Brown v. City of Houston

Case: 21-20302 Document: 00516264337 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/01/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 1, 2022
No. 21-20302
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Alfred Dewayne Brown,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Houston, Texas; Harris County, Texas; Breck
McDaniel; Ted C. Bloyd; D. L. Robertson,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before Wiener, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Alfred Dewayne Brown challenges the dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. His case presents a novel and significant
question of Texas state law, so we certify to the Texas Supreme Court.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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I. Introduction
Brown spent more than twelve years in state prison — ten on death
row — because of his wrongful conviction for the murders of a Houston
police officer and a store clerk. In 2017, following his release from
incarceration, Brown filed this § 1983 action in federal district court based on
his wrongful prosecution and conviction.
Back in 1965, Texas instituted the Tim Cole Act, Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code §§ 103.001 et seq. It provides state compensation to
individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state
courts. Under the statute, “[a] person is entitled to compensation if: (1) the
person has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of
this state; and (2) the person . . . has received a full pardon on the basis of
innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced.”1
Brown sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court after
the Texas Office of the Comptroller rejected his application for Tim Cole Act
compensation several times.2 In December 2020, the Texas Supreme Court
overturned the Comptroller’s decision and ordered the State to pay Brown
the compensation he was owed under the Tim Cole Act.3 Texas then paid
Brown’s Tim Cole Act claim. The instant litigation addresses the viability of
Brown’s federal lawsuit filed under § 1983 in 2017, long before he recovered
under the Tim Cole Act.
It is uncontested that Brown has met the criteria of the Tim Cole Act
and has received compensation under it. What the parties dispute here is the
1
Id. § 103.001(a).
2
For a more extensive background of the case, see In re Brown, 614 S.W.3d 712,
713-16 (Tex. 2020).
3
Id. at 723-24.
2
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impact of the following provision of the Act on his previously filed § 1983
suit:
A person who receives compensation under this chapter may
not bring any action involving the same subject matter,
including an action involving the person’s arrest, conviction,
or length of confinement, against any governmental unit or an
employee of any governmental unit.4
The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Defendants-Appellees and dismissed Brown’s § 1983 case with prejudice. In
doing so, that court explained that: “A state’s payment for wrongful
conviction under the [Tim Cole] Act provides immunity to suits against state
and local government entities and employees seeking additional payment for
the same wrongful conviction. The court concludes that, presented with the
facts in this case, the Texas Supreme Court would likely . . . conclude that §
103.153(b) bars Brown’s lawsuit.” The district court noted that this case
presents “a novel issue of Texas law” as “[t]he Texas Supreme Court has
considered the Tim Cole Act several times, but it has not addressed the
specific issue presented here.”
II. Standard for Certification to the Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court “may answer questions of law certified to
it by any federal appellate court if the certifying court is presented with
determinative questions of Texas law having no controlling Supreme Court
precedent.”5 We consider three factors in determining whether to certify:
1. the closeness of the question and the existence of sufficient
sources of state law;
4
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §103.153(b) (emphasis added).
5
Tex. R. App. Proc. 58.1.
3
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2. the degree to which considerations of comity are relevant in
light of the particular issue and case to be decided; and
3. practical limitations on the certification process: significant
delay and possible inability to frame the issue so as to produce
a helpful response on the part of the state court.6
No party to the instant litigation has moved to certify the question to
the Texas Supreme Court, but we may certify a question sua sponte.7
“[C]ases like this one—‘where important state interests are at stake and the
state courts have not provided clear guidance on how to proceed,’—are
candidates for certification.”8
III. Application
Brown contends that he may maintain his § 1983 suit because he filed
it before he received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. He explains that
he is only maintaining his earlier-filed lawsuit but the statute’s plain language
only proscribes bringing an action subsequent to receiving Tim Cole Act
compensation.
Defendants-Appellees assert that in analyzing case law, “the Texas
Supreme Court understands § 103.153(b) [as providing that] the State’s
payment provides immunity to suits against state and local governmental
entities and employees seeking additional payment for the same wrongful
conviction.”9 They contend that the Tim Cole Act presents an open offer of
settlement to which Brown knowingly and willingly agreed.
6
In re Gabriel Inv. Grp., Inc., 24 F.4th 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Silguero v.
CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2018)).
7
In re Norris, 413 F.3d 526, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2005).
8
Silguero, 907 F.3d at 333 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 613 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2010)).
9
(emphasis added).
4
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As the district court noted, the Texas Supreme Court has not decided
whether the Tim Cole Act’s provision that bars a person who has already
received compensation thereunder from subsequently bringing any action
involving the same subject matter, also bars the continued maintenance of a
previously-filed lawsuit. To phrase the puzzle another way, can a lawsuit filed
before the receipt of Tim Cole Act compensation survive the Act’s litigation
bar?
Defendants-Appellees reference the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion
in Brown’s own case seeking Tim Cole Act compensation. In a footnote, the
court summarized the Tim Cole Act: “The administrative remedy under the
Tim Cole Act works to the exclusion of any other action ‘involving the same
subject matter, including an action involving the person’s arrest, conviction,
or length of confinement,’ and in doing so, the Legislature has spared
governmental units, governmental employees, and the wrongfully
imprisoned the uncertainty and expense of litigation.”10 Brown counters that
Defendants-Appellees’ reliance on this footnote is “misplaced” because it
“does not purport to decide the issue before the Court, even comment upon
it, or construe the language at issue” here.
Both sides hone in on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Oakley,11 but draw opposite conclusions after analyzing the court’s reasoning.
In that case, the court analyzed “whether claims for compensation under
Chapter 103 can be brought against the State (1) by an assignee, or (2) after
settling with another unit of government.”12 The wrongfully convicted
plaintiff in that case had filed his civil rights claims against the City of Austin
10
614 S.W.3d at 723 n.60 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §103.153).
11
227 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. 2007).
12
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
5
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and received a settlement from the city.13 He then filed his Tim Cole Act
claims.14 Brown takes from the case that “the Texas Supreme Court stated
that § 103.153(b): (1) ‘explicitly makes sequence important,’ and (2) ‘plainly
prohibits those who receive compensation from the State from then suing
local government entities or employees.’”15 In contrast, Defendants-
Appellees conclude that “the Texas Supreme Court suggested that once the
State has paid Tim Cole Act compensation, §103.153(b) ‘grants immunity to
local government entities.’”16
“We do not ‘lightly abdicate our mandate to decide issues of state law
when sitting in diversity.’”17 But, in enacting the Tim Cole Act, Texas
waived its sovereign immunity so as to compensate those who had been
wrongfully convicted.
Texas courts should decide in the first instance the extent to which
that statutory waiver applies. We have no reason to believe that certification
will cause unnecessary delay. When asked about certification at oral
argument, neither side objected to the case being presented to the Texas
Supreme Court.18 That court “has graciously accepted and promptly
13
Id. at 59-60.
14
Id. at 60.
15
(quoting id. at 63) (emphasis added by Brown).
16
(quoting id.)
17
In re Deepwater Horizon, 807 F.3d 689, 698 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jefferson v.
Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1997)).
18
See Silguero, 907 F.3d at 333.
6
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answered our questions time and again. We have every confidence that it will
do so here too.”19
IV. Conclusion
We Certify the following question to the Texas Supreme Court:
Does Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act bar maintenance
of a lawsuit involving the same subject matter against any
governmental units or employees that was filed before the
claimant received compensation under that statute?
“We disclaim any intention or desire that the Supreme Court of Texas
confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the question certified.”20
19
Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc., 18 F.4th 802, 805 (5th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted).
20
Janvey v. GMAG, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 229, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Janvey
v. Golf Channel, Inc., 792 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 2015)).
7