light of the express non-retroactivity of § 406.033(e),
unpersuasive.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err
in dismissing this case without prejudice. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
7