Jeanty v. Big Bubba's

Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
June 29, 2023
No. 22-40241
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Van Damme V. Jeanty,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds, a corporate entity,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-366
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
Van Damme V. Jeanty, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his claims of breach of contract and false imprisonment against
Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM in part,
REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
I.
In November 2015, Jeanty was arrested and released on a surety bond1
provided by Big Bubba’s. Jeanty was formally charged with the same offense
in April 2016, but due to an epileptic seizure, he was hospitalized before re-
ceiving notice of the indictment. As a result, he was incapacitated for several
months, but according to Jeanty, his wife stayed in touch with Big Bubba’s
on his behalf. In July 2016, Big Bubba’s filed a petition with the trial court,
requesting an arrest warrant for Jeanty on the grounds that he had failed to
fulfill his contractual obligations by neglecting to check in and provide con-
tact information. The trial court subsequently granted the request, and Jeanty
was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.
On May 13, 2019, Jeanty sued Big Bubba’s, alleging that it violated
their agreement and caused him to be wrongfully arrested by presenting mis-
leading information to the court in order to obtain the arrest warrant. Big
Bubba’s moved to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that under the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, a surety such as itself is permitted to present a petition to the trial
court requesting an arrest warrant, and that such submission does not give
rise to a cause of action.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Jeanty’s false impris-
onment claim because his arrest was concededly based on a warrant whose
validity was undisputed. In addition, the magistrate judge recommended
_____________________
1
“A surety bond creates a three-party relationship, in which the surety becomes
liable for the principal’s debt or duty to the third party obligee.” In re Falcon V, L.L.C., 44
F.4th 348, 350 n.1 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
2
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
dismissal of his contract claim because under Tex. Occ. Code
§ 1704.207(b)–(c), an individual has the right to challenge their surrender by
a bail bond agent in the same court where they are being prosecuted. Since
Jeanty did not avail himself of this remedy, the magistrate judge determined
that Jeanty could not pursue a claim for breach of contract. The magistrate
judge then concluded that to challenge surrender, “the principal must do so
in the court that authorized the surrender.”
Jeanty objected to the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recom-
mendation. On March 17, 2022, the district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation in its entirety and granted Big
Bubba’s motion to dismiss. Jeanty timely filed this appeal.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA, 369 F.3d
833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) evaluates the ade-
quacy of the allegations in a complaint rather than the merits of the case.
George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, we
“accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,
948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
cepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may also “‘be appropriate based on a success-
ful affirmative defense,’ provided that the affirmative defense ‘appear[s] on
3
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
the face of the complaint.’” Basic Cap. Mgmt. v. Dynex Cap., Inc., 976 F.3d
585, 588 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006)). In such a sce-
nario, the pleadings must “reveal beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove
no set of facts” that would overcome the defense or otherwise entitle them
to relief. Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1991). Pro se pleadings, such as Jeanty’s, must be liberally construed. Alderson
v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017).
III.
On appeal, Jeanty contends that his false imprisonment and contract
claims were wrongly dismissed by the district court. We begin with his false
imprisonment claim.
Under Texas law, the elements of a false imprisonment claim are: (1)
willful detention; (2) without consent; and (3) without authority of law. Wal–
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002). Legal author-
ization or justification is established either through the issuance of an arrest
warrant or by demonstrating the presence of probable cause. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Odem, 929 S.W.2d 513, 519 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996,
writ denied).
If an arrest or detention is executed under a process that is legally suf-
ficient in form and duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction—where
an arrest is made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, for example—there is no
cause of action for false imprisonment. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918
(Tex. 1982). To determine whether an arrest warrant is valid, we look only to
the form of the process by which the arrest warrant was made. Id. If the war-
rant is valid on its face, our inquiry ends there. Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d
25, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
4
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
Here, Jeanty challenges the grounds on which the warrant was issued,
not the warrant’s facial validity. As Jeanty concedes, he was arrested
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Therefore, there can be no cause of action
for false imprisonment. See James, 637 S.W.2d at 918. Consequently, we
affirm the district court on this issue.
While Jeanty’s false imprisonment claim was properly dismissed, his
contract claim was not. The district court held that principals, such as Jeanty,
who seek to contest a surrender, are “limited to the remedy” set out in Tex.
Occ. Code § 1704.207(b)–(c). We conclude that Jeanty is not limited to
this remedy and therefore reverse the dismissal of his claim.
Texas courts have recognized that bail bonds are contracts between
the surety and the State, whereby the former ensures that the defendant will
appear before the court in exchange for a promise by the State that it will
release the defendant from custody. See Reyes v. State, 31 S.W.3d 343, 345–
46 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.). Under the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, the surety can end its financial liability on the
bond by physically surrendering the principal back into the custody of the
authorities, appropriately notifying the authorities where the principal is oth-
erwise incarcerated, or filing an affidavit stating the cause of surrender with
information sufficient to allow for an arrest warrant to be issued. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.16(a)(1), (2) & art. 17.19(a).
Traditionally, if the surety has wrongfully withdrawn from the bail
bond, Texas law permitted the principal to contest the surrender in a civil
action against the bonding company. See, e.g., Karakey v. Mollohan, 15 S.W.2d
692, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1929, no writ); Ex parte Vogler, 495 S.W.2d
893, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). However, in 1973, the Texas Legislature
passed Article 2372p-3, § 13 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which is
currently recognized as Article 1704.207 of the Texas Occupations Code. See
Cooper v. Hunt, No. 05-14-00928-CV, 2016 WL 1213299, at *2 n.6 (Tex.
5
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
App.—Dallas Mar. 29, 2016, no pet.) (unpublished). It provides that a
defendant in a criminal case “may contest the surrender” and mandates that
the surety may be obligated to refund fees to the defendant if the “surrender
was without reasonable cause.” Tex. Occ. Code § 1704.207(b)–(c).
Based on the State’s adoption of this provision, the magistrate judge
determined that principals who wish to contest a surrender are now restricted
to the remedy provided by the statute. The magistrate judge further noted
that Jeanty’s argument to the contrary was based on a single footnote in
McConathy v. State, 545 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) and that subse-
quent case law and a recent advisory opinion from the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral have made it clear that the contest provision in § 1704.207 governs a
principal’s right to challenge their surrender. We disagree.
It is well-settled that federal courts sitting in diversity should be slow
to expand state law in the absence of any indication of intent by the state
courts or legislature. See Nicolaci v. Anapol, 387 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“Federal courts sitting in diversity should be cautious about pushing state
law to new frontiers.”) (cleaned up). In the absence of authority supporting
the proposition that § 1704.207 limits a principal’s right to pursue a civil ac-
tion, we find no support for the district court’s conclusion.
Prior to 1973, the only route for a principal to seek relief from a
surety’s wrongful withdrawal from a bail bond agreement was to pursue a
civil cause of action. Vogler, 495 S.W.2d at 894 (“If the surety has wrongfully
withdrawn from the bail bond, appellant’s remedy lies not in a habeas corpus
proceeding but rather in a civil action against the bonding company.”) (empha-
sis added)). However, the enactment of article 2372p-3, § 13 (now
§ 1704.207) allows the principal to recover all or part of the bond fee paid to
the surety in the trial court if the surrender was without probable cause. See
§ 1704.207(b)–(c).
6
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cited this provision in McCona-
thy, only a few years after its passage, ruling that it provided a remedy for the
principal to recover the bond fee paid if the surrender was without reasonable
cause. 545 S.W.2d at 168. However, the court also emphasized that “another
remedy of the principal is a civil action against the surety.” Id. at 169 n.3 (cit-
ing generally Vogler, 495 S.W.2d at 893). Subsequent case law in Texas has
affirmed the availability of a civil cause of action for the principal. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 535, 537–38 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1979, no writ)
(discussing a surrender action in a civil action); Spears v. State, No. 10-08-
00396-CR, 2009 WL 5155573, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 30, 2009, no
pet.) (observing that a principal “can pursue a civil action against the bond
company” in order to “challenge the validity or content” of an Article 17.19
affidavit); Adi v. Rapid Bail Bonding Co., No. 01-08-00290-CV, 2010 WL
547474, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2010, no pet.) (un-
published) (reversing summary judgment for the surety on a breach-of-con-
tract claim).
The two post-McConathy cases cited by the magistrate judge, Robbins
v. Roberts, 833 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ) and Cooper
v. Hunt, No. 05-14-00928-CV, 2016 WL 1213299 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.
29, 2016, no pet.) (unpublished), only affirm that the statutory provision is a
valid remedy and do not suggest that this remedy is exclusive to all other po-
tential remedies available to a principal.
In Roberts, which the magistrate judge cites as proof that “when the
contest provision of Chapter 1704 applies . . . its remedy governs,” the surety
argued that the lower court erred in finding that the principal’s claim was
properly brought in the trial court and that he should have initiated a civil
action. 833 S.W.2d at 620–21. However, the court rejected this argument
finding that § 1704.207 “governs when invoked,” but pointed out that this
7
Case: 22-40241 Document: 00516805153 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/29/2023
No. 22-40241
remedy is “in addition to the remedy of a separate civil action,” not exclusive
of it. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
Likewise, the magistrate judge’s invocation of Hunt misses the mark.
There, a criminal defendant challenged his surrender using the statutory
mechanism; the trial court ruled in his favor, and the surety appealed, arguing
that the challenge “constitutes a separate civil action.” Hunt, 2016 WL
1213299, at *1–3. The court found that the surety had waived her procedural
argument and failed to demonstrate substantive error. Id. at *4–5. But just
like Roberts, this case does not stand for the proposition that suing a bail bond
agent can only be done through § 1704.207.
Similarly, the reliance on the advisory opinion is also misplaced as it
does not address the availability of civil remedies, and as Jeanty correctly
notes, opinions provided by the Texas Attorney General do not constitute
authoritative interpretations of Texas law. See Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d
920, 924 (Tex. 1996).
Thus, the district court’s ruling that Jeanty had to turn to § 1704.207
for a remedy against Big Bubba’s cannot be squared with existing Texas law.
Because the pleadings must “reveal beyond doubt that [Jeanty] can prove no
set of facts” that would overcome Big Bubba’s defense or otherwise entitle
him to relief, the district court erred in dismissing his contract claim. See
Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 938 F.2d at 594.
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court as to Jeanty’s false imprisonment claim, and we REVERSE
and REMAND for further proceedings on his contract claim.
8