United States v. Schexnayder

Case: 22-10087 Document: 00516783107 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/12/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10087
Summary Calendar FILED
____________ June 12, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Michael Tremaine Schexnayder,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:19-CR-623-1
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Michael Tremaine Schexnayder appeals his convictions for Hobbs
Act robbery, carrying and brandishing a firearm during a violent crime,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and carjacking. Schexnayder
represented himself with standby counsel at a suppression hearing and at
trial, where he cross-examined witnesses and made arguments before the
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-10087
court and jury. Throughout the proceedings Schexnayder frequently
invoked sovereign citizen arguments and disputed the court’s jurisdiction
over him. Schexnayder argues that he did not receive a fair trial because of
the district court’s failure to hold a competency hearing. He also argues that
he did not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel.
We consider the following factors relevant to decide whether a
competency hearing is necessary: “(1) any history of irrational behavior,
(2) the defendant’s demeanor at [the proceeding], and (3) any prior medical
opinion on competency.” United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th
Cir. 2002). All three factors are relevant in determining the need for further
inquiry, but one factor, standing alone, may be sufficient. See United States
v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 707 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court’s sua
sponte failure to conduct a competency hearing is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir. 1995). “Whether
reasonable cause exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might
be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.
at 304 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
All three factors support the district court’s decision not to hold a
competency hearing or order a psychological examination. See Messervey, 317
F.3d at 463. First, the district court had before it no evidence of a history of
irrational behavior demonstrating reasonable cause to question
Schexnayder’s competency; no participant in the proceedings alerted the
district court to any evidence showing that Schexnayder had a history of
disturbed behavior reflecting an inability to understand the criminal
proceedings or assist in his defense. Cf. United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892,
895, 902, 904 (5th Cir. 2009). As for Schexnayder’s demeanor in pre-trial
proceedings, the district court personally observed and interacted with
Schexnayder during the hearing on Schexnayder’s request to represent
himself, and it emphasized that he remained engaged and attentive
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No. 22-10087
throughout the hearing and demonstrated his understanding of the
proceeding by voicing his objections and opinions regarding the factual and
legal matters discussed. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
Finally, there was no prior medical opinion establishing reasonable cause to
believe that Schexnayder suffered from a mental illness or defect that
rendered him unable to understand the nature or consequences of the
proceedings or assist in his defense, and his testimony suggested he was
competent. See Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d at 707. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a competency hearing or
ordering a psychological examination. See id. at 706.
We review de novo whether a defendant validly waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial. United States v. Mesquiti, 854
F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2017). Before permitting a defendant to represent
himself, a district court is required to determine whether he has “knowingly
and intelligently” decided to forgo counsel and whether his request was clear
and unequivocal. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Schexnayder clearly and unequivocally
informed the district court of his desire to represent himself, and the district
court accordingly held a Faretta hearing to determine whether his waiver of
counsel and decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made.
The record demonstrates that the district court’s warnings were consistent
with those approved by this court. See Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at 274. Further,
nothing in the record indicates that Schexnayder did not understand the
difficulties of proceeding pro se. See id. at 274-75. Thus, Schexnayder’s
decision to waive his Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel was knowing
and intelligent. See id.; Davis, 269 F.3d at 518.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
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