Ana Piña v. FCA US LLC

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0512n.06
Case No. 14-2104
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jul 21, 2015
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
ANA MARIA PIÑA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
FCA US LLC, ) MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
)
BEFORE: SILER, COOK, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. In 2012, plaintiff Ana Maria Piña, a resident of Indiana, was driving her
Chrysler Jeep Cherokee in Indiana when she was struck from behind by another vehicle.
Complaint ¶¶ 2, 14–16. The Jeep had been originally sold in Michigan as a new vehicle in 1999;
it was subsequently purchased in Indiana and registered in that state by Piña. Id. ¶¶ 14, 24–25.
The collision ruptured the Jeep’s fuel tank and sparked a fire that severely injured Piña. Id. ¶¶
16, 18–19.
Piña filed this action in the Eastern District of Michigan against the defendant, FCA US
LLC (FCA), in 2014. The complaint presented product-liability claims under Michigan statutory
law along with a common-law claim for breach of warranty. Id. ¶¶ 104–16. FCA moved to
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as barred by the Indiana statute of
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Piña v. FCA US LLC
repose. R. 9. The district court granted the motion, holding that a Michigan court would apply
the Indiana statute of repose to Piña’s claims. R. 23. We AFFIRM.
We review a dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Z Techs.
Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp., 753 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2014). “When evaluating a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” In re
Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When applying Michigan law, an argument that an action is
barred by a statute of repose can form the basis for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Roskam Baking
Co., Inc. v. Lanham Mach. Co., Inc., 288 F.3d 895, 904 (6th Cir. 2002).
In Kirk v. Hanes Corp., 16 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 1994), we set forth our choice-of-law
framework for a case within our diversity jurisdiction:
The task of this court, sitting in diversity, is to apply the same law as would be
applied by the Michigan state courts. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78,
58 S. Ct. 817, 822, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). Where a state's highest court has
spoken to an issue, we are bound by that decision unless we are convinced that the
high court would overrule it if confronted with facts similar to those before us.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205, 76 S. Ct. 273, 277, 100
L. Ed. 199 (1956). Moreover, where a state appellate court has resolved an issue
to which the high court has not spoken, “we will normally treat [those] decisions .
. . as authoritative absent a strong showing that the state's highest court would
decide the issue differently.” Garrett v. Akron–Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc. (In re
Akron–Cleveland Auto Rental, Inc.), 921 F.2d 659, 662 (6th Cir.1990) (emphasis
added).
Id. at 707 (alterations in original).
“In a tort action, Michigan courts recognize a presumption in favor of lex fori and apply
Michigan law ‘unless a rational reason to do otherwise exists.’” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 723 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv.,
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Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997)). This court has acknowledged Michigan’s two-part
test for the existence of such a rational reason:
First, we must determine if any foreign state has an interest in having its law
applied. If no state has such an interest, the presumption that Michigan law will
apply cannot be overcome. If a foreign state does have an interest in having its
law applied, we must then determine if Michigan’s interests mandate that
Michigan law be applied, despite the foreign interests.
Id. (quoting Sutherland, 562 N.W.2d at 471). The parties do not dispute the application of
Michigan’s common-law causes of action and the Michigan product-liability statute to this
action.
The Michigan product-liability statute does not include a statute of repose. However, the
statute of repose in the Indiana Product Liability Act provides generally that a product-liability
action must be commenced within ten years of the delivery of the product to the initial user or
consumer. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-20-3-1. Piña filed her action roughly fifteen years after her Jeep
was first delivered to an individual consumer, so the first issue in this appeal is whether the
Indiana statute of repose bars her claim.
The Michigan legislature has enacted a borrowing statute, which originally included a
provision that, “The period of limitation applicable to a claim accruing outside of this state shall
be either that prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of this
state, whichever bars the claim.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5861(2) (1963). In 1978, the
borrowing statute was amended; it now provides that:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without this state shall not be
commenced after the expiration of the statute of limitations of either this state or
the place without this state where the cause of action accrued, except that where
the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of this state the statute of
limitations of this state shall apply.
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Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5861.
Piña has focused her argument on the deletion of the general reference to “period of
limitation” and addition of the specific and limited phrase “statute of limitations.” She argues
that this amendment to Michigan’s borrowing statute precludes the operation of Michigan’s
choice-of-law rules to import the Indiana statute of repose into this action. But in Smith v.
Elliard, 312 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), the Michigan Court of Appeals explained
that the Michigan legislature “amended the statute not with the intent of substantially altering its
purpose and effect, but rather to make special allowances for Michigan residents.” Not only
would Piña’s preferred interpretation fail to advance this purpose of the amendment, but it would
undermine the borrowing statute’s broader purpose of discouraging forum shopping. See id.
And even if the amendment was in fact intended to remove statutes of repose from the scope of
the borrowing statute, the amendment merely serves to vacate the field for the unimpeded
operation of Michigan’s common law. Therefore, the district court was correct in its
determination that the Michigan borrowing statute does not prohibit the application of Indiana’s
statute of repose in this action.
Piña next argues that, because her car was neither manufactured nor originally sold by
FCA in Indiana, Indiana has no interest in applying its law to this case. This position is
untenable. The Michigan Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized the interests of foreign
jurisdictions in applying their law based on factors other than the point of manufacture and
original sale. See Hernandez v. Ford Motor Co., 760 N.W.2d 751, 762–63 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008) (citing the interest created by injury to a Mexican plaintiff due to an accident on Mexican
soil involving a vehicle purchased in Mexico); Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 582 N.W.2d 866,
867–68, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Farrell v. Ford Motor Co., 501 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Mich. Ct.
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App. 1993) (citing North Carolina’s “obvious and substantial interest in shielding Ford from
open-ended products liability claims,” despite the lack of Ford manufacturing or design facilities
in North Carolina). In reliance on those Michigan Court of Appeals cases, we have previously
upheld a district court’s finding that Tennessee has an interest in applying its statute of repose
where a Tennessee resident sustained property damage in Tennessee from a vehicle registered
and insured in Tennessee. Standard Fire, 723 F.3d at 697.
Given the facts here, where an Indiana resident was injured on an Indiana road while
driving a vehicle that was purchased and registered in Indiana, there can be little doubt the
Michigan courts would find that Indiana has an interest in having its law applied.
At step two, the comparative weighing of Michigan’s interests and Indiana’s interests,
Farrell and Hall (along with this court’s own precedent of Standard Fire) teach that Michigan’s
inherent interest in its native automotive industry, standing alone, does not mandate the
application of Michigan law. It is apparent that Indiana’s interest in applying its statute of repose
is at least as great as that of North Carolina and Tennessee. The business dealings cited in
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 2:10-cv-11164, Dkt. No. 25, at 5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9,
2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2013), and Farrell, 501 N.W.2d at 572, are not as significant
as the presence of FCA’s multiple assembly plants within the borders of Indiana. Therefore,
Indiana’s interest in encouraging more commercial activity and offering FCA the protection
provided by that state’s statute of repose outweighs any countervailing interest of Michigan,
regardless of the lack of connection between FCA’s Indiana assembly plants and the particular
vehicle at issue in this action.
AFFIRMED.
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