United States v. Williams

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0448n.06
Filed: July 30, 2008
No. 07-3096
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
TROY WILLIAMS, aka Omar Pitter, ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Before: ROGERS, COOK, and MCKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
COOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal marks Troy Williams’s second challenge of his sentence.
Williams pleaded guilty to charges of distributing and conspiring to distribute cocaine, and the
district court sentenced him to 96 months in prison. After an initial appeal resulted in a remand for
Booker resentencing, the district court imposed the same sentence under the advisory guidelines
regime. Williams again appeals, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Our unpublished opinion in Williams’s first appeal set forth the salient facts, so we do not
repeat them here. United States v. Williams, 194 F. App’x 318, 320–21 (6th Cir. 2006). It suffices
to say that in Count 1 of a six-count indictment, a federal grand jury charged that Williams, a
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
Jamaican national residing illegally in Florida, acted as a drug courier between Florida and
Cleveland, Ohio. On June 5, 2003, Williams pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which
he agreed to testify against a coconspirator, Kerven Telsey.
At both sentencing and resentencing, the district court applied a two-level increase for
obstruction of justice and denied Williams’s request for a two-level decrease due to a minor role in
the offense. The court departed downward three levels for acceptance of responsibility and also
applied a two-level safety-valve reduction. With an adjusted offense level of 29 and a category I
criminal history, the court calculated Williams’s applicable sentencing range to be 87 to 108 months,
and sentenced him to a 96-month prison term.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Obstruction of Justice
Williams challenges the district court’s two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of
justice. He not only argues that he is innocent of such conduct, but also that this enhancement
violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by permitting judicial fact-finding. Both arguments lack
merit.
1.
-2-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 provides for a two-level increase where a “defendant willfully
obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect
to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. §
3C1.1. Various obstructive behaviors trigger this enhancement, including “providing materially false
information to a judge” and “providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that
significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.”
Id. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(f),(g). We follow a three-step approach in assessing whether the two-level
enhancement is appropriate. First, we ask whether the district court clearly erred in the factual
findings underlying its decision. Second, we review de novo the court’s conclusion that the facts
constitute obstruction of justice. Finally, we also review de novo the ultimate decision to enhance
the defendant’s sentence. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 389 (6th Cir. 2002).
The district court enhanced Williams’s sentence two levels after “compar[ing] . . . the
defendant’s testimony in the Telsey trial with the [conflicting] factual basis in the defendant’s earlier
guilty plea agreement.” We find ample evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion that
Williams made false statements.
In a statement filed with the court, Williams himself conceded prior inconsistencies: “Up to
this moment, I have told the agents a series of stories that were not completely truthful.” JA 287.
The record easily substantiates this concession. During his 2003 arrest, Williams repeatedly changed
his story as to who hired him to drive drugs to Cleveland, the source of the $30,000 found in his
-3-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
suitcase, and the type of drugs he sold. Likewise, at the Tesley trial, Williams made several
statements that directly contradicted his filed statement or statements made during his arrest. For
example, he testified that he made only two trips to Cleveland, although his filed statement noted
four; he testified that he met Telsey on the trip that led to his arrest, although his statement explicitly
mentioned an earlier meeting; and he testified that he never spoke to Telsey on the phone, despite
multiple records of calls from Telsey’s cell phone.
According to Williams, these contradictory statements to the district court and law
enforcement officers fail to trigger the obstruction of justice enhancement because they are not
“materially” false—that is, they did not affect the Telsey trial’s outcome. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4(f),(g). The district court, however, noted that the hung jury in Telsey’s case resulted in part from
the “ambiguous testimony offered by Williams” and that “the testimony of Williams during the
Telsey trial assisted the Telsey defense.” Given that Williams’s false statements bear directly on his
role in the offense as well as the involvement of others in the conspiracy, we conclude that the
statements are sufficiently material to warrant enhancement. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 (defining
“material” evidence as a statement that, “if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under
determination”). The district court did not err by increasing Williams’s sentence two levels for
obstruction of justice.
2.
-4-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
Williams also contends that Guidelines § 3C1.l violates his Fifth Amendment due process
and Sixth Amendment jury rights by “transplanting the criminal charges of obstruction of justice and
perjury into the sentencing guidelines.” In support, Williams points out that the base sentencing
range upon conviction for obstruction of justice is between 10 and 16 months, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, but
his enhancement for obstruction of justice increased his Guidelines range by 17 to 21 months. This
constitutional attack on judicial fact-finding is unavailing.
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that judicial fact-finding within an advisory
Guidelines regime is constitutionally sound. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007);
see also United States v. Wittingen, 519 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2008). Williams’s argument,
moreover, assumes that there is—or ought to be—no quantitative distinction between the sentence
resulting from conviction for a particular offense and the Guidelines enhancement for similar
conduct. The Supreme Court, however, noted with respect to perjury: “[T]he enhancement is more
than a mere surrogate for a perjury prosecution. It furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to
the principal crime, including the goals of retribution and incapacitation.” United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993). Precedent holding so strongly otherwise, we reject Williams’s
constitutional argument.
B. Role in the Offense and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B)
Guideline § 3B1.2(b) provides for a two-level reduction when, compared with other
defendants, “the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).
-5-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
Williams next contends that when weighing whether Williams was “a minor participant” in the
criminal activity for purposes of § 3B1.2(b), the court failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(i)(3)(B)’s requirement that a court “must—for any disputed [or] controverted
matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary.” In refusing to reduce the
offense level on the basis of § 3B1.2(b), the district court stated: “The defendant has also argued that
he is entitled to a two-level reduction for role in the offense. The Court finds that such an argument
is without merit and it is denied.” On de novo review, we conclude that no error occurred. See
United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 414 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing de novo whether a sentencing
court violated Rule 32(i)(3)(B) by failing to make independent findings).
Although Williams points to this conclusory statement to argue that the court failed to satisfy
Rule 32(i)(3)(B), he ignores the court’s other discussions of the matter at resentencing. During the
December 14, 2006, resentencing hearing, the court stated: “I don’t buy into the minor role. As I
recall, Williams was transporting drugs all over everywhere . . . . [w]hich he sets out in his own . . .
statement; that he described what he had done; talks about his various trips; and I believe I recounted
that in the opinion filed on the 22nd of November.” By his own admission, Williams conducted at
least thirteen separate trips to Houston, Cleveland, El Cajon, Boston, and New York, each of which
the court noted in its November Order. Williams admitted that these trips all involved cocaine
trafficking and he received between $1,000 to $2,000 per trip. The district court committed no error
under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) because it relied on Williams’s participation in the thirteen drug-trafficking
trips in declining to apply the two-level reduction.
-6-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
C. Reasonableness of the Sentence
Finally, Williams contends that his 96-month sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We assess the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007); United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 569 (6th
Cir. 2008). Reasonableness is understood both procedurally and substantively. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
597. We review first for procedural errors, which include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Id. Only then do we ask whether a sentence is substantively
reasonable. Id.
First, Williams argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court failed
to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550,
553 (6th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have
held that a sentence is unreasonable where the district court lists the § 3553(a) factors . . . but does
not . . . provide reasoning explaining its decision . . . .”). Second, Williams argues that his sentence
is substantively unreasonable because if the court accounted for the sentences of his codefendants,
his sentence would be lower. The record counsels us to disagree.
-7-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
1.
We first ask whether the district court adequately analyzed the § 3553(a) factors. During the
resentencing hearing, the court considered the sentences of Williams’s codefendants as required
under § 3553(a)(6), and then indicated that it would “write a memorandum to support [its] findings
with an analysis of the 3553 factors.” No bright-line rule exists to assess the depth of a court’s
§ 3553(a) analysis. As the Rita Court stated: “The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness
or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.” 127 S. Ct. at 2468; see Jeross,
521 F.3d at 582–83 (“District courts may exercise discretion in determining how much of an
explanation of the sentence is required because ‘the amount of reasoning required varies according
to context.’” (quoting United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2007))). What is clear,
however, is that this court does not require a mechanistic recitation of the factors. United States v.
Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005).
Here, the court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors in its separate order. Specifically,
under § 3553(a)(1), the court referenced the presentence report and Williams’s own statement in
assessing the nature and circumstances of the offense, and discussed Williams’s history and
characteristics by observing that Williams achieved only a sixth-grade-level education, had a
minimal employment background, would be subject to deportation upon completion of his sentence,
regularly used marijuana, and depended on his family’s support. Under § 3553(a)(2), the court
emphasized Williams’s substantial role in the conspiracy and concluded that a “sentence of 96
-8-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
months reflects the seriousness of the offense and is designed to promoted respect for the law and
just punishment.” With respect to deterrence, the court noted that while the 96-month sentence
“should provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct to those persons who know the defendant
and are informed about the nature of his sentence,” the question was “problematical” as to whether
Williams’s “friends, relatives and associates” would be deterred. The court also noted that, as a
deportee, Williams would not receive drug treatment while in prison. Finally, under § 3553(a)(6),
the court actively compared Williams’s sentence with those of his codefendants during the
resentencing hearing and in a separate order. Even though the court did not explicitly refer to each
of the § 3553(a) factors, the record demonstrates that the court gave the factors adequate
consideration. See Wittingen, 519 F.3d at 637 (“The district need not explicitly refer to each of the
factors of § 3553(a).”).
2.
We next examine whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively
unreasonable sentence. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; Jeross, 521 F.3d at 569. Williams’s specific
contention with respect to substantive reasonableness is that his 96-month sentence—within the 87
to 108 month applicable Guidelines range—is unduly long compared to the sentences of his
codefendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”).
-9-
No. 07-3096
United States v. Williams
As a threshold matter, we afford an appellate presumption of reasonableness to sentences
within the correctly calculated Guidelines range. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462; United States v. Vonner,
516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Williams fails to rebut this presumption. A colloquy
during the resentencing hearing reveals that the court fully understood that, for some codefendants,
lower sentences resulted from plea bargains or downward departures inapplicable to Williams. JA
524–26. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 96-month
prison term.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
- 10 -