McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist

Case: 22-30490 Document: 00516860566 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 16, 2023
No. 22-30490 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Katelynn McLin,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Twenty-First Judicial District; Robert H. Morrison,
III,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:21-CV-411
______________________________
Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
In this employment dispute, the district court dismissed with
prejudice a suit brought by Katelynn McLin against the Louisiana
Twenty-First Judicial District and its former Chief Judge Robert Morrison,
concluding that: (1) the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity to
be sued; (2) McLin failed to plausibly allege that she was treated differently
from anyone else; and, (3) Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified
immunity. McLin now appeals. We AFFIRM.
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I.
A.
McLin is a White female previously employed by Louisiana’s Twenty-
First Judicial District.1 On November 13, 2020, McLin attended a clerical
staff luncheon convened by the Twenty-First Judicial District. During the
luncheon, the Judicial Administrator Sara Brumfield publicly praised McLin
for her work performance. McLin sat next to T.D. at the luncheon, a Black
colleague whom she had never met. At the end of the lunch, McLin stated
that it was “time to go back to LP and deal with the LPians.” McLin alleges
that “LPians” refers to citizens of Livingston Parish, and that she did not use
that term “objectively or intend[ing] to be offensive, racially charged, or
antagonistic in any possible sense.” The Parties do not suggest the use of
“LPians” has any racial connotation. Accepting Plaintiff’s pleading as true,
it either lacks a racial element or none was intended. Yet the comment
prompted T.D. to search for McLin’s social media.
While searching through McLin’s Facebook posts, T.D. noticed an
article McLin reposted regarding a motorist on I-244 who drove his vehicle
and horse trailer through a blockade of protestors rallying in the wake of
George Floyd’s murder. In the post, McLin, who herself keeps and trains
horses and drives a truck with a horse trailer, posted “All I’m going to say is
_____________________
1
Her employment was “at will” and “may be terminated by either the Court or
the employee at any time, for any reason not prohibited by law.” McLin began her career
with the Twenty-First Judicial District as a collection’s department collector. At the time
of her termination, she had been promoted to a Hearing Officer’s Secretary.
2
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that Silver Duramax enjoys pulling that black horse trailer at 80mph
#IWillrunYouOver.”2
T.D. complained about the Facebook post and the use of the term
“LPians” to her supervisor, Judge Blair Edwards. Judge Edwards then
brought the complaint to Chief Judge Morrison, who terminated McLin’s
employment. Chief Judge Morrison asked Brumfield to process the
termination of employment, and Brumfield, in turn, told McLin that she
“hate[d] having to do this” but that she “had no other choice” as her “hands
are tied.” McLin then confronted Chief Judge Morrison who confirmed that
his decision to terminate her was based on the Facebook post and comment
to T.D., observing that “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other
choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.”
B.
In April 2021, McLin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the Twenty-First
Judicial District unlawfully terminated her based on her race in violation of
Title VII, and the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. This suit in the Middle
District of Louisiana followed, with: (1) a disparate treatment claim based on
race in violation of Title VII against the Twenty-First Judicial District, (2)
_____________________
2
We note that the Twenty-First Judicial District did not have any rules or policies
restricting employees from engaging in political speech via social media, and the only
Twenty-First Judicial District policy concerning political speech prohibited employees
from publicly endorsing political candidates for office. McLin alleges that her post was such
a political opinion.
3
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§ 1981 and § 1983 claims of disparate treatment based on race against Chief
Judge Morrison, (3) a claim of unlawful termination for “political activity”
in violation of Louisiana state law against the Twenty-First Judicial District,
and (4) a § 1983 claim of unlawful termination in retaliation for engaging in
protected speech in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution against Chief Judge Morrison.
The district court dismissed all claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), holding that the Twenty-First Judicial District lacked the capacity
to be sued, that Chief Judge Morrison was entitled to qualified immunity, and
the Complaint failed to state a claim. McLin timely appealed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss de
novo.3 Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court,4 with the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction.5
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, the court
first considers its jurisdiction.6
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de
novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the
_____________________
3
Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
4
Id.5
Id.6
Id.4
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light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”7 A complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion only if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”8
Finally, we review denials of motions to amend for abuse of
discretion,9 but “where the district court’s denial of leave to amend was
based solely on futility, this court applies a de novo standard of review
‘identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6).’”10 It is not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to amend
if it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.11
III.
McLin first argues that whether she sued a judicial district instead of
a district court is only a matter of semantics.12 We disagree. Regardless of
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7
Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted).
8
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
9
Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2016).
10
Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting City
of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010)).
11
Stem, 813 F.3d at 216.
12
On the other hand, the Twenty-First Judicial District argues that makes all the
difference, as “the judicial districts are just geographical areas. The district courts, on the
other hand, are subject to the control, oversight, and funding of numerous other public
entities.” McLin contends that this is “an argument without much relevance because, first,
these are really the same entity, and, second, if this Court were to find the Judicial District
Court was capable of being sued based on the merits arguments below, but not the Judicial
5
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whether McLin sued the Twenty-First Judicial District or the Twenty-First
Judicial District Court, the suit fails because both entities lack juridical
personality under Louisiana law.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), Louisiana state law governs
the capacity of a state district court to be sued.13 By its metric, capacity
belongs to a juridical person. The term is defined as “an entity to which the
law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.”14 The
Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining an entity’s
juridical status in Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans.15 The
Roberts court held that:
The important determination with respect to the juridical
status or legal capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size,
shape, or label. Rather the determination that must be made in
each particular case is whether the entity can appropriately be
regarded as an additional and separate government unit for the
particular purpose at issue. In the absence of positive law to the
contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to be a
juridical person separate and distinct from other government
entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to
function independently and not just as the agency or division
of another governmental entity.16
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District, plaintiff repeats her request originally made to the district court for leave to amend
her complaint to make that change.”
13
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (“Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the
law of the state where the court is located[.]”).
14
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24.
15
634 So.2d 341 (La. 1994).
16
Id. at 346–47.
6
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Where there is no constitutional or statutory authority for an entity to sue or
be sued, it lacks capacity under Roberts.17 The Louisiana Constitution
organizes Louisiana’s government into three separate branches, legislative,
executive, and judicial.18 Louisiana’s district courts are created by the
Louisiana Constitution as component parts of a unified state system. Under
that system, the Twenty-First Judicial District is not a separate entity. It is a
part of the greater body of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana’s state
government.19
The legislature did not classify judicial districts as political
subdivisions for all purposes, as it limited the classification to a particular
revenue statute.20 McLin’s comparing the Twenty-First Judicial District to
“Fire Protection Districts” or “Hospital Service Districts” is unavailing as
the legislature granted the latter two districts the right “to sue and be
sued.”21 In creating specific types of districts capable of suit and not others, it
implicitly chose not to make judicial districts separate entities.22 Having
“district” in their name does not alone give them juridical status. The district
_____________________
17
Id.18
See La. Const. art. II.
19
See Roberts, 634 So.2d at 346–47.
20
See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:308.
21
See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1500(A); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:1060.
22
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163 (1973) (“If [Louisiana] had meant to . . .
[effectuate the desired scheme] . . . ‘it knew how to use express language to that effect.’ ”
(quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 (1970))); see also NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S.
513, 600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If the [legislature] had thought [to enact a given
scheme], they would have known how to do so.”).
7
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court did not err in holding the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the
capacity to be sued.23
IV.
Turning to the claims against Chief Judge Morrison, McLin argues
that the district court erred in dismissing her § 1981 and Title VII claims. We
affirm the district court, but upon a different ground.24
Our “analysis of discrimination claims under § 1981 is identical to the
analysis of Title VII claims.”25 McLin alleges disparate treatment, which
“addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than others
based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”26
McLin rests her claims on being a White female.
The district court dismissed the claims, explaining that “Plaintiff does
not allege any direct evidence of [Chief] Judge Morrison’s discriminatory
motive . . . and therefore must prove her case through circumstantial
_____________________
23
Since we conclude the Twenty-First Judicial District lacks the capacity to be
sued and is instead properly considered a part of the Judicial Branch of Louisiana state
government, allowing McLin to amend her complaint to bring her claims against Louisiana
would be futile. The Eleventh Amendment bars McLin’s state-law claim for political
discrimination arising under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:961. See Richardson v. S. Univ., 118
F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997). And while Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity for Title VII purposes, see Ussery v. State of La. on Behalf of La. Dep’t
of Health & Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1998), as explained below, McLin fails to
state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. See Section IV.
24
See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting
that this Court “may affirm [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] on any basis supported by the record”
(citation omitted)).
25
Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017).
26
Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006).
8
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evidence, according to the burden-shifting framework established by . . .
McDonnell Douglas.”27
We disagree. A complaint need not allege “each prong of the prima
facie test for disparate treatment” in order to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion; rather, to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a
complaint must plausibly set out facts that the “defendant took the adverse
employment action against a plaintiff because of her protected status.”28 As
we have previously summarized:
[T]here are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to
support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an
adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because
of her protected status. . . . We reiterate, however, that a court
errs by requiring a plaintiff to plead something more than the
“ultimate elements” of a claim. A court thus inappropriately
heightens the pleading standard by subjecting a plaintiff’s
allegations to a rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis under
the McDonnell Douglas framework in response to a motion to
dismiss.29
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27
McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 614 F. Supp. 3d 278, 287 (M.D. La. 2022)
(internal citation omitted and revised).
28
Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
omitted).
29
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
9
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While the able district judge analyzed the claims under the McDonnell
Douglas standard,30 a plaintiff need only plead an adverse employment action,
taken against her because of her protected status.31 McLin fails to do this.
McLin seeks to meet the racial causation element with the comments
made by Brumfield that her “hands are tied” as well as the Chief Judge’s
tone and comment stating “[i]n today’s world that we live in, I have no other
choice but to terminate you. You need to watch what you say and do.” These
speculative allegations do not carry the day. McLin issued the public
statement “#IWillrunYouOver” in reference to driving her truck over
peaceful protestors. Taking all the factual allegations as true, a more
reasonable and obvious interpretation than the one put forth by McLin is that
her termination had to do with her public threat to run over people. While
the district court erred in requiring McLin to make allegations that satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas standard, McLin still failed to plead one ultimate element
a plaintiff is required to plead: that the termination was taken against her
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30
For example, the district court held that “Plaintiff satisfies the first three
elements of her claim: she belonged to a protected class ([W]hite), excelled at her position,
and was nonetheless fired. Still, as noted in Defendants’ dismissal papers, Plaintiff falters
at the fourth element because she has not plausibly alleged any differential treatment, which
requires allegations establishing that a ‘similarly situated’ comparator was not fired despite
committing nearly the same misconduct.” McLin, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 288 (internal citation
omitted). Being terminated is a sufficient adverse employment action.
31
Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767.
10
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because of her protected status.32 We conclude that McLin has not asserted
plausible facts meeting the elements of this claim.33
V.
Finally, McLin argues the district court erred in granting Chief Judge
Morrison qualified immunity on her First Amendment retaliation claim. We
disagree.
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability
in their individual capacity so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”34 “It protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”35 “Qualified immunity shields federal and
state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”36
“Ultimately, ‘the central concern is whether the official has fair warning that
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32
Id.33
Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm
a district court’s dismissal based on rule 12(b)(6) on any basis supported by the record.”
(internal citation omitted)).
34
Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
omitted).
35
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
36
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
11
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his conduct violates a constitutional right.’”37 We may decide which prong
of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.38 Our inquiry starts and
ends with the clearly established prong, whether Chief Judge Morrison
violated a clearly established constitutional right.
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the public
employee must establish that: “(1) she suffered an adverse employment
action; (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) her interest in
commenting on matters of public concern outweighs the employer’s interest
in promoting efficiency; and (4) her speech motivated the employer’s
adverse action.”39 Only the third prong is at issue.40
It is canon that “public employees do not surrender all their First
Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”41 Rather, some speech,
even if it “concerns information related to or learned through public
employment,” deserves protection because “‘[g]overnment employees are
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37
Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Delaughter v.
Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir. 2018)).
38
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (“[T]he judges of the district
courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the order of
decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”).
39
Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 179–80 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
40
See Graziosi v. City of Greenville Miss., 775 F.3d 731, 740 (5th Cir. 2015)
(observing that “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public” due to its
role as employer is a question of law (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418
(2006))).
41
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.
12
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often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they
work.’”42 Yet, “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions;
without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public
services.”43
In determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected by
the First Amendment, we “strike a balance between ‘the interests of
[employees] . . . commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of [the government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.’”44 In particular, we evaluate
whether the speech has caused disruption, impeded performance, or
“affected working relationships necessary to the department’s proper
functioning.”45 “When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling
public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s
judgment is appropriate.”46
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42
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original).
43
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
44
Graziosi, 775 F.3d at 740 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.
205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
45
Brawner v. City of Richardson, Texas, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal
citation omitted).
46
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). When performing this balancing
test, courts consider “whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony
among co-workers [or] has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which
13
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McLin fails to demonstrate that her interests outweigh those of the
Twenty-First Judicial District.47 The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]
government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its
role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech
that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”48 Here, Chief Judge
Morrison’s interest in an efficient, harmonious work environment in its
office outweighs McLin’s interests in her speech.49 Not only would a public
Facebook post about running over Black Lives Matter protestors pose a
threat to amicable workplace relationships, it strikes a blow against the
Twenty-First Judicial District by undermining its efforts to stay true to the
fact and image of a court whose “paramount purpose [is] providing a fair and
impartial open forum in which the public may resolve its disputes.”50 Adding
Chief Judge Morrison’s substantial interest in maintaining workplace trust
and efficiency and responding to threats to office morale, the balance weighs
against McLin. In other words, McLin did not show that Chief Judge
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personal loyalty and confidence are necessary[.]” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388
(1987).
47
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. “[T]he judicial branch depends upon the confidence
of the people it serves. Without that necessary confidence, the judiciary cannot serve its
paramount purpose of providing a fair and impartial open forum in which the public may
resolve its disputes.” In re Benge, 24 So. 3d 822, 845 (La. 2009). This duty falls upon Chief
Judge Morrison.
48
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
49
A “chief judge . . . shall exercise, for a term designated by the court, the
administrative functions prescribed by rule of court.” La. Const. art. V, § 17.
50
In re Benge, 24 So. 3d at 845. By McLin’s own concession, her post was public
and caused issues at work when T.D. saw it.
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Morrison violated a clearly established constitutional right. For at the very
least, the law is sufficiently uncertain so as to support Chief Judge Morrison’s
defense of qualified immunity.51 This public servant cannot be held
personally liable in money damages for the difficult choice he was called upon
to make and that is the issue before this court. The district court did not err
in granting Chief Judge Morrison’s qualified immunity defense against
McLin’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
****
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
_____________________
51
See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(holding that qualified immunity must be granted “if a reasonable official would be left
uncertain of the law’s application to the facts confronting him”); Presley v. City of Benbrook,
4 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he essence of qualified immunity [is] that an officer
may make mistakes that infringe constitutional rights and yet not be held liable where, given
. . . uncertain circumstances, it cannot be said that []he knew []he was violating a person’s
rights.”).
15