Carlisle v. McNair

Case: 22-30031 Document: 00516746273 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/10/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
May 10, 2023
No. 22-30031 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Taylor Carlisle, individually and as Representative Member of a Class;
Emile Heron, individually and as Representative Member of a Class,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Joe McNair, also known as Joseph Thomas McNair; Newell
Normand; McNair & McNair, L.L.C.; Philadelphia
Indemnity Insurance Company,
Defendants—Appellees,
Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III,
Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:16-CV-3767
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
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*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30031 Document: 00516746273 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/10/2023
No. 22-30031
Taylor Carlisle and Emile Heron, two former participants in Jefferson
Parish’s Drug Court, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They alleged members of the Drug Court, acting in their official and
individual capacities, violated their constitutional rights to due process by
jailing them for technical program violations and for giving them “flat time”
sentences that did not allow credit for good behavior. Appellants also brought
state law negligence claims against a court-contracted counselor. The district
court dismissed claims against most Drug Court staff members, and this
court affirmed those dismissals on two occasions.1 This court also affirmed a
district court’s denial of Carlisle’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2
Carlisle and Heron now appeal following the district court’s final orders
dismissing claims against the local sheriff and a court-contracted counselor.
We find five issues briefed on appeal.3
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1
See generally Carlisle v. Mussal, 774 F. App’x 905 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)
(per curiam); Carlisle v. Klees, 786 F. App’x 493 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (per curiam).
2
Carlisle v. Lopinto, No. 20-30720, 2022 WL 1778548, at *1–2 (5th Cir. June 1,
2022) (unpublished) (per curiam). In 2018, this court reversed the district court’s
conclusion that Carlisle’s habeas petition was moot. Carlisle v. Normand, 745 F. App’x 223,
224 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (per curiam).
3
Appellants’ briefing does not clearly convey their arguments. Appellants listed
eighteen issues but failed to adequately brief most of those positions with legal arguments
and citations to the record. Failure to adequately brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver.
See Roy v. City of Monroe, 950 F.3d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2020). And an appellant’s contentions
must provide “citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies,” as well as “a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.” FED. R. APP. P.
28(a)(8), (9).
2
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This court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment de novo.4 We review a district court’s denial of a motion
to amend for abuse of discretion.5
First, Appellants argue that the district court erred in rejecting their
overdetention claim against Sheriff Joseph Lopinto. But the district court
found, and Appellants do not contest, that authorities detained them at all
times pursuant to court orders. Appellants’ claim therefore attacks the drug
court’s sentence and is barred by Heck v. Humphry, which requires a § 1983
plaintiff whose claims would necessarily “render a conviction or sentence
invalid” to prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal
or collateral attack.6 Appellants can make no such showing here, so their
overdetention claim may not proceed under § 1983.
Second, Carlisle contests the district court’s dismissal of his state tort
claim against Joseph McNair, a court-contracted counselor who evaluated
Drug Court participants. McNair assessed Carlisle only once, in January
2013. The district court determined that McNair did not have a therapist–
patient relationship with Carlisle and that McNair’s activity did not cause
Carlisle’s alleged harm given that the ultimate decision-making power
“rested with the judges administering the program.” Appellants do not argue
on appeal that McNair owed any duty to them, obliquely challenging only the
district court’s power to dismiss insufficient claims under Federal Rule of
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4
Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., 278 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted).
5
Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th
Cir. 2014).
6
512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994).
3
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No. 22-30031
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).7 Carlisle therefore fails to show that the district
court erred in dismissing his state law tort claim on the merits.
Third, Carlisle contests the district court’s determination that any
state law claims against McNair arising prior to April 27, 2015, were
prescribed.8 The district court determined that the drug court imposed all
sanctions before that date, and Carlisle was therefore aware of facts that
would put a reasonable person on notice that McNair committed any of the
alleged wrongs against him. On appeal, Carlisle cites mainly federal case law
discussing tolling in employment claims under the continuing violation
doctrine. This argument is inapposite, and Carlisle points to no facts alleging
that McNair continued to cause him harm after April 27, 2015. Carlisle’s
argument does not show that the district court erred in finding claims arising
before that date prescribed.
Fourth, Appellants argue that McNair acted with deliberate
indifference to the conditions of Appellants’ confinement. The district court
concluded that McNair was entitled to qualified immunity, dismissing “all §
1983 claims for damages against McNair” with prejudice. Appellants do not
challenge the district court’s determination that McNair retained qualified
immunity, which bars relief on the deliberate indifference claim. Appellants
also point to no facts indicating that McNair knew of and disregarded an
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7
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (citation omitted).
8
Appellants filed their complaint on April 27, 2016, see Complaint, Carlisle v.
Normand, 2:16-CV-3767 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1), and the statute of limitations
is one year.
4
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excessive risk to Appellants’ health or safety.9 Appellants demonstrate no
error in the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to McNair.
Fifth, Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their motion
to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. A “district court properly exercises its
discretion under Rule 15(a)(2) when it denies leave to amend for a substantial
reason, such as undue delay, repeated failures to cure deficiencies, undue
prejudice, or futility.”10 The district court reasoned that Appellants were
“simply shifting their claims in response to the Court’s rulings, and that the
Sheriff would be unduly prejudiced at this stage of litigation if Plaintiffs were
allowed to significantly amend the claims against him, particularly given the
status of his pending Motion for Summary Judgment.” Appellants argue that
they had good cause to amend and that the district court lacked a substantial
reason to deny the motion but provide no reasons specific to their case. We
are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to file a sixty-page amended complaint in these circumstances.
Appellants fail to show district court error in any orders rejecting
claims brought against individuals conducting work related to the Drug
Court. We AFFIRM.
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9
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US 825, 837 (1994).
10
U.S. ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2014).
5