Perez v. Hijar

Case: 22-50904 Document: 00516823146 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-50904 July 17, 2023
Summary Calendar
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Alexander Isaiah Perez,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Sandra Hijar, Warden, FCI La Tuna,
Respondent—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:22-CV-324
______________________________
Before Smith, Elrod, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Prison officials caught Alexander Perez, federal prisoner # 44217-013,
using a third-party e-mail communication service that allowed users to mask
the identities of their contacts. A prison disciplinary hearing was held, and
the discipline hearing officer (“DHO”) concluded that Perez violated Pro-
hibited Act Code 296. As a consequence, the DHO sanctioned Perez with
the loss of 27 days of good-conduct time, 180 days of commissary privileges,
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-50904
and 365 days of e-mail privileges.
Perez filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, raising various challenges to
the disciplinary proceeding, which the district court denied. Perez then filed
a Rule 59(e) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district
court likewise denied that motion.
Perez now appeals, raising six arguments: (1) The district court erred
in sua sponte denying the § 2241 petition because it relied on Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases in the United States District
Courts; (2) the district court’s grant of Perez’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) demonstrates that it erred in denying the § 2241 petition;
(3) the disciplinary hearing violated Perez’s due process rights; (4) the dis-
trict court erred in not analyzing the due process claim based on violations by
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) of its disciplinary regulations; (5) the BOP’s
reading of e-mail into Code 296 violated the Administrative Procedures Act;
and (6) the district court erred in denying the Rule 59(e) motion.
A certificate of appealability is not needed because Perez is proceeding
under § 2241. Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001). “In an
appeal from the denial of habeas relief, this court reviews a district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and issues of law de novo.” Id. This court
“may affirm the district court’s denial of relief on any ground supported by
the record.” Hunter v. Tamez, 622 F.3d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2010). Addition-
ally, Perez’s challenge to the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Kapordelis v. Myers, 16 F.4th 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 2021).
Perez’s Rule 4 argument is unpersuasive because Rule 1(b) of the rules
governing § 2254 cases articulates that these rules may apply to other habeas
corpus petitions as well. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Perez’s argument regard-
ing the granting of IFP status fails, as the IFP standard does not encompass a
full inquiry into the merits. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.
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No. 22-50904
1983). Regarding Perez’s due process claim, the record reflects that all three
factors articulated in Wolff v. McDonell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974), were
met, and there was the requisite level of evidence to support the disciplinary
action, see Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454–55
(1985).
Perez’s argument that the district court should have analyzed the due
process claims in light of the BOP’s failure to follow its hearing regulations is
without merit because a prison’s failure to follow its own policies or regula-
tions does not violate due process where constitutional minima were other-
wise satisfied. See Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009). We
also discern no error in the district court’s determination that the inclusion
of e-mail amounted to an interpretation of an existing rule, not a substantive
rule change. Finally, the district court did not err when it denied Perez’s
Rule 59(e) motion. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567
(5th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of the § 2241 petition and the
denial of the Rule 59(e) motion.
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