Ali Sawaf v. United States

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0468n.06
No. 13-5620
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
ALI HADI SAWAF, ) Jun 30, 2014
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) KENTUCKY
)
Respondent-Appellee. )
)
)
BEFORE: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; GRAHAM, District Judge.*
BERNICE B. DONALD, Circuit Judge. Ali Hadi Sawaf appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. For the reasons below, we
REVERSE the district court’s order and REMAND to the district court with instructions to
administer an appropriate remedy in light of our holding that Sawaf is entitled to relief.
I.
In 2001, Dr. Sawaf, a medical doctor specializing in the practice of urology, was charged
with multiple counts of unlawful drug distribution for prescribing narcotic pain medications
without a legitimate medical purpose, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). It is undisputed that,
prior to trial, the Government offered Sawaf a plea bargain that would have resulted in a
*
The Honorable James L. Graham, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
significantly reduced prison sentence of 41 months instead of the 235-293 month term of
imprisonment he would likely receive under the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines if
convicted at trial. Upon the advice of his attorney, Sawaf rejected the Government’s plea offer
and proceeded to trial, unsuccessfully, where he was convicted and ultimately received a prison
sentence of 240 months.
As the district court correctly observed, the subsequent history of this case has already
been summarized in United States v. Sawaf, 129 F. App'x 136, 138-41 (6th Cir. 2005), and needs
not be repeated in full here, as we are only concerned with the narrow issue for which a
Certificate of Appealability has been granted. Accordingly, our discussion of the facts is limited
to those that are relevant to Sawaf’s present claim that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to advise him about his sentencing exposure under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and failed to inform him that he would likely receive a prison sentence of
at least 235 months if he was convicted at trial after rejecting the Government’s plea offer.
Sawaf claims that his attorney failed to inform him that rejecting the Government’s plea
offer of a 41-month prison sentence would expose him to a much lengthier prison sentence under
the otherwise applicable sentencing guidelines. According to Sawaf, his attorney’s failure to
advise him of the applicable guidelines range amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel
because it prevented him from making a fully informed decision as to whether he should accept
the Government’s plea offer. As a result, Sawaf argues, and without knowing the potential
consequences of his decision, he relied on the advice of his counsel to his detriment in rejecting
the plea bargain, and proceeded to trial without ever having been informed that doing so would
expose him to the possibility of a 20-year prison term.
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
Based on the foregoing, the district court granted Sawaf’s request for an evidentiary
hearing on his § 2255 motion, where it heard testimony from several witnesses, including Sawaf
and his trial counsel. At the evidentiary hearing, Sawaf claimed as he had before, prior to,
during, and after his trial, that he was innocent of the crimes for which he has been convicted;
nevertheless, he explained, despite his continued insistence that he is innocent, Sawaf stated that
he readily would have entered a guilty plea in exchange for a 41-month sentence if he had known
that going to trial involved a risk that he could receive a prison sentence five times that long.
After a careful review of the evidence, the district court found that Sawaf’s attorney had
indeed failed to advise him about the applicable sentencing guidelines at any time prior to his
trial, resulting in “objectively unreasonable and constitutionally ineffective” assistance of
counsel at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. See United States v. Smith, 348 F.3d 545, 552-
53 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that defense counsel’s failure to “fully inform . . . [the] client of
the available options” in the context of a plea offer “constitutes ineffective assistance” when an
attorney does not adequately “explain the sentencing exposure the defendant will face as a
consequence of exercising each of the options available.”). Having found that Sawaf had
therefore established his attorney’s deficient performance, in satisfaction of the first prong of the
two-part Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, however, see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the district court denied relief based on its finding that Sawaf
had failed to satisfy Strickland’s second prong—the “prejudice” prong—by making the requisite
showing that he would have accepted the Government’s plea offer if he had been properly
informed by counsel as to the potential consequences of that decision.
On appeal, Sawaf challenges the district court’s conclusion that he suffered no prejudice
from his attorney’s failure to inform him about his otherwise applicable guidelines range. Sawaf
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argues that the district court departed from this Court’s precedent in United States v. Morris,
470 F.3d 596, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2006), which explains that Strickland’s prejudice prong is
presumptively satisfied when defense counsel fails to inform a defendant about a “substantial
disparity” between the length of a prison sentence offered by the Government in a plea bargain
and the otherwise applicable sentencing guidelines range.
II.
This Court generally reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
findings of facts for clear error in an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion. See Jefferson v.
United States, 730 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2013); Palazzolo v. Gorcyca, 244 F.3d 512, 515 (6th
Cir. 2001). To the extent that Sawaf’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents mixed
questions of law and fact, however, the district court’s analysis is subject to de novo review. See
United States v. Little, 208 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161,
1164 (6th Cir. 1997)).
III.
Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance arises from the plea bargaining stage of
criminal proceedings, the second part of the Strickland analysis, i.e., the “prejudice” prong,
“focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of
the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); accord Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409-10 (2012); Fitzpatrick v. Robinson,
723 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2013); Cauthern v. Colson, 736 F.3d 465, 483 (6th Cir. 2013). Once
the defendant has satisfied the first prong of Strickland by establishing that counsel’s
performance was constitutionally defective, the threshold showing of prejudice required to
satisfy the second prong is comparatively low—in such cases, the prejudice prong is satisfied if
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
there is a “reasonable probability” that the defendant would have accepted the Government’s
plea offer, but-for counsel’s ineffective assistance or inadequate advice. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at
1385; see also Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 550 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Griffin v.
United States, 330 F.3d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that it is easier to show
prejudice in the guilty plea context than in other contexts because the claimant need only show a
reasonable probability that he would have pleaded differently). Accordingly, if reasonable minds
could conclude that a fully informed defendant would have accepted the Government’s plea
offer, then the defendant is entitled to relief. Moreover, if counsel failed to provide the defendant
with an estimated range of the penalties that could result from a trial conviction, the prejudice
prong is presumptively satisfied if the difference between the length of the sentence proposed in
the Government’s plea offer and the sentence imposed after a trial conviction was substantial.
See Morris, 470 F.3d at 602; Griffin, 330 F.3d at 737. When this presumption applies, the
defendant is not required to submit additional objective evidence to “support his own assertion
that he would have accepted the offer” if provided with the benefit of effective assistance.
Griffin, 330 F.3d at 737.
Here, it is undisputed that the sentence Sawaf received as a result of his trial conviction
was substantially longer than the sentence he would have received if he had accepted the
Government’s plea offer—while the plea bargain would have resulted in a sentence just above
three years, Sawaf received a 20-year prison sentence after being convicted at trial. Therefore,
Sawaf is entitled to the presumption that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to inform him
that he could face a substantially longer prison sentence upon rejecting the plea offer and
proceeding to trial. See e.g., Griffin, 330 F.3d at 737 (“[A] substantial disparity between the
penalty offered by the prosecution and the punishment called for by the indictment is sufficient
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
to establish a reasonable probability that a properly informed and advised defendant would have
accepted the prosecution's offer.”); accord Morris, 470 F.3d at 602 (assigning “special weight to
significant disparities between penalties offered in a plea and penalties of a potential sentence in
determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice by not accepting a plea offer”); see also
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (explaining that the injury to a defendant who declines a
plea offer as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel is that he is deprived of the opportunity
to receive a lesser sentence).
Although the district court acknowledged the general presumption of prejudice “created
by the significant disparity between the plea offered and the ultimate sentence” that Sawaf
received, it nonetheless concluded that Sawaf was not entitled to relief because he had failed to
show that he would have accepted the Government’s plea offer but-for his counsel’s
ineffectiveness. In doing so, however, the district court failed to actually apply the presumption
of prejudice to which Sawaf was entitled. The applicable presumption means that the district
court should have started its analysis by assuming that Sawaf had been prejudiced with regard to
the plea negotiations, and then asked whether there was evidence to rebut that presumption.
Instead, the district court determined that Sawaf’s claim that he would have entered a guilty plea
if adequately informed was not credible, given Sawaf’s continued insistence that he was
innocent, prior to and during the trial, after the trial, and even during the evidentiary hearing, and
effectively declined to credit Sawaf with the applicable presumption of prejudice.
While the district court’s credibility finding as to Sawaf’s testimony is entitled to
deference under the clear error standard of review, its failure to credit Sawaf with the applicable
presumption was a legal error that warrants reversal unless the evidence suggests that Sawaf’s
repeated declarations of innocence were sufficient to overcome the presumption that Sawaf was
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s ineffectiveness. Therefore, we begin with the applicable
presumption that there is a “reasonable probability” that Sawaf would have pleaded guilty in
exchange for the Government’s offer of a reduced sentence if he had known that proceeding to
trial would expose him to a substantially higher sentence.
Under this burden-shifting framework, the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence
conclusively supports the finding that—even if Sawaf had known that proceeding to trial would
expose him to a 20-year prison sentence—there is no reasonable possibility that Sawaf would
have pleaded guilty. Here, the only evidence in support of that finding, which the district court
relied on exclusively, is Sawaf’s repeated assertions that he was innocent. Given Sawaf’s
unrelenting insistence as to his innocence, the district court was understandably reluctant to
credit Sawaf’s self-serving claim at the evidentiary hearing that he would have pleaded guilty
under different circumstances. As the district court emphasized in its opinion, Sawaf’s continued
declarations of innocence at the evidentiary hearing undermined the plausibility of his assertion
that he would nonetheless have pleaded guilty if he had been properly informed as to the possible
consequences of proceeding to trial. On the other hand, to conclude that this information would
have had no impact on Sawaf’s decision-making process would undercut the very reasoning for
the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the plea-
bargaining process includes the right to be informed by counsel as to the range of penalties under
the applicable guidelines. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; accord Smith, 348 F.3d at 552-53; Griffin,
330 F.3d at 739; Morris, 470 F.3d at 602. After all, the existence of that right is necessarily
rooted, at least in part, in our general understanding that the discrepancy between the punishment
resulting from a plea agreement and that which would result from a trial conviction is an
important factor that the defendant is entitled to consider in his decision-making process.
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
More importantly, however, we have consistently declined to conclude that a defendant’s
“repeated declarations of innocence” alone preclude the possibility that the defendant would
have entered a guilty plea if he had been aware of the consequences of proceeding to trial.
Griffin, 330 F.3d at 738; accord Smith, 348 F.3d at 552; Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 603; Valentine v.
United States, 488 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2007). In light of these cases, we are compelled to
conclude that Sawaf’s continued insistence as to his innocence does not foreclose the possibility
that he would have been willing to enter a guilty plea in exchange for a 41-month sentence,
despite his proclaimed innocence, if he had known about the risk that he might otherwise receive
a 20-year sentence. Put simply, Sawaf’s claim that he is innocent does not conclusively establish
that there is no “reasonable probability” that his decision would have been different if he had
been adequately informed about its consequences.
Finally, the district court’s reliance on Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 859
(6th Cir. 2005), was mistaken. In Humphress, the defendant, like Sawaf, continued to insist on
his innocence throughout the proceedings, and maintained that he was innocent at the evidentiary
hearing. Unlike Sawaf, however, the defendant in Humphress admitted during his evidentiary
hearing that he was unsure that his decision to reject the plea offer would have been any different
if he had been properly informed of the consequences, because it would not have changed his
desire to contest the charges at trial. Here, by contrast, while Sawaf maintains that he is innocent
to this day, his testimony at the evidentiary hearing was unequivocal in stating that he would
have pleaded guilty if he had been adequately informed of the risks involved with proceeding to
trial. The facts and circumstances surrounding our decision in Humphress are therefore
inapplicable to the instant case.
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No. 13-5620, Sawaf v. United States
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order denying Sawaf’s
motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and REMAND to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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