James Thomas v. Bill Haslam

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0401n.06
Case No. 20-6188
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Aug 25, 2021
JAMES THOMAS; DAVID HIXSON, )
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
BILL HASLAM, et al., ) TENNESSEE
)
Defendants, )
)
JEFF LONG, Commissioner for the )
Department of Safety and Homeland Security, )
in his official capacity, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: ROGERS, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The district court granted Plaintiffs
James Thomas and David Hixson’s (“Plaintiffs”) motion for summary judgment, concluding that
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(b)(1) (2018) (“Section 105”) violated their constitutional rights. On
appeal, we held that because the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a new law that amended
Section 105—while the appeal was pending—in a manner that provided the Plaintiffs the relief
they sought, the case was moot. Consequently, we vacated the district court’s judgment, remanded
the case, and instructed the district court to dismiss the underlying litigation. The Plaintiffs later
Case No. 20-6618, Thomas, et al v. Haslam, et al,
moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and Jeff Long,1 the Commissioner of
Tennessee’s Department of Safety and Homeland Security (“Defendant”), 2 objected—arguing that
the Plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties.” The district court found that the Plaintiffs were entitled
to attorney’s fees and granted their request. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM in part,
REVERSE in part, and REMAND.
I.
In January 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Section 105. Under this statute, Tennessee residents
were subjected to having their driver’s licenses revoked for failure to timely pay “court debt,”
including court costs, litigation taxes, and fines resulting from a criminal conviction. The
Plaintiffs, residents of Tennessee who suffered from this practice, contended that Section 105
violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
because it did not include an indigency exception.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court granted the
Plaintiffs’ motion and denied the Defendant’s. Specifically, the court: (1) declared Section 105
unconstitutional; (2) ordered that all driver’s licenses that had been revoked based solely on an
individual’s inability to pay court debt be reinstated; and (3) enjoined the State of Tennessee from
further revoking any driver’s licenses pursuant to Section 105 until a lawful procedure was
implemented. The Defendant appealed that decision to our Court.
1
The Plaintiffs named then-Governor of Tennessee, Bill Haslam and Tennessee Attorney General, Herbert
Slatery, III as defendants before the parties jointly stipulated to dismissing Haslam and Slatery from this case. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
2
David Purkey, then-Commissioner of Tennessee’s Department of Safety and Homeland Security, was
initially named as a defendant. During the course of this suit, Long succeeded Purkey in that role, and was
consequently substituted as a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). When using the term “Defendant,” we are referring
to the Commissioner who was in office at that relevant time.
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Case No. 20-6618, Thomas, et al v. Haslam, et al,
Before the appeal was resolved, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a law that
amended Section 105 by, inter alia, relieving any individual from paying court debt who could
provide proof of his or her indigence. 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 438. After this law became
effective, we asked both parties to provide the Court with supplemental briefing to address how
this new law affected their case. The Plaintiffs argued that the passage of this law made their case
moot. We agreed, acknowledging that when a plaintiff abandons an argument on mootness
grounds, that issue is no longer live or justiciable. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910, 911 (6th Cir.
2019). Accordingly, we vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with
instructions for the district court to dismiss the underlying litigation as moot. Id.After the case was remanded, the Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees. They sought
$1,081,174.50 in fees and $3,563.41 in costs.3 In response, the Defendant asserted that because
the Plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits of their claims, the district court should decline to award
the Plaintiffs any fees that they incurred throughout the course of the litigation. The Defendant
especially took issue with the Plaintiffs being awarded attorney’s fees that were incurred on appeal.
The district court was unpersuaded by the Defendant’s arguments and awarded the Plaintiffs
$760,385.56 in attorney’s fees and costs, which included fees for work performed at both the trial
and appellate levels.4
The Defendant’s timely appeal followed.
3
The Plaintiffs first requested $1,114,074.50 in attorney’s fees, but withdrew their fee requests that pertained
to any work performed between May 7, 2019—the day before our Court ordered that this case be held in abeyance
due to the implementation of the new legislation—and September 12, 2019—when we declared that this case was
moot.
4
After analyzing the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ fee request, the district court applied a 30% “across-
the-board” reduction to the total requested attorney’s fees amount sought.
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II.
The question of whether a party has “prevailed” is one we review de novo. Miller v.
Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 496 F.3d
609, 619 (6th Cir. 2007)).
While litigants are generally required to pay their own attorney’s fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988provides an exception to that rule for litigants who are successful with their 42 U.S.C. § 1983actions. McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2010). Pursuant to § 1988, a
“prevailing party” in such litigation has the right to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” For
a plaintiff to have “prevailed,” that party must have “receive[d] at least some relief on the merits
of his claim[,]” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987), and “be able to point to a resolution of
the dispute which changes the legal relationship between [himself] and the defendant[,]” Texas
State Tchrs. Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties because their claims were
dismissed as moot and the district court’s judgment was vacated. We have not yet been tasked
with resolving a case involving this exact procedural posture. However, our Court has recognized,
albeit in dicta, that "‘[w]hen plaintiffs clearly succeeded in obtaining the relief sought before the
district court and an intervening event rendered the case moot on appeal, plaintiffs are still
prevailing parties for the purposes of attorney’s fees for the district court litigation.’” Green Party
of Tennessee v. Hargett, 767 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Diffenderfer v. Gomez–
Colon, 587 F.3d 445, 454 (1st Cir. 2009)). This principle is consistent with how several circuits
have resolved this dispute. See Kirk v. New York State Dep’t of Educ., 644 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir.
2011); Diffenderfer, 587 F.3d at 454; Dahlem by Dahlem v. Bd. of Educ. of Denver Pub. Sch., 901
F.2d 1508, 1512–14 (10th Cir. 1990); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108–10 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
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Case No. 20-6618, Thomas, et al v. Haslam, et al,
Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th
Cir. 1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 415 (3d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, we find that it is
appropriate to apply this standard articulated in Hargett to the instant case.
Based on the events that transpired during this litigation, it is difficult to debate that the
Plaintiffs were prevailing parties at the district court. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs succeeded
and obtained the relief they sought: the district court (1) concluded that Section 105 was
unconstitutional; (2) ordered the Commissioner to reinstate driver’s licenses that had
unconstitutionally been revoked; and (3) enjoined the State from revoking driver’s licenses
pursuant to Section 105 in the future. Even though our Court held that this case was moot because
Section 105 was amended, it does not change the fact that the Plaintiffs prevailed at the district
court.5 Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees for their counsel’s efforts in
obtaining an initial favorable outcome for their clients.
The Defendant alternatively argues that if we were to conclude that the Plaintiffs were
prevailing parties at the district court, we should find that the Plaintiffs should not be permitted to
receive attorney’s fees incurred in the prior appeal. We agree. In Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 483 (1990), the Supreme Court explicitly indicated that in instances where a district
court’s judgment has been “vacated on the basis of an event that mooted the controversy before
the Court of Appeals’ judgment was issued,” a party cannot be deemed a “prevailing party” at that
subsequent stage in the litigation, and would thus not be entitled to attorney’s fees associated with
the cost of the appellate litigation. Id.; Diffenderfer, 587 F.3d at 454. Therefore, because the
5
The Defendant additionally argues that because the Plaintiffs supposedly caused the intervening event that
mooted this case, they cannot be considered prevailing parties. This contention is without merit. The state passed a
new law that amended Section 105, which was the intervening event that rendered the case moot. The Plaintiffs simply
brought this legislative development to our attention. And that does not alter whether they prevailed below.
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Plaintiffs did not prevail at the appeals stage, they are not entitled to attorney’s fees incurred during
the previous appeal.6 Lewis, 494 U.S. at 483.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
6
The Plaintiffs contend that Lewis is distinguishable from the present case because there “[the] plaintiff did
not succeed before the district court and thus was not a prevailing party at any stage of the litigation[.]” The Plaintiffs
are mistaken. In Lewis, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, determining that the statutes at
issue were unconstitutional. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 475.
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