Vikramjeet Singh v. Loretta E. Lynch

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0777n.06
Case No. 15-3066 FILED
Dec 02, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
VIKRAMJEET SINGH, )
)
Petitioner, )
) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
v. ) FROM THE UNITED STATES
) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
LORETTA E. LYNCH, U.S. Attorney General, ) APPEALS
)
Respondent. )
)
) OPINION
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; SUTTON, Circuit Judge; BELL, District Judge.
COLE, Chief Judge. Petitioner Vikramjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India, was
arrested after illegally entering the United States. Singh applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied Singh’s application on the grounds that he was not
credible, and had not met his burden of showing that he faces persecution or torture if he returns
to India. Singh now petitions for review of the BIA’s decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Finding the
BIA’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition.

The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.
Case No. 15-3066, Singh v. Lynch
I. Background
Vikramjeet Singh was born in India on February 18, 1976. A follower of the Sikh
religion, he lived in the town of Tanda Urmar in the majority-Sikh state of Punjab where he
worked as a taxi driver. When he left India to come to the United States in October 2010, Singh
left behind his wife and infant daughter; his wife gave birth to their second daughter about two
months after he was arrested in the United States.
Singh joined the Amritsar Simranjit Singh Mann Party (“Mann Party”), a Sikh religious
and political organization, in 2007. The Mann Party’s main political objective is the creation of
an independent Sikh nation. Singh, however, says that he primarily viewed the party as a
religious organization and assisted with its charitable mission of providing food and clothing to
the impoverished.
Singh claims he fled to the United States because he was persecuted by Hindu members
of the Congress Party, one of the most popular and powerful political parties in India.
Specifically, Singh described three incidents where he was beaten by members of the Congress
Party. Based on these incidents, Singh testified that he fears he will be killed if he returns to
India.
First, Singh claims he was driving to a Mann Party rally in December 2009 when a group
of Congress Party supporters stopped him and his companions. The crowd “started using foul
language.” This escalated to a fist fight between the groups in which Singh and his companions
were beaten. Singh’s group eventually made it to the rally and recounted the incident to Mann
Party leaders. Party leaders took them to the police station, but Singh says the police took no
action “because the country is being ruled by [the] Congress Party.”
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Second, Singh claims he was attending a Mann Party rally in February 2010 when the
speaker, Mann Singh (the head of the Mann Party), “used some offensive words against Hindus.”
Singh alleges Congress Party members who were in attendance then started a fight, during which
Singh was injured.
Third, Singh claims that on August 15, 2010, he had another altercation with Congress
Party supporters as he drove with his wife and infant daughter to attend a Mann Party rally. As
they were driving to the rally, they passed through a competing Congress Party rally. When
Singh honked his horn so his car could pass, the crowd started “us[ing] foul language.” Singh
says someone pulled him out of the car and a number of people began beating him. Singh also
says the crowd “abus[ed]” his wife by using “very bad” language, though they did not physically
assault her. Singh and his family eventually reached the rally, and were again taken by party
leaders to see the police. After keeping them waiting for “a long time,” the police took
statements from Singh and his wife and said they would “go take some action,” but they never
did.
The same day as this third encounter—August 15, 2010—Singh alleges he was alone
when he was stopped by members of the Congress Party. He says the Congress Party members
told him that if he continued supporting the Mann Party he would be killed. This was the last
straw, and made Singh decide to leave the country.
Singh paid a friend to get him to the United States. On October 8, 2010, Singh flew out
of Delhi. After traveling through several countries, Singh finally arrived in the United States
when an “agent” smuggled him across the Mexican border. Singh did not seek asylum in any of
these other countries.
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Singh’s family has since relocated to the city of Gobindgarh, also in Punjab. They have
not experienced any persecution or violence since Singh left.
Singh was arrested on October 26, 2010, in Rio Grande City, Texas. An immigration
officer interviewed Singh and found he had a credible fear of persecution. Singh conceded
removability and filed an application for asylum. He posted bond, was released from custody,
and moved to Battle Creek, Michigan. Singh filed a corrected application for asylum on May 24,
2011.
On August 1, 2012, Singh had a merits hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in
Detroit, Michigan. Singh was the only witness who testified. A continued hearing was held on
October 1, 2012, so Singh could present corroborating documents that he had failed to bring to
the previous hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). In support of his claims, Singh
submitted, among other documents, two Indian driver’s licenses, an affidavit from his wife, and a
letter from the Mann Party’s Secretary.
On March 8, 2013, the IJ issued a decision denying Singh’s application. The IJ found
that Singh was not credible, and that the documents he submitted were either fraudulent or
fabricated. Thus, Singh had not met his burden of proving his claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the CAT. The IJ also found that Singh’s application was frivolous
because it contained knowingly false material.
On December 30, 2014, the BIA issued a written opinion affirming the IJ’s denial of
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. However, the BIA reversed the
IJ’s determination that Singh’s application was frivolous.
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II. Analysis
A. Legal Standards
“Because the BIA did not summarily affirm or adopt the IJ’s reasoning and provided an
explanation for its decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.”
Young Hee Kwak v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey,
507 F.3d 1044, 1047 (6th Cir. 2007)). We review the BIA’s factual findings, including its
credibility determinations, “[u]nder the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Khozhaynova
v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 2011). The BIA’s decision is “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702–03 (6th Cir. 2004).
In order to succeed on an application for asylum, an applicant must show that he “has
suffered past persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, social group, or political
opinion; or show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on one of those same bases.”
Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations marks,
alterations, and citation omitted); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Similarly, withholding removal
requires an applicant to show that he faces a “clear probability” of persecution based on one of
these same protected grounds. Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2006). To
qualify for CAT protection, the applicant must show it “is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Under the REAL ID Act, when determining an asylum applicant’s credibility, the trier of
fact may consider “any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [an applicant’s] statements, without regard
to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,
or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). An adverse credibility
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determination is fatal to claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
CAT. Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068, 1072, 1074 (6th Cir. 2014). This is because a finding
that the applicant “did not testify credibly precludes her from meeting any of these [claims’]
burdens of proof.” El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009).
B. BIA’s Credibility Determination Was Supported by Substantial Evidence
We review the grounds relied on by the BIA to determine whether the adverse credibility
determination was supported by substantial evidence.1 See Khozhaynova, 641 F.3d at 193 (citing
Zhao v. Holder, 569 F.3d 238, 247–48 (6th Cir. 2009)). The BIA highlighted several
inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony in finding him not credible. When considered as a whole,
see El-Moussa, 569 F.3d at 256, they provide substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s
decision.
When he was first arrested, Singh did not say he was in the United States seeking asylum.
Instead, he told Border Patrol officers that he came to the United States to look for employment
in New York. Only later did he claim religious or political persecution.
Singh’s claims of persecution are based on three specific incidents where he was
allegedly assaulted by members of the Congress Party. But Singh did not mention the February
2010 incident in either his initial or corrected asylum applications. Instead, Singh only first
raised it in his testimony at the first merits hearing. We have previously held that an application
for asylum need not contain every detail of the claim as long as it “contain[s] at least some
indication of the type of assertions that will be made.” Kaba v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 741, 749–50
(6th Cir. 2008). Singh’s application certainly contains more than vague, non-specific allegations.
1
In his brief, Singh challenges some credibility-related findings made by the IJ that the BIA either did not address
(see Petitioner’s Br. at 16–17 (discussing whether Singh’s appearance is consistent with being a Sikh)), or explicitly
rejected (see id. at 20–21 (discussing Singh’s failure to detail which party leaders took him to the police station)).
Because the BIA did not rely on these findings, we need not address them here. See Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1073
(citing INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)).
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See id. Notably, though, Singh detailed the other two incidents in his application, but completely
omitted any mention of the February 2010 incident. The absence of such an important episode to
his claims supports the BIA’s skepticism about this incident. See, e.g., Sy v. Holder, 337 F.
App’x 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2009); Atugah v. Holder, 321 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009).
Further, Singh submitted inconsistent evidence describing the other two incidents. As to
the December 2009 incident, Singh testified that Congress Party members beat him as he was on
his way to a Mann Party rally. But Singh’s wife submitted an affidavit saying that the two of
them were on their way to meet a relative when Hindus stopped and assaulted them. Singh was
also inconsistent as to whether his wife was even present: in his asylum application he attested
that his wife was with him and the Congress Party “verbally yelled and used abusive language,”
but when he first testified to the IJ about the incident he said that she was not with him on that
day. At the continued hearing, he again changed his story and said that his wife was present at
both the December 2009 and August 2010 incidents.
As to the August 2010 incident, Singh testified that Congress Party members beat him
and verbally harassed his wife. Again, his wife’s affidavit contradicts his testimony, as she says
that both of them were “beaten.” Singh accounted for this contradiction by explaining that, in his
culture, verbal harassment is equivalent to physical beating, but the BIA found this to be an
inadequate explanation for the discrepancy.
This confusion between verbal harassment and physical beating also arose in Singh’s
complaints about the police. Singh claimed in his asylum applications that the police beat him
when he tried to report his altercations with the Congress Party; he also claimed the police
“harassed” him and forced him to give them free rides in his taxi. During his testimony
regarding the three incidents, however, Singh criticized the police for failing to investigate his
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complaints—he did not mention any beatings. When pressed to explain the discrepancy, Singh
admitted the police never actually beat him and explained they only “use[d] very filthy language
which I consider is as bad as beating somebody.” Singh testified that he understood the
difference between verbal abuse and physical violence, so his attempts to explain away these
discrepancies were unconvincing to the BIA.
Another inconsistency highlighted by the BIA was Singh’s alternating description of
himself as either a “member” of or a “worker” for the Mann Party. Singh argues that this is
merely an issue of translation—that the two words mean the same thing. But Singh also often
objected to being called a member—he repeatedly said he was “just” a worker. One wonders
why, if “member” and “worker” are interchangeable terms, Singh made such an effort to
distinguish them. Regardless of the reason, the BIA found Singh’s explanation for his
inconsistent terminology “not persuasive.”
Similarly, in Singh’s initial interview with an immigration officer, he stated that he had
never been a member of any political party. Singh argues that he views the Mann Party as a
primarily religious organization, rather than a political one. And yet, the very first time he was
asked about the Mann Party at his merits hearing, he described it as a “religious party and a
political party.” This type of direct contradiction certainly calls into question Singh’s
relationship to the Mann Party.
A few of the inconsistencies highlighted by the BIA are less significant. For example,
when testifying about the August 2010 incident, Singh stated that his wife and daughters were
with him. But Singh’s second daughter was not born until December 30, 2010, four months after
the incident and two months after Singh had been apprehended in the United States. As another
example, Singh’s asylum application lists six countries he traveled through to reach the United
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States, but while testifying at his hearing he initially listed only four. After this oversight was
pointed out to him, though, he was able to name all six. While these are certainly “inaccuracies”
that can properly be considered in assessing Singh’s credibility, we have previously cautioned
that the BIA should “exercise due care” before relying on de minimis inconsistencies to assess
credibility. See Slyusar, 740 F.3d at 1074–75. Still, such inconsistencies can be properly
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances even if they would not themselves be
sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding. See El-Moussa, 569 F.3d at 256.
The BIA also found that the documents Singh offered at the October 1, 2012, hearing did
not rehabilitate his credibility. Singh testified that he did not bring his Indian driver’s license to
the original hearing because it was not translated into English. But the licenses he submitted at
the continued hearing were in English. In addition to the previously described discrepancies
between Singh’s testimony and his wife’s affidavit, the BIA also noted that the affidavit was
notarized several days before Singh’s wife signed it. And the letter from the Mann Party’s
Secretary, which was offered to prove Singh’s affiliation with the party, was found to be
“fraudulent on its face” due to its being dated June 27, 2012—more than a month before the
August 1, 2012, hearing where Singh testified that he would contact people in India to request
such a letter. Even crediting the substance of the letter, the BIA concluded it does not help Singh
because it provides no details as to his activities with the Mann Party or the past persecution he
suffered.
Our role is not to evaluate Singh’s credibility in the first instance. We only ask whether
the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Although Singh offers explanations for
most of the inconsistencies in his evidence, they do not “meet the high standard of compelling a
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contrary result.” Yu, 364 F.3d at 704. The BIA was not required to accept them, and there is
substantial evidence supporting that decision.
III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, we deny Singh’s petition for review.
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