United States v. Ronald Jones

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0653n.06
FILED
No. 08-5009
Sep 06, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
RONALD JONES, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: GIBBONS, ROGERS, COOK, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Defendant Ronald Jones appeals the district court’s imposition of
a mandatory life sentence for possession with intent to distribute 108 grams of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. Jones argues that the jury made no
findings of fact as to the quantity of controlled substances involved, and that thus the district court
erred in concluding that he was required to serve a life sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). He also contends that the district court erred in making findings as to the existence
of prior convictions necessary for the imposition of a mandatory life sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A).
The Government concedes its error on Jones’ first argument. However, Jones’ second argument is
clearly precluded by Supreme Court precedent. We accordingly vacate Jones’ sentence and remand
for resentencing.
No. 08-5009
United States v. Jones
In 2003, Memphis police officers began investigating a methamphetamine distribution ring,
and their interviews with persons involved in the enterprise led them to Jones. [PSR at 3-4.]
Officers eventually discovered quantities of methamphetamine, along with digital scales, at a hotel
where Jones was renting a room. Jones admitted to officers that the drugs belonged to him. [PSR
at 4-5.] The drugs weighed in at 108 grams. [PSR at 5.] A grand jury first charged Jones with
various violations of the Controlled Substances Act on December 16, 2004. [DE 1.] On June 21,
2005, a superseding indictment was filed, charging Jones with (1) conspiracy to possess with the
intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount
of methamphetamine, and (2) possession with intent to distribute approximately 108 grams of a
mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, both in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). [DE 42.] The Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)
on July 6, 2007, noting its intent to seek a life sentence, should Jones be convicted, because of his
two prior convictions for violations of the Controlled Substances Act. [DE 136.] On July 13, 2007,
a federal jury found Jones guilty of the second count, but a mistrial was declared as to the first.1 [DE
146; DE 148.]
In regard to the quantity of methamphetamine involved, the only evidence presented at trial
was the testimony of the Government’s drug chemistry expert. This expert testified that she had
calculated the weight of the methamphetamine mixture as 99 grams. [DE 181 at 100.] She also
explained that she had conducted a purity analysis of a sample of the methamphetamine mixture
1
The court later granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the first count.
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United States v. Jones
from which she concluded that 73 percent of the mixture was methamphetamine; thus, she opined
that the amount of “pure meth” recovered was approximately 72 grams. [DE 181 at 100.] Despite
the testimony in regard to quantity and the indictment’s notation of quantity as to both counts, when
instructing the jury as to the second count, the district court stated as follows: “In the indictment,
particular amounts or quantities of methamphetamine are alleged. The evidence in the case need not
establish the amount or quantity of methamphetamine alleged in the indictment, but only that a
measurable amount of methamphetamine was in fact the subject of the acts charged in the
indictment.” [DE 179 at 18.] Accordingly, the jury was asked solely to answer whether Jones was
guilty or not guilty as to each count and was not required to make a finding as to the particular
quantity of methamphetamine involved.
The court held a sentencing hearing on December 11, 2007. In conjunction with sentencing,
the Government presented testimony to prove Jones’ two prior convictions for purposes of the
mandatory life sentence in § 841(b)(1)(A), and the district court noted that it would decide the
existence of these convictions. [See DE 183 at 27.] The district court did just that, reviewing the
evidence submitted by the Government as to the existence of these convictions and finding that “the
government ha[d] met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on those issues of fact” and that
“these are valid convictions” for purposes of § 841. [DE 184 at 25.] The district court then went
on to sentence Jones to life in prison pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A). Jones now appeals this sentence.
The district court plainly erred in applying 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) without a jury finding
as to the amount of methamphetamine involved in Jones’ offense. Both parties concede that plain
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No. 08-5009
United States v. Jones
error review applies in this case. Further, the Government concedes that the district court erred in
this respect. Because Jones did not raise an objection to the lack of a finding as to the quantity of
drugs at issue before the district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Page, 232 F.3d
536, 543 (6th Cir. 2000). This requires that (1) there be an error, (2) that is plain or clear, (3) that
affects Jones’ substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2001).
It is plain that the district court erred in Jones’ sentencing as Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000), clearly holds that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides for a mandatory life
sentence if a person with two prior felony drug convictions commits a violation of § 841(a) involving
“50 grams or more of methamphetamine . . . or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” However, the maximum sentence for a
person with a similar criminal history who commits a violation of § 841(a) involving an
indeterminate amount of methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance, is thirty years. 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, the amount of methamphetamine involved works to increase the
penalty for a § 841(a) violation, requiring a determination beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury of
this fact.
This court has recognized Apprendi’s application in sentencing under § 841(b)(1). See, e.g.,
United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d
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No. 08-5009
United States v. Jones
490, 521-24 (6th Cir. 2001); Page, 232 F.3d at 542-45. For example, in Graham, the presentence
report noted that the defendant was responsible for one-hundred marijuana plants, which increased
his maximum punishment from five years’ imprisonment to forty years’ imprisonment. 275 F.3d at
521-23. However, the jury did not make any findings as to the amount of marijuana involved. Id.
at 523. We held that Apprendi had been violated, vacated the defendant’s sentence, and remanded
for resentencing. Id. at 524. It is clear that the district court violated Apprendi by sentencing Jones
to life in prison in the absence of a jury finding as to the quantity of methamphetamine involved.
Having established that the district court clearly violated the principles laid out in Apprendi,
we must next address the remaining requirements for a finding of plain error—whether the error
affected Jones’ substantial rights and whether the error affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. Both are met in Jones’ case. In Page, we analyzed these
requirements for plain error in terms of an Apprendi violation:
An error affects substantial rights when the error was prejudicial, that is, when it
“affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” There is no doubt that
imposing additional years of imprisonment beyond that authorized by a jury’s verdict
affects a defendant’s substantial rights. Furthermore, a sentencing error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings when a
court’s error results in imposition of a sentence which is not authorized by law.
232 F.3d at 544 (citations omitted). Here, Jones received a term of imprisonment beyond that
authorized by the jury’s verdict. At most, the jury’s verdict permitted him to be sentenced to thirty
years, but the court imposed a life sentence. This was clear error.
The district court did not err, however, in finding that Jones had been previously convicted
of felony drug charges. Apprendi explicitly excepts this type of fact finding from its requirement of
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a jury determination. 530 U.S. at 490; see also United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560, 563 (6th
Cir. 2002). Thus, “a judge is permitted to find, based on the preponderance of the evidence, the fact
of a prior conviction.” United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 941 (6th Cir. 2008). This precedent
is binding.
For these reasons, we vacate Jones’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
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