Redding v. Swanton

Case: 20-50769 Document: 00516300350 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/29/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 29, 2022
No. 20-50769 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
William Brent Redding; Thomas Paul Landers; Gilbert
Zamora,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Patrick Swanton, in his individual capacity; Steven Schwartz,
in his individual capacity; Christopher Frost, in his individual
capacity; Jeffrey Rogers, in his individual capacity; Brent
Stroman, Chief of Police for the Waco Police Department, in his individual
capacity; Abelino Reyna, Elected District Attorney for McLennan County,
Texas, in his individual capacity; Manuel Chavez, Waco Police
Department Detective, in his individual capacity,
Defendants—Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC Nos. 1:17-CV-470; 1:17-CV-468;
1:17-CV-469; 1:16-CV-1153; 1:16-CV-1154
Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Clement and Higginson, Circuit
Judges.
Case: 20-50769 Document: 00516300350 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/29/2022
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Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:*
The Plaintiffs-Appellants here are almost identically situated to the
plaintiffs in this court’s recent decision in Wilson v. Stroman, --- F.4th ----,
No. 20-50367 (5th Cir. Apr. 28 2022). Like the plaintiffs in Wilson, the
Plaintiffs-Appellants here were also arrested following the Twin Peaks
shootout 1 pursuant to the same challenged form warrant affidavit, and they
were subsequently indicted by a grand jury for the offense of Engaging in
Organized Criminal Activity (“EIOCA”) in violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 71.02. See Wilson, slip op. at 2. Their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims
also suffered the same fate below: the district court dismissed the claims
because it held the grand jury’s indictment triggered the independent
intermediary doctrine. See id. at 3. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs-
Appellants’ First Amendment and Equal Protection claims.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs-Appellants’
First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. We REVERSE the district
court’s decision dismissing the false arrest claims and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this court’s decision in Wilson.
I.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo,
accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs. Lindsay v. United States, 4 F.4th 292, 294 (5th Cir.
2021).
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
For background on the Twin Peaks incident, see Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270,
277-79 (5th Cir. 2021).
2
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Plaintiffs-Appellants appear to claim that their First Amendment
rights were violated because they were allegedly arrested in retaliation for
their association with a political group (i.e., their motorcycle clubs) and in
retaliation for exercising their right to assemble and listen to political speech
(i.e., participating in the meeting of the Texas Confederation of Clubs &
Independents at the Twin Peaks restaurant). We agree with the district court
that these conclusory claims fail.
Principally, Plaintiffs-Appellants fail to state a First Amendment
retaliation claim because they fail to adequately allege that the defendants’
“adverse actions were substantially motivated by . . . constitutionally
protected [First Amendment] conduct.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721,
729 (5th Cir. 2016). Assuming arguendo that the Plaintiff-Appellants were
engaged in protected First Amendment activity, the only allegation
supporting their assertion that the defendants arrested them in retaliation for
such activity is the allegation that certain bikers who were members of
Christian motorcycle clubs were not arrested even though they behaved
similarly. And their only explanation for this alleged difference in treatment
is the wholly conclusory allegation that the defendants approved of the
Christian clubs, but not the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ clubs. These allegations
are insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007))).
Moreover, nowhere do Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the
defendants had any plan to arrest them prior to the occurrence of a shootout
that left nine people dead, despite the defendants’ alleged advance
knowledge of the gathering. Regardless of the ultimate propriety of these
arrests under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs-Appellants have not
plausibly alleged that the defendants were substantially motivated to arrest
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them in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than
because of their proximity to an incident of mass violence. See id. at 680(describing that a plaintiff’s claims must cross the line “from conceivable to
plausible” in order to survive the pleading stage (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570)).
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Equal Protection claim fails for similar reasons.
This separate claim again relies on the alleged disparate treatment between
them and members of the Christian motorcycle clubs. As just discussed, the
allegation that defendants “favored” Christian clubs is wholly conclusory.
Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Equal Protection claim fails because, among
other reasons, they fail to adequately allege that the defendants’ decision to
arrest them was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Johnson v.
Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1997).
II.
The district court below is the same court assigned to handle Wilson.
And the portion of its order applying the independent intermediary doctrine
to dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claims is
identical to its order that dismissed the Wilson plaintiffs’ false arrest claims.
It thus contains the same legal flaws identified by our court in Wilson. See
Wilson, slip op. at 8-14. Thus, for the same reasons stated in Wilson, we
REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s decision applying the
independent intermediary doctrine to dismiss the Plaintiffs-Appellants’
Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. We note, however, that although we
have remanded both this case and Wilson on equal footing, we make no
comment on whether the district court should reach the same outcome with
respect to both sets of consolidated cases on remand—it is possible that
differences in individual pleadings may prove material in outcome. See id. at
17.
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* * *
We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion and consistent with this
court’s decision in Wilson.
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