Arban v. West Publishing Corp

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0341P (6th Cir.)File Name: 03a0341p.06 Motowski Lund, PEPPER HAMILTON, Detroit, Michigan,
for Appellant. William G. Tishkoff, Marvin B. Bartlett,
LONG, BAKER & TISHKOFF LLP, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for Appellee.
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________
_________________
OPINION
DANIEL R. ARBAN, X _________________
Plaintiff-Appellee/ - JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Daniel R. Arban
Cross-Appellant, - brought this action against West Publishing Corporation
- Nos. 01-2278/2370
- (West) pursuant to the Family Medical and Leave Act
v. > (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq. Arban alleged that West
, violated the FMLA by terminating him while he was on
- medical leave and by failing to reinstate him at the
WEST PUBLISHING CORP ., - completion of the leave. Arban also alleged that West
Defendant-Appellant/ - violated the FMLA by interfering with, restraining, or
Cross-Appellee. - denying him his right to take an FMLA leave. The case was
- tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Arban.
N West then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or
Appeal from the United States District Court for a new trial, which the district court denied. West appeals.
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. Arban cross-appeals the district court’s denial of front pay
No. 99-73520—Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge. and liquidated damages and the district court’s grant of a stay
without bond. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
Argued: June 13, 2003 district court’s denial of West’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law or for a new trial, reverse and remand the trial
Decided and Filed: September 24, 2003 court’s denial of an award of liquidated damages, affirm the
district court’s denial of Arban’s claim for front pay, and
Before: KEITH, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges. affirm the district court’s grant of a stay without bond.
_________________ I.
COUNSEL Arban began working as a sales representative for Lawyer’s
Cooperative Publishing in 1995. Lawyer’s Cooperative
ARGUED: Abraham Singer, PEPPER HAMILTON, Publishing merged with West in 1996. Arban has a
Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. William G. Tishkoff, documented history of gastrointestinal problems, including
LONG, BAKER & TISHKOFF LLP, Ann Arbor, Michigan, chronic and severe esophagitis and irritable bowel syndrome,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Abraham Singer, Michelle which began in the middle of 1995 or early 1996. In 1997,
1
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Arban was promoted from a field sales representative to a resulted in Dan benefitting from the sale.” Wolfe, Nicolini,
regional field sales manager. In this position, he supervised and Carlson then inquired about the “[i]nconsistency with
other representatives, while continuing to make sales. In [Arban’s] reported numbers.” According to Wolfe, Arban
January 1998, Arban voluntarily returned to the position of admitted “lack of follow up in getting his orders in.” Wolfe
field sales representative in order to spend more time with his also asked Arban about “sending in orders that do not have
children. At that time Arban’s immediate supervisor was signatures,” and Arban admitted that on at least nine
Robert Wolfe, who held the position of regional field sales occasions he “did not talk to the decision maker to get a
manager. Wolfe, in turn, reported to Nick Nicolini, who verbal approval.” Wolfe explained to Arban that “this is not
served as senior regional field sales manager, and to James allowable for Field Reps and is an abuse of our process.” In
Colantino, who served as director of sales. his e-mail, Wolfe noted that Arban also “admitted to adding
products to the order without the customer’s permission.”
In February 1998, Richard Carlson, who had replaced Wolfe described this as an “event that should cause
Arban as a regional field sales manager, learned that the termination.” Wolfe concluded the e-mail with the following
preexisting account of the Hervas, Sotos law firm in suburban statement:
Chicago had been cancelled, that a new account had been
generated in the name of James Sotos, and that Arban had We have numerous examples of gross negligence, fraud,
misrepresented this account as “a new sales activity.” deceit and lack of moral character. These are not areas in
Carlson brought this information to the attention of Wolfe, which corrective action can be taken. I can merely
Nicolini, and Arban. On April 1, 1998, Arban received a monitor him more closely. I recommend that Dan be
warning letter from Wolfe, which stated: terminated as an employee of West Group in the near
future. I also believe that everyone has a right to dignity
I cannot overstate the seriousness of the situation. . . . and respect, Dan should be given the chance to resign.
West Online Solutions will now be responsible for
supporting an account where the revenue has been cut in I welcome any and all feedback from my fellow
half. . . . This letter will warn you that misrepresentations Managers to see if I have missed any major elements that
concerning an account are unacceptable to WEST would allow Dan to continue. His production in [sic]
GROUP. I am confident that there will be no future needed, I like the fellow and he truly has great sales
occurrence of such activity. However, I must include skills, unfortunately, the negative side outweighs the
that any future occurrence will subject you to further positives. If I have not been open minded to an
disciplinary action, up to and including termination from alternative that I should consider, please let me know. I
West Group. have anguished over this decision and keep on coming up
with no other workable solutions.
On December 16, 1998, Wolfe, Nicolini, and Carlson met
with Arban to discuss additional violations of company policy (emphasis added). At trial, Wolfe testified that Colantino
committed by Arban and customer complaints that allegedly “had the final authority to make the decision to terminate Mr.
had occurred in the intervening months. According to an e- Arban.”
mail sent to Colantino by Wolfe the following day, the
meeting began “with a reminder that Dan has been involved In an e-mail to Colantino, Nicolini, and Wolfe sent on the
in switching names of accounts to achieve new sales that evening of December 17, Carlson noted that he “concur[red]
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in [Wolfe’s] summary” and added that he “believe[d] that throat. Arban called his physician’s office and described his
[Wolfe’s] conclusion is well-supported.” At trial, Carlson condition to an associate of his physician, who called in a
explained that he believed that “Arban should be terminated prescription to a pharmacy near Arban’s residence. The
from the company” as a result of “[t]he account issues; the office notes from the call state “anxiety reflux . . . wants time
misrepresentations of accounts to the company; the trouble to off work.” Arban picked up the medication later that day.
the customers; the problems exceeded the good from Dan.”
At trial, Nicolini also testified that he agreed with the On December 24, Arban contacted Joyce Van Sciver, a
recommendation to terminate Arban “[b]ecause of all the human resources representative for West. Arban “explained
ongoing things that Dan Arban had done.” Finally, Colantino what had happened” and that he would “be needing to take
testified that after conferring with Wolfe, Nicolini, and Ira some time off.” Arban was told that there were no special
Tiffenberg, a director of human resources for West, he forms needed to request an FMLA leave, but that he should
decided to terminate Arban in the middle of December. contact West’s disability insurance carrier. Arban also told
Colantino testified that in the days following December 17, he Van Sciver that he had an appointment to see his physician on
communicated to Nicolini his decision to terminate Arban December 28. A “leave of absence form” prepared by Van
after the holidays. Wolfe also testified that “within a few Sciver on December 29 indicates that Arban’s leave began on
days of the December 16 meeting” Nicolini told him that “we December 25, 1998. A January 19 letter to Arban from
should go ahead and terminate after the holidays.” West’s disability insurance carrier states that Arban’s claim
for short-term disability benefits was approved for the period
On December 21, Wolfe accompanied Arban on a “field between January 4 and January 21.
ride.” At trial, Wolfe testified that the “Field Ride Recap” he
prepared after the field ride was “simply a review of what I On December 28, Arban visited his physician, who
saw that day with one customer” and “not a general provided him with a note stating that he had been treated for
evaluation of Mr. Arban.” According to the recap, Arban “severe esophagitis and stress” and adding that Arban would
received a rating of “meets expectations” in all areas. Wolfe be “unable to work for 3wks.” Arban hand-delivered medical
testified that he did not “tell Arban that all the problems that certification forms he had received from West’s disability
were raised at the December 16 meeting were cured,” nor did insurance carrier to his physician’s office on December 29,
he tell Arban that “everything with him was in good and Arban’s physician completed the forms on January 8.
standing.” However, Arban testified that after the ride, Wolfe
made the following notation at the bottom of the recap: Arban notified Wolfe of his medical leave via telephone on
“visited five accounts, all five accounts corrected.” The December 28. In an e-mail to Nicolini sent that day, Wolfe
handwritten comments on the form provided in the joint stated, “I have not called Dan regarding this yet, nor have I
appendix are illegible. Arban also testified that at no point spoke with Jim about this. I would think the first move would
during the field ride did Wolfe indicate that he “hadn’t be to check with HR.” Arban also notified Wolfe of his
properly followed up from the 16th.” Arban stated that Wolfe medical leave via e-mail on December 28. Wolfe forwarded
told him that he was “very satisfied” and did not indicate that Arban’s e-mail to Nicolini shortly after it was received, with
any action would be taken against Arban. the words, “Here is a message from Dan. I would think you
also have some questions. Let’s talk and do the right thing.”
Early in the morning of December 23, according to his
testimony, Arban awoke with “a severe amount of acid” in his
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 7 8 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
On December 29, Arban received a telephone call from ***
Don Owens, a sales representative, who explained that “Bob
Wolfe had instructed him to get these hot lists, to get the Q. Okay, I want to give you a chance to tell the jury
different accounts and pending sales he could work with.” how it ended. What happened to conclude your
Later that day, Wolfe called Arban at home. Arban testified phone conversation with Mr. Wolfe on the 30th?
that Wolfe “wanted to kind of follow up on Don too to make
sure those sales got in, and he wanted to find out what it was A. We were in the dialogue and Bob – you know, I
that I had done and how much I had given Don so he could explained to Bob that I felt very uncomfortable,
kind of track it.” based on the information that I knew about the
FMLA and based on what Hartford had told me, I
According to Arban, Owens called again the following day wasn’t supposed to be doing any work, that any
“to check up with leads again.” Arban testified that Wolfe work I did could constitute jeopardizing my benefits
also called on the afternoon of December 30. At trial, Arban that I would get. So I told him that I felt that he was
described the conversation: really putting me on the spot here because I knew I
wasn’t supposed to be working; my doctor said I
Q. Okay, could you describe for the jury the phone call wasn’t supposed to be working. And what he was
that you had with Mr. Wolfe on the 30th? requesting was more than what I had given Don
initially. And he was asking me to do quite a bit
A. He was upset. I thought that I was giving him more and I didn’t think that was in the best interest
minimal effort. He said that the few leads that I of what I was supposed to be doing at that point. I
gave Don, you know, that was unacceptable, you think he said something like, you know, well, we’ll
know, as a top performer, that I would have more see, and he slammed the phone down. The
going than that and that I should be able to produce conversation was over.
a much more substantial list. And he said that he
really needed me to put an effort towards it – really According to Arban, on December 31, Owens called him at
wanted me to come up with quite a bit, you know, as home again and stated that “Bob asked me to give you a call
much as I possibly could so again, he could make and see if you’d reconsider.” Arban refused. On January 5,
these sales number. Arban received another call at home from Wolfe. Arban
testified that Wolfe repeated his request that Arban provide
Q. Did he describe why it was important to be doing Wolfe with “different accounts that I can work so when you
this at this time? come back from your leave you’re ready to roll.” In response,
Arban “explained that, again, I was certain that would be
A. Well, we kind of knew – he reiterated just that it was against what I was supposed to be doing. I appreciated the
the end of the year and that there were – there was a effort but, you know, that was not necessary. I would handle
lot on the line for Jim Colantino and the exclusive it when I got back.”
users. There were a lot of points involved. People
could win certain prizes and he wanted to make sure Sometime between December 31 and January 3, Colantino
that everybody got as much as they could. called Tiffenberg. Tiffenberg testified that Colantino
“indicated at that time that Mr. Arban had applied for short-
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term disability and wanted to know whether or not we could Hartford said I was not supposed to do this. He said,
proceed – or he could proceed with the termination of Mr. well, I’ll see about that. He’s going to call Hartford
Arban’s employment.” Tiffenberg consulted with West’s in- and verify or check on whether or not that was to
house counsel, who concluded that “there were no issues in take place – whether I could do that or not.
proceeding with the termination.” When asked at trial
whether he thought there was “any problem with terminating According to Arban, Wolfe called him again later that day.
Mr. Arban during his leave,” Tiffenberg said no, and
explained that “it had no relationship to the reasons for the Q. Okay, and what – go ahead. What was said to you
termination, and the termination we had made that decision by Mr. Wolfe at that time?
prior back in mid-December before Mr. Arban even had
applied for leave.” However, Tiffenberg also testified that he A. Whole different tone at this point. He was very
was not “aware of any records or e-mail that documents an upset, told me that I – he had called, spoke to
actual decision being ordered by Mr. Colantino.” Hartford. They told him, you know, supposedly
from what he said that I had to do this and that I,
Late in the afternoon on January 6, Arban received another you know, my – if not, then I was going against
telephone call from Wolfe. At trial, Arban described the what was called insubordination.
conversation:
***
Q. All right. Go ahead. Will you describe that phone
call? Q. Okay, well, go ahead. If you could just describe to
the jury what was said in that phone conversation?
A. Bob called me again and asked me to come out and
meet with him, asked me to pick a spot where I A. I asked Bob what was so important and why I had to
thought I could drive out and meet him. And I, come and meet with him on this particular day at
again, reiterated this to Bob, you know, I’m not this particular – you know, why I had to come and
going to be able to do this. I can’t come to meet do this. They said, Dan, what I want you to do is
with you. He suggested coming to my house and gather all your materials. I want you to bring your
meeting with me. I told him at this point, any work computer, your laptop, and I want you to come out
that I did I thought was a violation, and he became and meet me. We’ll pick a spot and we’ll meet. I
more and more insistent and said that it was not in said this seems kind of unusual. You don’t need to
violation, that I needed to do this, this was have all this material to go over hot lists that you’re
something I had to do. going to manage while I’m gone. And he said, Dan,
I need you to get all your – he wouldn’t tell me
*** basically what the reason was so I finally called and
said, Bob, it sounds to me like you’re firing me. Are
Q. Okay. How did the phone conversation conclude? you terminating me, Bob? And he said, yes.
A. He said if I wanted – he asked me why I was Q. Did he make any mention about any of the materials
unwilling to do that so I said I spoke with Hartford. or the computer that you had at your house?
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 11 12 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
A. Oh yeah. He said he wanted met you [sic] gather problem. I’ll come to you. Where would you like to
my computer, any hot list, any company be? And I said I have no idea. He said, well, we’ve
information, anything at all that belonged to West he met before at the Weber. Why don’t we use the
wanted me to gather, put in my car and meet him. Weber. . . . I said Fine. I said, I’ll meet you there
and he said, Dan, you’ve got great reputation; you
Q. And did you – go ahead. Can you just describe the know, employee file. He said, I were you, I’d be
end of the conversation? Did you agree to do that? worried about protecting that, being terminated. If
you wanted to come in and offer to me a letter of
A. No. I told him that I was certain that being on resignation, I would probably accept it at that point.
medical leave, I was not supposed to do that. It
would constitute work. And I asked him if, you On January 6, Nicolini forwarded an e-mail from Wolfe
know, what was so important and why he had to do regarding Arban to Colantino. In the e-mail, Nicolini stated,
this right now. I was simply going to be on leave for “Below are the main issues we have regarding Dan Arban.”
another week, why don’t we just wait until the end Wolfe’s e-mail, which had been created earlier that same day,
of the week and then I’d be back to work and we began by stating, “You wanted an outline of events to
could address whatever the reasons were then. consider in terminating Dan Arban.” The e-mail went on to
describe the allegations against Arban, including
Q. What did he say? “misrepresentation concerning a new firm being started,” the
addition of “products to a signed contract,” double billing of
A. He said no. He said, I want you to go and meet with a customer’s account, the unsolicited sending of materials to
me. . . . And he said, well, you know, Dan if I have customers, and the “misrepresentation of when the trial period
to, I will come to your house. We’ll do this at your would start” with respect to another client. At trial, Colantino
house. I’m going to have to terminate you in front testified that he had no idea why Nicolini had sent him this e-
of your own family. And I was concerned about mail. Colantino also stated that the decision to terminate
that. I have small kids. Arban had been made before he received the e-mail. On
January 8, Arban prepared a letter of resignation, met Nicolini
When asked at trial whether it “would be a violation of the and Wolfe, and handed his letter to Wolfe, who read it and
policy . . . that West had, that you couldn’t ask an employee accepted it.
to do work-related services during their leave,” Wolfe
responded, “If the leave were granted, yes.” On July 14, 1999, Arban filed this lawsuit against West. In
October and November 2000, the case was tried before a jury.
At trial, Arban described the final conversation that West timely moved for judgment as a matter of law at the
occurred between himself and Wolfe on the evening of close of all the evidence, which the district court denied after
January 6: the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount
Q. Did the subject of resignation come up? of $119,000. On March 2, 2001, the district court entered
judgment in favor of Arban in the amount of $119,000 plus
A. No, not at this point. What he said to me was, where $11,448.88 in interest, $85,656.73 in attorney’s fees, and
do you want to meet? I said, well Bob, I know for a $8,961.87 in costs. The district court declined to award front
fact I’m not supposed to be going far. He said, no pay or liquidated damages. On August 23, 2001, the district
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 13 14 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
court denied West’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter and from § 2614(a)(1), which provides that “any eligible
of law or new trial. On September 17, 2001, West filed its employee who takes leave . . . shall be entitled, on return from
notice of appeal. On September 27, 2001, Arban filed his such leave (A) to be restored by the employer to the position
notice of appeal. of employment held by the employee when the leave
commenced; or (B) to be restored to an equivalent position.”
II. The “retaliation” or “discrimination” theory arises from
§ 2615(a)(2), which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for
This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a any employer to discharge or in any other manner
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Monday v. Oullette, discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice
118 F.3d 1099, 1101 (6th Cir. 1997). This court does not made unlawful by this subchapter.”
weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Instead, this court The “entitlement” or “interference” theory is derived from
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party the FMLA’s creation of substantive rights. If an employer
against whom the motion is made and gives that party the interferes with the FMLA-created right to medical leave or to
benefit of all reasonable inferences. The motion should be reinstatement following the leave, a violation has occurred.
granted, and the district court’s decision reversed, only if King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th
reasonable minds could not come to a conclusion other than Cir. 1999).
one in favor of the movant. Wehr v. Ryan’s Family Steak
Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1152 (6th Cir. 1995). The issue is simply whether the employer provided its
employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA– for
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to as many as example, a twelve-week leave or reinstatement after
twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-month period if the taking a medical leave. Because the issue is the right to
employee has a “serious health condition that makes the an entitlement, the employee is due the benefit if the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of statutory requirements are satisfied, regardless of the
such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A “serious intent of the employer.
health condition” is defined as “an illness, injury, impairment,
or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st
care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; Cir. 1998).
or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” Id. at
§ 2611(11). An employee need not specifically mention the The substantive right to reinstatement provided in
FMLA when taking leave. All the employee must do is notify § 2614(a)(1), however, “shall [not] be construed to entitle any
the employer that FMLA-qualifying leave is needed. 29 restored employee to . . . any right, benefit, or position of
C.F.R. § 825.303(b). employment other than any right, benefit or position to which
the employee would have been entitled had the employee not
Two distinct theories for recovery on FMLA claims exist. taken the leave.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). Similarly, the
The “entitlement” or “interference” theory arises from right to non-interference with medical leave also is not
§ 2615(a)(1), which states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any absolute. “[A]n employee who requests FMLA leave would
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or have no greater protection against his or her employment
the attempt to exercise, any right provided in this subchapter,” being terminated for reasons not related to his or her FMLA
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 15 16 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
request than he or she did before submitting that request.” The “Field Ride Recap” prepared after the ride also stated that
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Arban “meets expectations” in all areas. In addition, the jury
Cir. 1998). An employee lawfully may be dismissed, considered an e-mail from Wolfe that Nicolini had forwarded
preventing him from exercising his statutory rights to FMLA to Colantino on January 6, which stated, “You wanted an
leave or reinstatement, but only if the dismissal would have outline of events to consider in terminating Dan Arban.”
occurred regardless of the employee’s request for or taking of (emphasis added). While this e-mail is open to several
FMLA leave. Id. interpretations, the jury was entitled to conclude that West
was continuing to study the matter and had not come to a final
At trial, Arban argued that West denied him his substantive decision by January 6. As the Seventh Circuit has observed,
right to reinstatement and interfered with his substantive right “the timing of this decision could lead a fact finder to infer
to take FMLA leave. First, with respect to Arban’s that the employee would not have been fired absent her taking
reinstatement claim, Arban “must establish, by a of leave (if, for example, a supervisor who had been aware of
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the problems with an employee did not decide to fire the
benefit he claims.” Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, employee until she took leave, and the supervisor based the
1018 (7th Cir. 2000). firing on the incidents of which the employer had already
been aware).” Kohls v. Beverly Enters. Wisconsin, Inc., 259
[I]f the employer claims that the employee would have F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, while the
been discharged . . . the employee, in order to establish evidence permitted differing inferences, sufficient evidence
the entitlement protected by § 2614(a)(1), must, in the was presented at trial for the jury to conclude that West
course of establishing the right, convince the trier of fact denied Arban his substantive right to reinstatement.
that the contrary evidence submitted by the employer is
insufficient and that the employee would not have been Next, with regard to his interference claim, the jury was
discharged . . . if he had not taken FMLA leave. entitled to find in Arban’s favor if he presented sufficient
evidence to establish that he was denied his substantive rights
Id. Here, West presented considerable evidence that the under the FMLA “for a reason connected with his FMLA
decision to terminate Arban had been made before Arban leave.” Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d
went on medical leave, but that his actual termination had 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2002). “Such a reason need not be
been deferred until after the holidays. While an employer has retaliation.” Id.; see also Miller v. Defiance Metal Prods.,
the discretion to fire an at-will employee for poor Inc., 989 F.Supp. 945, 946 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (noting that
performance, at trial Arban cast doubt upon both the timing plaintiff’s termination due to absenteeism caused by a
of and the reasons for the decision to terminate him. For medical condition constituted “an interference under
example, the December 17 e-mail from Wolfe to Colantino FMLA”). Twenty-nine C.F.R. § 825.220(b) also explains
suggests that no final decision had been reached. In that e- that “interfering with” the exercise of an employee’s rights
mail, Wolfe states: “I welcome any and all feedback from my under the FMLA includes “discouraging an employee from
fellow Managers to see if I have missed any major elements using [FMLA] leave.”
that would allow Dan to continue. . . . If I have not been open
minded to an alternative that I should consider, please let me West argues that “it is undisputed that West promptly
know.” Arban also testified that following the “field ride” on granted Arban’s request for leave without any further
December 21, Wolfe told Arban that he was “very satisfied.” questions” and that Arban’s “allegations are, therefore,
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 17 18 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
insufficient to state a claim for interference.” As support for proscriptive in nature. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. If the
this proposition, West cites Dodgens v. Kent Mfg. Co., 955 employer is found to have retaliated against the employee for
F.Supp. 560, 564 (D.S.C. 1997). In Dodgens, the court found using FMLA leave, the employer is subject to a claim for
that a plaintiff employee’s claim that his FMLA rights were compensatory damages and, unless the court finds the
“interfered with” when a plant manager called him twice violation occurred in good faith, additional liquidated
during his medical leave and requested that he take a damages. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A).
demotion was not cognizable under the FMLA. West’s
reliance on Dodgens is misplaced. Unlike the plaintiff in With regard to Arban’s retaliatory discharge claim, there
Dodgens, who was not asked to work while on medical leave was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
but rather to accept a demotion upon returning to work, Arban West retaliated against Arban for taking leave under the
presented evidence that he was asked to continue to perform FMLA. At trial, Arban testified that during the December 21
work-related tasks while ostensibly on medical leave. Arban field ride Wolfe stated that he was “very satisfied” with
testified that after notifying Wolfe of his medical leave on Arban’s performance. The “Field Ride Recap” prepared by
December 28, Wolfe called him on several occasions and Wolfe also stated that Arban “meets expectations in all
requested that he provide customer lists and pending sales. areas.” West does not dispute that after the field ride, Arban
Moreover, Arban stated that during a January 6 conversation engaged in protected activity by taking leave pursuant to the
with Wolfe, he explained that he could not meet with Wolfe FMLA, nor does West dispute that its termination of Arban
because he was on medical leave, to which Wolfe responded qualifies as an adverse employment action. The evidence also
that “he’s going to call [West’s disability insurance carrier] supports the jury’s finding of a causal link between Arban’s
and verify or check whether or not” Arban could meet with participation in the protected activity (FMLA leave) and the
him. Shortly thereafter, Wolfe called Arban and told him that adverse employment action (his termination). Although
he had spoken with West’s disability insurance carrier, which “temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish
had “told him, you know, supposedly, from what he said that that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
I had to do this [meet with Wolfe].” Arban then asked him an employee was in fact pretextual,” Skrjanc, 272 F.3d at 317,
whether he was being fired, and Wolfe responded that he was. the jury weighed additional evidence, including evidence of
In light of this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Arban’s performance appraisals and the demeanor of
Arban was terminated for reasons related to his FMLA leave. witnesses on the stand. Moreover, as previously discussed,
Arban testified that after notifying Wolfe that he had taken
As previously mentioned, in addition to the substantive medical leave, Wolfe repeatedly called Arban at home “to get
guarantees provided by the act, the FMLA also affords different accounts and pending sales he could work with.”
employees protection in the event they suffer retaliation or Arban stated that Wolfe had indicated that “there was a lot on
discrimination for exercising their rights under the FMLA. the line for Jim Colantino and the exclusive users” and that
Specifically, “[a]n employer is prohibited from discriminating “[p]eople could win certain prizes and he wanted to make sure
against employees . . . who have used FMLA leave,” nor can that everybody got as much as they could.” Arban also
they “use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in explained that when he told Wolfe that he “wasn’t supposed
employment actions.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). This to be doing any work,” Wolfe responded with anger. Arban
prohibition includes retaliatory discharge for taking leave. added that Wolfe described Arban’s failure to assist him as
Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 314 “insubordination.” Although West argues that “Arban
(6th Cir. 2001). These protections have been described as changed his story so that it appears that Wolfe was upset that
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 19 20 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
he would not work or meet with him during his leave,” as Family and Medical Leave Act. It is also unlawful under
previously explained, the jury is in a better position to judge the Family and Medical Leave Act for an employer to
witness credibility than the appellate court. The record thus discharge or in any other manner discriminate against
contains evidence that supports the jury’s finding that West’s any other individual for opposing any practice made
explanation for Arban’s termination was disingenuous and lawful by the Family and Medical Leave Act.
that the real reason was the taking of FMLA leave.
***
III.
In order for Plaintiff to prove that West discriminated or
A district court’s disposition of a motion for a new trial is retaliated against him because he took leave, Plaintiff
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Workman v. Frito-Lay, must establish the following evidence by a
Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1999). This court has preponderance of the evidence.
defined an abuse of discretion as a “definite and firm
conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the Act;
judgment.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, (2) that this exercise of his protected rights was known
578-79 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). to the defendant;
(3) that defendant thereafter took an employment action
West argues that it is entitled to a new trial “based upon adverse to the plaintiff; and
critical errors in the jury instructions and the verdict form.” (4) that there was a causal connection between the
Specifically, West argues that “the jury was not given any protected activity and the adverse employment
guidance whatsoever regarding what constitutes ‘interference’ action.
under the FMLA.” West contends that the jury improperly
could have found it guilty of “interference” while at the same To show such a causal connection [between the protected
time “rejecting Plaintiff’s arguments that he was fired activity and the adverse employment action], Plaintiff
because of his leave.” must show that the reasons given for his termination
were not the true reasons, and that the true reason for his
This court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine termination was that he took a medical leave.
whether they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and
applicable law to the jury. Jones v. Federated Fin. Reserve In this case, West claims that Plaintiff was not terminated
Corp., 144 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 1998). A party is not because of his leave, but because of misconduct. In order
entitled to a new trial based upon alleged deficiencies in the to prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must also
jury instructions unless the instructions, taken as a whole, are prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that West’s
misleading or give an inadequate understanding of the law. stated reason for discharging Plaintiff is not the true
Id. Here, the district court’s instructions to the jury state, in reason, but merely a pretext for retaliation, which means
relevant part: that the true reasons for his termination were not the
reasons stated by West, but that Plaintiff took a medical
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act it is unlawful leave.
for any employer to interfere with, restrain or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right under the ***
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 21 22 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
However, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the FMLA cannot allow a recovery of front pay, and by not
the evidence that he would not have been discharged had properly considering an award of front pay to Mr. Arban, at
he not taken Family and Medical Leave Act leave. least as an alternative to reinstatement.”
Upon examination of the jury instructions, West’s The issue of whether front pay is available under the FMLA
arguments lack merit. The trial in this matter was bifurcated, is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. See
and following the liability phase the jury answered “yes” to Gottfried v. Med. Planning Serv., 280 F.3d 684, 690 (6th Cir.
the following question: “Did defendant West Publishing 2002). Although this circuit has not directly considered this
Corporation violate plaintiff Daniel Arban’s rights under the question,1 other circuits have found that front pay is an
Family and Medical Leave Act?” This court must presume equitable remedy available under the FMLA, as have at least
that the jury followed the district court’s instructions. Weeks two district courts in this circuit. See, e.g., Diffee Ford-
v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). As previously Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d at 965; see also Nichols v.
discussed, Arban presented evidence sufficient for the jury to Ashland Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 503-504 (4th Cir. 2001);
find in his favor under an interference theory premised upon Churchill v. Star Enters.,183 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 1999);
the denial of his substantive rights under the FMLA “for a Rogers v. AC Humko Corp., 56 F.Supp.2d 972, 978 (W.D.
reason connected with his FMLA leave.” Diffee Tenn. 1999); Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d
Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d at 961. The foregoing 799, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). Neither the district court nor
instructions ensured that the jury could not find West liable or West cites any cases to the contrary. Instead, West argues
award any damages unless it found that West discharged that “the plain language of the statute does not contemplate
Arban for taking medical leave – a finding that also would any future damages as an available remedy under the FMLA,
support Arban’s interference claim. Since the instructions, because the language clearly identifies damages in the past
taken as a whole, indicate that the jury was required to find tense.” However, West focuses solely upon the language of
that the “true reason for [Arban’s] termination was that he 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) and ignores the language of
took a medical leave,” no error has been demonstrated. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B), which provides for equitable
remedies. Although West adds that the legislative history
IV. does not contain “any discussion of, or even reference to, the
availability of front pay or future damages under the FMLA,”
Under the FMLA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to receive West has not identified any explicit prohibition against front
damages in the amount of “any wages, salary, employment pay. In light of these authorities and the FMLA’s provision
benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such for equitable remedies, we find that the FMLA provides for
employee” as a result of the adverse employment action. 29 front pay.
U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I). The FMLA also provides that
“the employer . . . shall be liable . . . for equitable relief as
may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B). In this
case, the district court declined to submit the issue of front
pay to the jury, concluding that the FMLA “does not provide 1
In an unpublished decision concerning an FMLA claim, this court
for a remedy of front pay” and adding that “there is in this previously has held that “[t]he appropriateness of reinstatement and front
case insufficient evidence for the question of front pay.” pay, as equitable remedies, are within the discretion of the district court.”
Arban now argues that the district court erred “by ruling that Taylor v. Invacare Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. 516, 523, 2003 WL 21212674,
at *6 (6th Cir. May 21 , 2003).
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 23 24 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
While the determination of the precise “amount of an award Number two is the Court believes that there is in this case
of front pay is a jury question,” the initial “determination of insufficient evidence for the question of front pay even if
the propriety of an award of front pay is a matter for the it were allowed to go to the jury for the following
court.” Roush v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d 392, 398 (6th reasons: Number one, is there has been really – the
Cir. 1993) (ADEA claim). This court reviews the district proofs here are that in terms of loss wages, loss
court’s conclusions regarding the propriety of an award of opportunity, and so forth, that there’s just not enough
front pay for an abuse of discretion. See Simpson v. Ernst & evidence to go – especially on what he has made, and I
Young, 100 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 1996) (ERISA claim) (“A understand that part of it had to do with the law school
decision to submit the issue of front pay to the jury is and so forth, but still based upon his mitigation of
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is damages which he has none, there is no reason that a
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.”). reasonable jury could believe that there’s going to be
front pay, number one.
Although “[r]einstatement is the presumptively favored
equitable remedy,” it is not appropriate “where the plaintiff A review of the evidence presented at trial indicates that the
has found other work.” Roush, 10 F.3d at 398. In this case, district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. Arban
Arban testified that he accepted an offer to serve as a field testified that after accepting employment with Matthew
sales representative for Matthew Bender, a legal publishing Bender in July or August of 1999, his compensation was
company, in July or August of 1999. The fact that $45,000. Arban also explained that in 2000, he became a
reinstatement is inappropriate, however, does not mean that field sales manager, a position that he agreed was “similar to
an award of front pay is required. “No per se rule governs the the field sales manager position [he] had with West dating
appropriateness of front pay damages in a particular case. . . . back to 1997.” Through the first eleven months of 2000,
Ultimately, the question to be answered is whether front pay Arban had earned $185,000, $100,000 of which was
damages are needed in a particular case to make the plaintiff attributable to the opening of a new law school in his area.
whole.” Wilson v. Int’l Bro. of Teamsters, 83 F.3d 747, Arban’s earnings as an employee of West in 1998, by
756-57 (6th Cir. 1996). Several factors must be considered contrast, were $169,412. Consequently, Arban has shown no
when determining the propriety of an award of front pay, damages warranting an award of front pay.
including “an employee’s duty to mitigate, the availability of
employment opportunities, the period within which one by Arban argues that “[a] comparison of the earned wages in
reasonable efforts may be re-employed, the employee’s work 1998 to the earned wages in 2000 clearly is not proper or
and life expectancy, the discount tables to determine the relevant in the determination of Mr. Arban’s front pay” and
present value of future damages and other factors that are that “a legitimate comparison for calculating front pay is the
pertinent on prospective damage awards.” Roush, 10 F.3d at amount Mr. Arban would have earned and the amount Mr.
399 (quoting Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, Arban was earning.” Arban, however, did not provide
1160 (6th Cir. 1985)). evidence by which the jury could make what he claims would
be a more accurate estimate of his earnings. “A plaintiff who
In this case, the district court refused to submit the issue of seeks an award of front pay must provide the district court
front pay to the jury, stating: with the essential data necessary to calculate a reasonably
certain front pay award.” Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239
F.3d 848, 862 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Tyler v. Union Oil Co.
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 25 26 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming district THE COURT: – he thinks he could have made
court’s denial of front pay where an award would be “purely somewhere else?
speculative”). At trial, William King, Arban’s economic
expert, testified as follows: THE WITNESS: Well, he had said he was going to
go up thirty percent a year, and I
Q. Did you come up with a number for front pay, would do so–
taking the October 30 date and going forward?
THE COURT: But it’s all based on what he told
A. Certainly. you?
Q. And what number did you come up with for that? THE WITNESS: Yes.
A. One Million, Eight Hundred and Eighty-Seven Arban’s evidence regarding front pay was purely speculative.
Thousand, Three Hundred Eighty-Four Dollars. On the evidence before it, the district court thus did not abuse
its discretion in declining to submit the issue of front pay to
Q. Now– the jury.
THE COURT: Hang on. Front pay is what Mr. V.
Arban told you? You didn’t do
any research or anything else? Arban contends that the district court erred in failing to
It’s what he said that he thinks he award liquidated damages under the FMLA. The FMLA
could make or not make? provides that a court shall award liquidated damages equal to
the damages due to lost compensation plus interest. 29
THE WITNESS: Well, it’s based on that and the U.S.C. § 2617(a)(iii). However, if an employer proves that it
Social Security Wage Index. acted “in good faith and that the employer had reasonable
grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a
THE COURT: But it’s all based on what he hold violation” of the FMLA, the court may reduce the damages.
you? Id.
THE WITNESS: Yes. The two years at the twenty The FMLA does not explicitly define the term “good faith.”
percent, and then the Social However, this court previously has turned to the Fair Labor
Security Wage Index. Standards Act (FLSA), which contains similar remedial
provisions, for guidance in interpreting the FMLA. Both the
THE COURT: But all you did was take the FMLA and the FLSA provide that an employer “shall” be
Social Security formula and add it liable for damages and liquidated damages and that the
to what he told you– district court “may” reduce the amount of liquidated damages
if good faith is established. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
THE WITNESS: Correct. (providing damages under FLSA); id. at § 260 (providing
good faith defense to liquidated damages under FLSA); id. at
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 27 28 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. Nos. 01-2278/2370
§ 2617(a) (FMLA). “[T]he legislative history of the FMLA In this case, West claims that Plaintiff was not terminated
reveals that Congress intended the remedial provisions of the because of his leave, but because of misconduct. In order
FMLA to mirror those in the FLSA.” Frizzell, 154 F.3d at to prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must also
644 (citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 35 (1993), reprinted in 1993 prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that West’s
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37 (“[The FMLA’s] enforcement scheme is stated reason for discharging Plaintiff is not the true
modeled on the enforcement scheme of the FLSA. . . . The reason, but merely a pretext for retaliation, which means
relief provided in FMLA also parallels the provisions of the that the true reasons for his termination were not the
FLSA.”)). reasons stated by West, but that Plaintiff took a medical
leave.
Under the FLSA, a district court may not exercise its
discretionary authority to reduce or eliminate a liquidated As previously noted, this court presumes that the jury
damages award unless the employer first sustains its burden followed the district court’s instructions. Weeks, 528 U.S. at
of proving that its “failure to obey the statute was both in 234. In finding in favor of Arban, the jury thus necessarily
good faith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that found that West made its decision because Arban “took a
it would be unfair to impose upon it more than a medical leave,” not because of Arban’s misconduct. “[W]hen
compensatory verdict.” Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care legal and equitable issues to be decided in the same case
Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted) depend on common determinations of fact, such questions of
(FLSA context). This court thus must consider whether West fact are submitted to the jury, and the court in resolving the
sustained its burden. “Although in the final analysis, we equitable issues is then bound by the jury’s findings on
review a district court’s decision on liquidated damages for them.” Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d at 965.
abuse of discretion, that discretion must be exercised In this case, the district court disregarded the jury’s finding –
consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in that West’s decision to fire Arban was a result of his medical
favor of doubling.” Elwell, 276 F.3d at 840 (quotation leave and not his misconduct – in considering the liquidated
omitted). damages issue. Instead, the district court made its own
contrary finding, which served as the basis for its denial of
The district court found that West acted in good faith liquidated damages. This was error. The district court thus
because “they made their decision even before the medical abused its discretion when it denied Arban liquidated
leave was – the Family Medical Leave Act request was even damages.
put in. They wanted to delay it because of the holidays.”
However, as previously noted, the district court’s instructions VI.
to the jury specifically state:
In its April 26, 2001, order, the district court granted
To show such a causal connection [between the protected West’s motion for stay of execution of the judgment “pending
activity and the adverse employment action], Plaintiff the disposition of post-trial motions and, if necessary, during
must show that the reasons given for his termination appeal.” Arban now argues that for West to obtain a stay of
were not the true reasons, and that the true reason for his execution of the judgment, West must give a supersedeas
termination was that he took a medical leave. bond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). This court reviews a
district court’s denial of a supersedeas bond for an abuse of
Nos. 01-2278/2370 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. 29
discretion. Kennedy v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 937 F.2d 608,
1991 WL 134613, at **8 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished).
Rule 62(d) entitles a party who files a satisfactory
supersedeas bond to a stay of money judgment as a matter of
right. Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n,
636 F.2d 755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Am. Broad. Paramount Theatres, Inc., 385 U.S. 931(1966)). However, “the Rule in no way necessarily implies
that filing a bond is the only way to obtain a stay. It speaks
only to stays granted as a matter of right, it does not speak to
stays granted by the court in accordance with its discretion.”
Id. Arban claims that West must make “at least a showing
that it has adequate resources to satisfy the bond.” West has
done so here. At the hearing on West’s motion for stay
without bond on April 25, 2001, counsel for West stated that
“the revenues of the group of which West is a part is
approximately 2.5 billion.” The Seventh Circuit has noted
that “an inflexible requirement of a bond would be
inappropriate . . . where the defendant’s ability to pay the
judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond would be a
waste of money.” Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986). In light of
the vast disparity between the amount of the judgment in this
case and the annual revenue of the group of which West is a
part, the district court’s decision to grant a stay without a
bond was not an abuse of discretion.
VII.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s denial of West’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law or for a new trial, reverse and remand the trial court’s
denial of an award of liquidated damages, affirm the district
court’s denial of Arban’s claim for front pay, and affirm the
district court’s grant of a stay without bond.