Tapss, LLC v. Nunez Co.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 10, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
__________________________ Clerk
No. 05-51671
Summary Calendar
__________________________
In Re: CYNTHIA MORGAN RIPPSTEIN
Debtor,
________________________
TAPSS, LLC,
Appellant,
versus
NUNEZ COMPANY,
Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(5:05-CV-61)
___________________________________________________
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
*
PER CURIAM:
The district court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court, which granted
summary judgment to Nunez Company (“Nunez”). TAPSS, LLC, appeals the district
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
court’s decision and also moves to certify the legal question at issue to the Texas Supreme
Court. We affirm the judgment of the district court and deny the motion to certify the
question.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The facts of this case are undisputed. In October 1991, a judgment was rendered
against Van Rippstein in the amount of $610,000 plus costs and interest. In May 1992, an
abstract of judgment was recorded and indexed in Comal County, Texas, creating a
judgment lien on Van Rippstein’s real property in Comal County, including after-acquired
real property. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.001. Van Rippstein married Cynthia Rippstein two
years later, and shortly thereafter, Cynthia Rippstein purchased property, called the
Rolling Oaks property, in Comal County. Acquired during marriage, the property was
community property. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.002.
In September 2001, a writ of execution issued on the 1991 judgment, preventing the
judgment from becoming dormant. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 34.001. In June
2003, Cynthia Rippstein sold the Rolling Oaks property to Nunez for $1.75 million. At the
time of the closing, Van Rippstein conveyed his interest in the property to his wife by
quitclaim deed, and she in turn sold the collective share to Nunez. The judgment was still
unpaid at the time of sale. In July 2003, TAPSS acquired the 1991 judgment by assignment.
In August 2003, more than ten years after the May 1992 abstract of judgment, a second
abstract of judgment was filed in Comal County. TAPSS then attempted to execute the
judgment by seizing, among other property, the Rolling Oaks property.
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Cynthia Rippstein brought suit in state court, seeking a temporary restraining order
and injunctive relief to prevent execution of the judgment. TAPSS filed a counter claim
seeking declaratory judgment that the judgment lien was valid and also filed a third-party
action against Nunez for foreclosure of the judgment lien. After Cynthia Rippstein filed
for chapter eleven bankruptcy, the proceedings continued in bankruptcy court. Nunez
moved for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, finding (1) that,
under TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.006, the judgment lien terminated after ten years, and (2) that,
therefore, the Rolling Oaks property was not encumbered at the time of the sale in June
2003. The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. TAPSS appeals this
ruling and moves to certify the question of the interpretation of § 52.006 to the Texas
Supreme Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the decision of a district court, sitting as an appellate court, by applying
the same standards of review to the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law as applied to the district court.” U.S. Dept. of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt),
348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Total Minatome Corp. v. Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc. (In
re Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc.), 258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001)). Findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law, de novo. Id. We also review de novo the
bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment. Ingalls v. Erlewine (In re Erlewine), 349
F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2003); Zer-Ilan v. Frankford (In re CPDC, Inc.), 337 F.3d 436, 441 (5th
Cir. 2003).
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III. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the sole issue is the interpretation of TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.006.
Section 52.006, which is entitled “Duration of a Lien,” provides: “A judgment lien
continues for 10 years following the date of recording and indexing the abstract, except
that if the judgment becomes dormant during that period the lien ceases to exist.” The
parties do not dispute that the judgment had not become dormant and that a judgment lien
arose based on the abstract of judgment recorded in May 1992. The parties do dispute
whether the judgment lien still encumbered the Rolling Oaks property at the time it was
conveyed to Nunez in June 2003, more than ten years after the May 1992 abstract of
judgment was filed. Nunez contends that the statute provides that the judgment lien
expired at the conclusion of ten years. TAPSS maintains that the lien was still valid,
because the underlying judgment had not become dormant.
Under Texas law, a court construes a statute in accordance with the legislative
intent. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Schutz, 101 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tex. App.
2002) (citing, inter alia, Albertson’s Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 960 (Tex. 1999)). See
also In re CPDC, 337 F.3d at 442 (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 383
(Tex. 2000)). In doing so, a court first looks to the statute’s language and presumes that the
legislature intended the plain meaning of the statute’s terms. Schutz, 101 S.W.3d at 520
(citations omitted); Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865
(Tex. 1999). If a statute is unambiguous, a court may not employ other rules of
construction to create ambiguity but should give the statute its common meaning.
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Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865–66; St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505
(Tex. 1997).
TAPSS argues that the statute should be interpreted broadly. TAPSS states that the
word “continues” used in the statute is not the same as “expires” and that the statute
should be read to provide for the continuance of the lien as long as the judgment is not
dormant. However, TAPSS’s suggested interpretation of § 52.006 is contrary to the plain
language of the statute. The statute explicitly provides that a judgment lien lasts ten years,
unless the underlying judgment becomes dormant, in which case the lien expires before
ten years have lapsed. “Continues for” is synonymous with “lasts” or “expires after” in
this provision; otherwise, the “10 years” time-frame would be meaningless. The plain
language of the statute does not suggest that the lien continues beyond ten years as long
as the underlying judgment remains valid. Additionally, § 52.001, which provides for the
establishment of the lien, references both a “first” and “subsequent” abstract of judgment;
in other words, the statute anticipates that a subsequent abstract may be filed to extend the
lien beyond ten years. Consequently, we agree with the district court that a judgment lien
terminates at the expiration of the ten year period, even if the underlying judgment is not
dormant.
Though the plain meaning of the statute dictates this result, we also find support
in other sources. Early Texas cases, which discuss the predecessor statute of § 52.006 have
made clear that a judgment lien terminates at the conclusion of ten years. See Burton
Lingo Co. v. Warren, 45 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App. 1931); Nichols v. Cansler, 140 S.W.2d
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254, 256 (Tex. App. 1940). See also TEX. GOVT. CODE § 311.023 (providing that, when
construing a statute, a court may consider a former statutory provision). Recently, in
Olivares v. Nix Trust, a Texas appellate court cited to one of the early cases for the
proposition that “a judgment lien terminates by the expiration of the ten-year period.” 126
S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Burton Lingo Co., 45 S.W.2d at 752). Finally,
various Texas practice guides employ the same interpretation of § 52.006 as that of the
bankruptcy and district courts. See, e.g., 5 ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, MCDONALD &
CARLSON TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 31.17 (2005); 1 W. MICHAEL BAGGETT & BRIAN THOMPSON
MORRIS, TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: REAL ESTATE LITIGATION §1:101 (2006). Because the plain
language of the statute is clear, and because we find support for the plain interpretation
in other sources, we reject TAPSS’s various arguments that the statute should be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with its common meaning.
Finally, we deny TAPSS’s motion to certify. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1
provides that the Texas Supreme Court may answer question of law certified to it if the
certifying court is presented with question of Texas law without controlling Texas
Supreme Court precedent. TEX. R. APP. P. 58.1. The decision whether to certify a question
or not lies within our sound discretion. Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 283
F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 2002)). Generally, we will not certify questions where Texas law is
sufficiently clear. See id. Because the plain meaning of § 52.006 is unambiguous, we see
no need to certify the question at issue to the Texas Supreme Court.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The motion to certify is DENIED.
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