Foley v. University of MS

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60339
Summary Calendar
DEAN MICHAEL FOLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:98-CV-219-LN
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60405
Summary Calendar
DEAN MICHAEL FOLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:98-CV-219-LN
March 14, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The jury awarded Dean Michael Foley damages for race and sex
discrimination, and the district court awarded him attorney fees in
this Title VII case. The University of Mississippi Medical Center
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
and damages, and that the district court committed error in its
award of attorney's fees. We AFFIRM.
The Medical Center appeals from the district court's denial of
its alternative motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial. We review a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law de novo. See Scott v. University of Mississippi, 148 F.3d
493, 503-4 (5th Cir. 1998). When a case was tried to a jury, we
examine the sufficiency of the evidence by considering all the
evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in a light favorable to
the verdict. See id. We review the denial of a motion for a new
trial for abuse of discretion. See Sibley v. LeMaire, 184 F.3d
481, 486 (5th Cir. 1999).
Foley was employed as a nurse at the University of Mississippi
Medical Center. He was terminated by his supervisor after having
his license restricted for patient abuse. He alleged that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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nonwhite female nurses with restricted licenses were not
terminated. The Medical Center urges us to reverse the jury's
verdict because Foley failed to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination, as the other nurses were not similarly situated
employees. When a case has been tried to a jury, we do not examine
the verdict through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
but decide whether the plaintiff met his ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. See Scott, 148 F.3d at 504. The Medical Center
argues that the nonwhite female nurses were not similarly situated
to Foley, because the restrictions imposed upon their licenses were
less extensive. The director of nursing testified in her
deposition that she terminated Foley because his license was
restricted rather than because of the features of the restrictions.
Foley offered as comparators nonwhite female nurses with restricted
licenses who were retained by the Medical Center. A rational jury
could have found that Foley was treated differently than similarly
situated nonwhite females because of his race and gender and
disbelieved the Medical Center's proffered nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. We agree with the district court that the
evidence supports the verdict.
The jury awarded Foley $ 70,000 in damages, and the Medical
Center argues that the amount of the award is not supported by the
evidence. The Medical Center did not present this issue to the
district court. We do not consider issues not presented to the
trial court. See Ferguson v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir.
1997).
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We review the district court's initial determination of
attorney fees for clear error, and its adjustments to the lodestar
amount for abuse of discretion. See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc.,
135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998). The Medical Center argues
that the district court should not have awarded fees for time spent
on Foley's grievance hearing with the Medical Center. In fact, the
district court agreed with the Medical Center and did not consider
these hours. The court did, however, consider hours spent on
Foley's EEOC charges, to which the Medical Center also objects.
Fees should be awarded for time spent on the litigation only. See
Webb v. Dyer County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). We see
no error here, since an EEOC filing is a prerequisite to a Title
VII claim.
AFFIRMED.
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