McFarland v. Yukins

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0030P (6th Cir.)File Name: 04a0030p.06 James Krogsrud, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Jeffrey W. Caminsky, COUNTY OF WAYNE
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS James Krogsrud, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________
_________________
OPINION
PAULA MCFARLAND, X _________________
Petitioner-Appellee, - JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. The district court1
-
- No. 01-1360 granted Paula McFarland a conditional writ of habeas corpus
v. - on the ground that the attorney defending McFarland against
> drug charges labored under a conflict of interest because he
, also represented her daughter on the same charges. The
JOAN YUKINS, -
Respondent-Appellant. - Warden appeals the grant of the writ, arguing that McFarland
did not justify her failure to raise the conflict of interest
N argument on appeal from the conviction, that the defense
Appeal from the United States District Court attorney's representation of McFarland and her daughter did
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. not violate McFarland's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
No. 98-70465—Victoria A. Roberts, District Judge. and that McFarland received an evidentiary hearing to which
she was not entitled. We affirm the grant of the conditional
Argued: September 19, 2002 writ.
Decided and Filed: January 23, 2004 McFarland was charged in Michigan state court with eleven
counts of possession or possession with intent to deliver
Before: DAUGHTREY, GILMAN, and GIBSON, Circuit various drugs, based on the results of a search on
Judges.* November 4, 1986, of the house at 15151 Minock in Detroit,
where McFarland and her daughter lived. In a locked
_________________ bedroom in the southeast corner of the second floor of the
house, police found the chief incriminating evidence: an
COUNSEL assortment of pills and powders, blank physician's
prescription pads, and physician's ink stamps. Some of the
ARGUED: Jeffrey W. Caminsky, COUNTY OF WAYNE pills were found in a closet in the southeast bedroom, which
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. also contained women's clothes; some pills and the
* 1
The Honorab le John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United S tates The Honorable Victoria A. Roberts, United States District Judge for
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. the Eastern District of Michigan.
1
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 3 4 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
prescription paraphernalia were found in a file cabinet in the receipts for money orders bearing Reeves's name and the
room; and some pills and packets of powder were found in a 15151 Minock address, and a receipt from the Humane
safe in the room. At unspecified locations in the house, Society made out to "Donna Rayford." There were women's
police also found two scales; a sifter that was of the type used clothes in the closet of the southeast bedroom, but there is no
in the cocaine trade and that had residue on it; a prescription evidence as to what woman they belonged to.
slip for Tylenol 3 made out to Paula McFarland; and tally
sheets containing prices, names, addresses and phone Fourth was petitioner, Paula McFarland. McFarland's name
numbers. They also found $1423 in cash and three guns, appeared on many of the documents found in the dresser in
including a homemade .22 caliber made from a pen. the southeast bedroom, such as money order receipts and a
notice from the Michigan Department of Social Services. Her
There were four people who could have been linked to the name also appeared on a prescription for Tylenol 3 found
drugs found in the southeast bedroom. First, the only person somewhere in the house.
who was actually in the house at the time of the search was a
man, identified as Robert Eaton, who had a key to the front McFarland and her daughter hired one lawyer, Leroy
door, but no key to the locked southeast bedroom. Daggs. At the preliminary hearing in May 1987, counselor
Daggs informed the court that he was representing both
Second, a man was described in the affidavit supporting the McFarland and Reeves, that he had held discussions with both
search warrant as "black male, unknown, Gheri curl, dark of them about the possibility of conflict of interest, and that
complexion." (Eaton did not match this description.) This they did not anticipate a conflict arising. The court informed
man was seen on the stoop of the house when police were each defendant individually of her right to have separate
investigating complaints received from the "Crack Hotline" counsel appointed, and both defendants stated that they
about the house at 15151 Minock. The man's identity was not wished to proceed with Daggs representing them jointly.
established during trial. However, during the search of the
locked, southeast bedroom, police found a marriage license On April 5, 1988, the day trial was to begin, the court again
for Donna Ann Reeves and Reginald Leonard Rayford. They inquired on the record whether there was any conflict of
also found a briefcase in the house containing documents interest due to Daggs's joint representation of McFarland and
belonging to Reginald Rayford and two letters addressed to Reeves. Daggs replied first:
him at 15151 Minock.
I know at the examination I did [represent both
Third, McFarland's daughter Donna Reeves lived in the defendants], and I realize now this is probably a little
house. Agent Michael Hawes indicated at Reeves's trial that more–as far as representation is concerned, it would
the southeast bedroom was Reeves's bedroom. During the be–if I were going to make opening statements, I know
investigation that led to the search, an informant had gone to I would have to make two or–in closing statements, if I
the house attempting to buy drugs; the informant reported were, I would have to make two. But I think maybe in
speaking to "Donna," who said that she had dilaudids, but that talking with them this morning, I don't think that they
she would not sell them without seeing a "known face." feel very comfortable about the fact that–they've been
Police found documents stored in the dresser in the southeast talking to outsiders who indicate that I could represent
bedroom, many of which bore Reeves's name, such as the both of them at trial.
marriage license for Reeves and Rayford, a number of
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 5 6 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
The court probed: "Are you presenting some defenses here In other words, are you–is a part of your defense in this
that may be antagonistic in some kind of way?" Daggs case, you know, that things that might have been found
answered: didn't belong to you; they might have belonged to
someone else?
See, there were different–I think when the officers Defendant Reeves: Yes.
testified, there were different places in the house that ....
certain things were found. Whether or not there is a The Court: Okay. And let me understand here what it is
possibility during the course of this trial, if there was–if that you are saying, okay? Do you see any problem with
those antagonistic defenses as to both of them would Mr. Daggs representing both you and Ms. McFarland?
occur–I don't know. And if so, what do you think those problems are?
As I said, I've never been in this situation before, your Defendant Reeves: I think I need another lawyer. He's
Honor, where I've had two people at trial time, and I good, but I don't think he can handle both of us.
know that sometimes things can become sticky maybe. The Court: Why do you think that; that's what I'm
Maybe I would object, maybe the other attorney, if he asking.
represented the other party, maybe would not or maybe ....
he would and I would not. Defendant Reeves: Because I've talked with different
I think maybe I could handle it, but again after talking people, and they just said I need a different lawyer.
with them this morning, and the other day by
telephone–this morning out in the hall–they have begun The court then questioned McFarland:
to raise some problems, your Honor. I think maybe the
Court should more interrogate them as to the particular Without–I'm not asking you to make any kind of a
issue. statement or admissions or anything like that, but do you
perceive it as part of your defense that it maybe
The court commented: antagonistic in some way to the defense of Ms. Reeves?
Do you understand what I'm saying?
Well, I'm not concerned about any kind of problem Defendant McFarland: You Honor, I had called another
that the defendants are being raised here, you know, in attorney.
terms of what–if there's some kind of dissatisfaction. I'm The Court: Pardon me?
just concerned about following the procedure on this, and Defendant McFarland: I had called another attorney, and
so far I haven't heard anything that seems to be possibly he was too expensive, okay, to represent me, because I
antagonistic defenses here. feel like it may come to a point where we do need two
attorneys, and that he was too expensive, so I just had to
Despite its impression that Daggs had not established a leave that alone. But I feel that maybe it's best that we
conflict, the court inquired of Reeves: do need two.
I mean I have no doubt that Mr. Daggs is not a good
Do you see that there is–that you are raising some issues attorney, but I think that probably, you know, we need
or defenses that may be in a sense antagonistic to those one each.
that are raised by Ms. McFarland, or are you aware of
what that might be in any way?
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 7 8 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
The court expressed its concern that the defendants had taken southeast bedroom was sufficient to establish a possessory
no action to ask for appointment of counsel until the day of interest in the drugs. Accordingly, he found Reeves guilty.
trial. As the defendants were prepared to waive their rights to
a jury trial, the court determined that the proper course was to At McFarland's trial, in contrast to Reeves's, when Baaki
sever the cases, but proceed to trial with Daggs representing testified about the documents found in the southeast bedroom,
each defendant in front of different judges. he identified a notice addressed to McFarland at 15151
Minock, a receipt signed by McFarland, and 26 receipts for
The Trials money orders, of which 23 bore McFarland's name and three
bore the name "Brenda something." He identified no
The government's evidence at the respective trials of documents bearing Reeves's name or Reeves's putative
Reeves and McFarland differed. At Reeves's trial, the husband's name, nor did Daggs ask him about any such
government introduced the documents that tended to link documents on cross examination. Officer Deborah Steward
Reeves to the southeast bedroom, and at McFarland's trial, it identified a prescription slip for Tylenol 3 in the name of
introduced documents linking McFarland to the room. At Paula McFarland, but she did not say where the slip was
Reeves's trial, Officer Dennis Baaki testified about searching found. Officer Steward testified that $1423 in cash was found
the southeast bedroom, and he identified Reeves's and in the "far bedroom, not the south east bedroom." Steward
Rayford's marriage license; money orders signed variously by stated that the pen gun was found in the southeast bedroom.
Reeves, McFarland and a Brenda Retmer; the Humane When Steward was describing the investigation that led to the
Society receipt made out to "Donna Rayford"; a money order issuance of the search warrant, she did not mention the fact
from an insurance company to Reeves; and a "document from that the crack hotline telephone complaints named "Donna"
the State of Michigan"–all of which were found on the dresser or that the confidential informant had talked to Donna and
in the southeast bedroom. Also at Reeves's trial, Agent Donna had said she had dilaudids. Daggs did not bring out
Hawes testified that police had received Crack Hotline these facts on cross examination. Agent Michael Hawes
telephone complaints about a "Donna." Hawes also referred testified that in the second bedroom, which he searched, a
to the southeast bedroom as Reeves's room and the second purse was found with the pen gun inside and also with a letter
bedroom as McFarland's. Daggs argued in Reeves's case, or card addressed to Paula McFarland. However, in contrast
"[M]ost of these narcotics were taken out of one room and not to his testimony at Reeves's trial, Hawes did not describe the
out of the other room . . . [N]o one knows exactly which room southeast bedroom as Reeves's and the second bedroom as
Donna Reeves was in because, if it were shown, I mean only McFarland's. Hawes did describe the telephone complaints as
by mail and letters but other things. . . ." Daggs argued that having identified "Donna, no last name, as being the person
the narcotics could have belonged to Eaton or the other man who was dealing out of the premises." Daggs did not present
who was not at the house at the time of the search. The judge any witnesses for McFarland's case.
trying Reeves found that Eaton did not have a key to the
southeast bedroom and that Reeves was linked to the At McFarland's trial, Daggs's summation developed the
bedroom by the documents found there that bore her name. theory that the narcotics could have belonged to one of the
The judge specifically noted that possession did not have to two men, Robert Eaton or Reginald Rayford, but Daggs never
be exclusive, but could be joint. The judge found that the mentioned the evidence that the locked, southeast bedroom
evidence that Reeves had possession and control of the was Reeves's room. To the contrary, he appeared to concede
that it was McFarland's room:
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 9 10 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
So, and we–I'm assuming if we had two men living there You–you would like the Court to conclude from all of
at the same time we had two women they were probably the evidence, including the fact that the pen gun was
maybe sharing bedrooms so how can we say that Paula found in this defendant's purse, that she was involved or
McFarland would be guilty of possession and control of had constructive possession. I'm going to go back over
narcotics and not the person maybe who was sharing the the evidence as I recall it, but my recollection is that the
bedroom with her. That person could have just as easily pen gun was found in a purse in a different bedroom
brought those pills in there. The same with Donna from where the drugs were found?
Reeves. Evidently they indicated somewhere in here, The prosecutor: I think that's accurate.
well, maybe that was in the other case. I'm getting The Court: And also that the drugs were found in a
confused, that they introduced a marriage license of–I bedroom where there were was [sic] women's clothing
don't think it was in this case, I'm not sure but there was and two women living in the house?
a marriage license showing Donna Reeves was married The prosecutor: There's been no direct testimony that
to this man Mr. Rayford . . . . Donna Reeves lived there.
The Court: Okay.
When Daggs touched on the investigation leading to the ....
issuance of the warrant, Daggs not only failed to point out The Court: And there was no evidence about what else
that it was Donna Reeves, not McFarland, who engaged in the was found in the bedroom where the purse was found?
conversation about dilaudids with the informant, but he The prosecutor: Correct.
actually gave the impression that it was McFarland:
(Emphasis added.)
Now they couldn't–they weren't successful making any
buys. They says some white lady came to the door, well Later, on April 21, when the trial judge made her findings,
so what? . . . But there wasn't any buy made. So how can she had apparently forgotten that McFarland's purse was
you associate either–I mean Miss Paula McFarland with found by Agent Hawes in the second bedroom; instead, she
anything. I mean they haven't, all they have is her name relied on the testimony of Officer Deborah Steward, whose
on something that she lives there. Well, we don't deny role was not to search the house, but to catalog the evidence
that. But if she's to be charged with this and the other found by the searchers: "[Officer Steward] placed on her
people who lived there, the two black males, they weren't return a home made .22 caliber pen gun found from the purse
charged. taken from the south east bedroom." The trial judge later
made a contradictory finding that Agent Michael Hawes
In his summation, the prosecutor reviewed the documentary found the pen gun "in a purse in the upstairs bedroom at the
evidence with McFarland's name on it found in the southeast end of the hall, and there was a letter in that purse and that
bedroom. He said, "So it's pretty clear to me from that letter was addressed to Paula McFarland." The judge found
evidence that the occupants of that bedroom were involved in McFarland guilty, but she remarked:
the narcotic trade and it's pretty clear Mr. Eaton was excluded
from that [because he had no key to the southeast bedroom]." The only thing that I–I have to tell you this, Mr. Daggs,
(Emphasis added.) The trial court interrupted: in all honesty. I thought about it, I almost was ready to
find not guilty because I did not think at first blemish
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 11 12 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
that if you had two women living in the house you can leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals and
narrow it down but -- Michigan Supreme Court, People v. McFarland, 573 N.W.2d
Mr. Daggs: That's my thought too. 617 (Mich. 1997), on the ground that the claim for relief
The Court: I went back over the evidence and I was could have been raised on appeal and McFarland did not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. show good cause for her failure to do so. Michigan Criminal
Rule 6.508(D) forecloses review of claims a defendant could
McFarland was convicted on ten of the eleven counts and have, but did not, raise on appeal, unless the defendant shows
sentenced to various concurrent terms, including twenty to cause and prejudice for the default.
thirty years for possession with intent to deliver 225-650
grams of Oxycodone. Habeas Proceedings
Appeals and State Post-Conviction Proceedings McFarland filed this federal habeas corpus proceeding in
1998, arguing (among other things) that she was entitled to
McFarland and Reeves both appealed to the Michigan relief because the trial court failed to inquire into the
Court of Appeals, and both were represented by Attorney possibility of a conflict of interest resulting from trial
Robert F. Mitchell. Mitchell raised seven points on appeal, counsel's joint representation of Reeves and McFarland; that
including a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a trial counsel's conflict of interest adversely affected his
challenge to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the representation of McFarland; that trial counsel's deficient
search warrant, and an argument that amendments to the performance affected the outcome of her trial; and that
Michigan Controlled Substance Act should apply appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise trial
retroactively to McFarland's case. Counsel did not argue that counsel's deficiencies in McFarland's direct appeal. The
McFarland had received ineffective assistance of counsel, nor Warden raised the defense that McFarland's procedural
did he mention the possibility of a conflict of interest. The default in failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel on
Michigan Court of Appeals consolidated Reeves's and her direct appeal was an independent and adequate state
McFarland's cases and affirmed the convictions, but ground supporting the state courts' denial of postconviction
remanded for resentencing under the amendments to the relief.
Controlled Substance Act. On remand, McFarland's sentence
was reduced from twenty to thirty years to ten to thirty years. The district court held that "M[ichigan] C[riminal] R[ule]
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 6.508(D)(3) is not an independent and adequate state rule."
Order of May 11, 1999, slip op. at 10. Therefore, the district
McFarland then filed a motion for postconviction relief in court held that McFarland's failure to raise the ineffective
the Michigan courts, raising the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and of appellate counsel for failing to argue that trial
counsel was ineffective.2 The motion was denied, as was
McFarland had attempted to raise the issue. Transcript of Hearing of
February 15 , 200 1 at 11, 18 . M oreo ver, McFarland 's Application for
2
Leave to Appeal the denial of the postconviction motion shows that
The record before us does not contain the postconviction motion McF arland raised the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that she
itself, but the district court found that the motion attempted to develop the offered the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel as cause for her failure to
facts material to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the raise the argument about trial counsel, and that she sought an evidentiary
W arde n's counsel con ceded at a hearing befo re the district court that hearing.
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 13 14 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal presented no McFarland had shown cause and prejudice excusing her
procedural obstacle to reaching the merits on habeas. Id. at failure to raise the conflict of interest argument on appeal
11. On the merits, the district court first held that a defendant from the conviction. Id. at *3.
is entitled to relief without proof of prejudice whenever a trial
court "is or should be aware of a potential conflict" of interest The cause and prejudice McFarland offered to excuse her
and the court nevertheless fails to take adequate steps to default was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in
ascertain whether separate counsel are needed. Id. at 12. failing to argue the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Her
The court held that McFarland was entitled to relief according claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel rested on two
to this principle because she objected before trial to having to theories: first, appellate counsel had also labored under a
share counsel with Reeves and because the trial court should conflict of interest because he represented both McFarland
have known a serious conflict existed after Daggs explained and Reeves, and second, appellate counsel had simply failed
that the question at trial would be who had possession of to raise her strongest argument, which showed that he made
drugs found in different parts of the house. Id. at 13. The an unreasonable error and that the error caused her to lose her
district court held that the trial court's failure to investigate the appeal.
conflict and assure that McFarland received assistance of a
lawyer entirely loyal to her violated McFarland's Sixth The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which
Amendment rights. Id. at 13-14. Alternatively, even without McFarland called appellate counsel, who testified to almost
the rule granting relief without a showing of prejudice, the nothing of usefulness to either side because he had
district court held that McFarland was entitled to relief relinquished his files to Reeves and he had no independent
because her counsel labored under an actual conflict of recollection of what he had done in the case or why he had
interest adversely affecting his performance. Id. at 16. The done it.
court found that Daggs's decision to present a common
defense seeking to exonerate both Reeves and McFarland Nevertheless, the district court found that appellate
made no strategic sense at all, since Reeves and McFarland counsel's assistance had indeed been ineffective because he
were tried separately. Furthermore, the court found that had unreasonably failed to raise the trial counsel's conflict of
Daggs's failure to introduce any evidence pointing to Reeves's interest and, had he done so, McFarland would have won her
possession of the drugs, even the mere fact that Reeves lived appeal. Order of February 22, 2001, slip op. at 11-12.
in the house, showed that his representation of McFarland Therefore, the district court held that McFarland's failure to
was adversely affected by his loyalty to Reeves. Id. at 17. raise the issue on appeal had been excused and the court was
The court therefore granted McFarland the writ conditionally, authorized to reach the merits, as it had done in its first order
allowing the state the option of affording her a new trial granting the writ. The court reaffirmed its earlier order
within ninety days of the decision. Id. at 19. granting McFarland a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Id.
at 13.
We reversed because the district court's procedural ruling
was incorrect. McFarland v. Yukins, No. 99-1659, 2000 WL On appeal, the Warden argues that McFarland should not
1290125 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished). We have been allowed to have the evidentiary hearing at which
determined that the procedural default cited by Michigan she tried to prove that her appellate counsel's ineffectiveness
courts was an independent and adequate state ground, so it caused her to default her claim of trial counsel's
would be necessary for the district court to ascertain whether ineffectiveness. The Warden also argues that the appellate
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 15 16 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
counsel's representation of McFarland was not ineffective a constitutional right to counsel at the procedural stage at
because even if counsel had raised her claim about her trial which the alleged attorney error occurred. Coleman v.
counsel, McFarland would not have won her appeal on that Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). The failure to raise
claim. Finally, the Warden argues that the trial counsel's ineffectiveness of trial counsel occurred on McFarland's first
representation was not affected by an actual conflict of appeal of right, at which stage she enjoyed a constitutional
interest and that the trial court had no obligation to do right to counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
anything more than it did to safeguard McFarland's right to
effective counsel. McFarland must show that her appellate counsel's failure to
raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel rose to the level of a
I. constitutional violation under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). According to Strickland, a defendant's Sixth
We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and Amendment rights are violated if (1) the defendant's attorney
its factual findings for clear error. Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d commits an error "so serious that counsel was not functioning
412, 416 (6th Cir. 1999). McFarland's ineffective assistance as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
of counsel claim presents a mixed question of fact and law, Amendment," id. at 687, and (2) counsel's deficiency so
which is therefore subject to de novo review. Id. The district prejudiced the defense that there is a reasonable probability
court's determinations of questions of procedural default and that, but for counsel's performance, the result of the
cause and prejudice are also subject to de novo review. Id. proceeding would have been different, id. at 694. Counsel's
failure to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective
Logically, we must decide the procedural question of assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of
whether McFarland is entitled to pursue her claim of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal. See
ineffective assistance of trial counsel before we reach the Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 676 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
merits of that claim. However, the nature of the procedural denied, 535 U.S. 940 (2002). Thus, in order to decide
arguments in this case requires us to decide at the outset whether McFarland can present her claim of ineffective
whether that underlying claim has merit, as we will explain. assistance of trial counsel, we have to decide whether there is
a reasonable probability that the claim would have prevailed
The Warden argues that McFarland is not entitled to raise at the time counsel failed to raise it. Cf. Lucas, 179 F.3d at
trial counsel's effectiveness on federal habeas because she 420 (counsel could be ineffective for failing to raise argument
neglected to raise the claim on her direct appeal, as required that would have been overruled at the time it was omitted, if
by state procedural rules. McFarland's answer to the a change in law was foreshadowed). We consider this
Warden's procedural defense is that her claim of trial question in section II, infra.
counsel's ineffectiveness was so strong that her appellate
counsel's failure to raise it shows she also received ineffective If there is a reasonable probability that McFarland would
assistance of counsel on her state appeal. Ineffective have prevailed on appeal had the claim been raised, we can
assistance of counsel can supply the cause that, together with then consider whether the claim's merit was so compelling
prejudice, would excuse a procedural default. Murray v. that appellate counsel's failure to raise it amounted to
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). In order to show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that would excuse
ineffective assistance of counsel excusing a procedural McFarland's procedural default. See Section III, infra. Along
default, it is first necessary to establish that the defendant had the way, we must decide whether the district court erred in
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 17 18 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
allowing McFarland the evidentiary hearing at which interests and the trial court fails to investigate the conflict, a
appellate counsel was questioned about how he selected the defendant is entitled to automatic reversal without
issues to be raised on appeal. See Section IV, infra. demonstration of prejudice. Harris v. Carter, 337 F.3d 758,
761 (6th Cir. 2003). The reason for this automatic reversal
If ineffective assistance of appellate counsel excused the rule is that "[j]oint representation of conflicting interests is
failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel on appeal and suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from
if trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, our inquiry is doing." Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489-90. The record will
still not concluded. Because McFarland's habeas claim is ordinarily not memorialize mistakes of omission as it does
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty affirmative instances of trial error, id. at 490-91, so for courts
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Tit. I, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218 (1996), to evaluate the existence and effect of such omissions would
known as the AEDPA, if her claim of ineffective assistance entail "unguided speculation." Id. at 491. Moreover,
of trial counsel was adjudicated on the merits in state court, “counsel’s conflicting obligations to multiple defendants
she can only receive federal habeas relief if the state ‘effectively sea[l] his lips on crucial matters,’” thus
adjudication of her claim was contrary to or involved an preventing counsel from making an adequate record to
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law establish prejudice. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168
embodied in decisions of the Supreme Court or else the state (2002) (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489-90). Although
adjudication involved an unreasonable determination of the this evidentiary concern exists whenever counsel is subject to
facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). We consider the divided loyalty, the Holloway automatic-reversal rule does
application of the AEDPA standard to McFarland’s case in not apply to every such case; instead, it is limited to situations
Section V, infra. where "defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants
over his timely objection, unless the trial court has determined
II. that there is no conflict." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168.
Sometimes defendants prefer joint representation, even if
The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal there is the possibility of a conflict. See Wheat v. United
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Serra v. Mich. Dept. of
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” At the time of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1350-54 (6th Cir. 1993). Limiting
McFarland's appeal from her conviction in 1988-89, there the Holloway automatic-reversal rule to cases in which a
were three possible routes to establishing that her trial counsel defendant has timely objected to the conflict recognizes that
provided ineffective assistance violating her Sixth defendants have a countervailing interest in being allowed to
Amendment right to counsel. To determine whether appellate proceed with counsel of their own choice, while also ensuring
counsel's assistance was ineffective, we must first ascertain that the defendant cannot have it both ways by asking for
whether there is a reasonable probability that McFarland reversal or habeas corpus on the basis of representation that
would have won her appeal on any of these three theories. he or she acceded to during trial. See Smith v. Anderson, 689
F.2d 59, 64-65 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Because certain benefits of
A. a single defense counsel may be imagined, a different and
Under the rule of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 more searching review [than that prescribed in Holloway] is
(1978), when a defendant or his counsel voices a timely mandated when the defense is silent until the appropriate
objection to joint representation of clients with antagonistic occasions for objecting have passed." (citations omitted)).
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 19 20 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
McFarland's case presented the factors that make it This court recently affirmed the grant of habeas under the
obligatory under Holloway for the trial court to investigate. Holloway rule in Harris v. Carter, 337 F.3d 758 (6th Cir.
First, Daggs's representation of Reeves and McFarland was 2003), a case in which one lawyer, Evans, represented both
the kind of joint representation covered by the Holloway rule. the petitioner, Harris, and a co-defendant, Payton, who was
We have distinguished among the different situations in called as a witness and incriminated Harris at trial. Harris's
which a lawyer's representation of various clients and Payton's cases were originally joined for trial, but the trial
compromises his duty of loyalty: "joint and dual court severed them, sua sponte, on the day of trial. Payton
representation refer to simultaneous representation occurring had already been convicted, but not sentenced, when Harris's
in the same proceeding, while multiple representation refers trial began. Id. at 759. When Evans learned that Payton
to simultaneous representation in separate proceedings." would be called to testify at Harris's trial, he asked that
United States v. Moss, 323 F.3d 445, 456 n.15 (6th Cir.), cert. Payton be appointed separate counsel. Id. at 759-60. The
denied, 124 S. Ct. 303 (2003).3 "Successive representation trial court denied the request and forced counsel to proceed.
occurs where defense counsel has previously represented a The state courts held that "Holloway was inapplicable to
co-defendant or trial witness." Id. at 459. In Mickens, the [Harris's] case because Harris and Payton were not tried
Supreme Court recently noted it has never applied the jointly and . . . because Harris and Payton's separate trials
heightened protections from its conflict of interest minimized the risk of conflict and Payton had little need for
jurisprudence to cases of successive representation. 535 U.S. Evans' continued representation." Id. at 763. We disagreed.
at 176 (discussed in Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 816 We held that the state decision condoning the joint
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 441 (2003)). representation over the petitioner's objection without inquiry
by the trial court was contrary to Holloway, even though the
lawyer's two clients were not tried together. Id. at 764.
At the time the trial court ruled on the Holloway issue,
Daggs was representing two co-defendants joined for trial.
This is the prototypic Holloway situation and so passes the
threshold of eligibility for the Holloway rule. Whether the
severance on the day of trial fulfilled the trial court's
obligation under Holloway is discussed below.
3
At this stage in our analysis, we examine the merits of the
ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel-issue only to decide if appellate counsel
ought to have raised that issue on direct appeal. We recognize that new
law made in cases decided after the 1988-89 period during which
McFarland 's appeal was pending is not relevant to the question of whether
McFarland 's appellate counsel should have m ade a certain argument in her
appeal in 198 8-89 . But see Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 41 2, 420 (6th Cir.
1999) (taking into account future developments that were foreshadowed
at time of representation). W e cite later-decid ed ca ses only for their
assistance in analyzing the law as it existed in 19 88-8 9.
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 21 22 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
Second, McFarland voiced an objection4 to having to share the question of who in the house possessed the drugs was the
an attorney with Reeves. In Mickens, the Supreme Court source of a conflict. The court asked: "[I]s a part of your
interpreted Holloway as applying only where there has been defense in this case, you know, that things that might have
a timely objection to conflicting representation. 535 U.S. at been found didn't belong to you; they might have belonged to
168. In this case, Daggs initially informed the trial court that someone else?" Reeves answered: "Yes."
his clients were uncomfortable with him representing both of
them at trial. The court asked whether there would be A mother and daughter were charged with possession of
antagonistic defenses. Daggs's response was equivocal, but drugs found in the house where both were living. They
he did point, albeit cryptically, to the issue of who possessed indicated that they would defend themselves on the theory
the drugs based on the location of the drugs in the house: that "someone else" owned the drugs and that they did not
"See, there were different–I think when the officers testified, want to be represented by the same lawyer at trial. This is
there were different places in the house that certain things clear notice to the court of a concrete conflict of interest,
were found. Whether or not there is a possibility during the sufficient to bring the case within the Holloway rule.
course of this trial, if there was–if those antagonistic defenses Holloway does not require counsel to disclose trial strategy or
as to both of them would occur–I don't know." to breach his duty of loyalty to either client in order to
substantiate the existence of a conflict, United States ex rel.
After hearing from Daggs, the court inquired of Reeves and Zembowski v. Robertis, 771 F.2d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1985),
McFarland individually whether they thought there was a as Daggs would have done had he suggested to the court
conflict. Both stated that they wanted separate lawyers. before which both Reeves's and McFarland's cases were then
Moreover, McFarland stated that she had tried to hire separate pending that it was Reeves's room where the drugs were
counsel and could not afford to do so. Reeves confirmed that found. See Smith, 689 F.2d at 64 n. 5 ("[W]e need only note
the thorny issues raised by a judge's inquiry of counsel
pertaining to concerns and problems in his defenses,
4
This Circuit has interpreted Holloway to apply when "a defendant especially since the judge may be the trier of fact and may
or defense counsel makes a timely objection to joint representation based impose sentence upon his clients if conviction results.").
on an asserted conflict of interests." Ha rris, 337 F.3d at 761 (em phasis
added); Mo ss, 323 F.3d at 455 ("Indeed, where the defen dan t or his Third, the objection was timely. McFarland's objection
counsel objects to the conflict prior to, or during trial, the trial court must came before the beginning of trial. "[A] conflict of interest
inquire as to the extent of the conflict or subject any subsequent
conviction to automatic re versal."); Sm ith, 689 F.2d at 65 ("W hen the
objection is timely not only when it is raised before trial, but
defendant, individually or through his legal repre sentative, fails to raise also when it is raised during the course of the trial." Harris,
his concern for a conflict in a timely fashion," an actual conflict of interest 337 F.3d at 764 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 495 n.4
must be established to warrant relief). W e are aware of a district court (Powell, J., dissenting)); accord Smith, 689 F.2d at 62
holding that the rule in Holloway does not ap ply when a defendant (lawyer's objection on day of trial timely under Holloway
himself, rather than his co unsel, objects to the multiple representation.
Riley v. South Carolina, 82 F . Supp. 2d 474 , 481 (D.S .C.), appeal
where government moved to consolidate two cases at last
dismissed, 225 F.3d 655, 2000 WL 1009026 (4th Cir. 2000) moment); United States ex rel. Ballard v. Bengston, 702 F.2d
(unpublished). It makes little sense to deny effect to the objection of the 656, 663 (7th Cir. 1983) (motion one week before trial
defendant where his counsel was negligent or worse in tolerating a timely). Holloway specifically preserves the trial court’s
conflict of interest. However, we need no t plumb the depths of this issue, power to deal with defendants who make untimely motions
since Daggs himself brought the con flict issue to the trial court's attention
and the defendants then elaborated on the issue first raised by counsel.
for separate counsel in order to cause delay. 435 U.S. at 486-
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 23 24 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
87. However, courts interpreting Holloway have recognized Holloway is limited to the duty to inquire about the conflict,
that the existence and extent of a conflict may only become and that once inquiry has shown a possible conflict exists, the
clear as events unfold. Trial courts may not rigidly insist on duty to rectify the situation is judged under the actual conflict
objection a certain amount of time before trial when standard, rather than the automatic-reversal rule of Holloway.
circumstances have prevented counsel or the defendant from United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1994). It
speaking up earlier. See Harris, 337 F.3d at 764; Smith, 689 makes little sense to say that the burden of proving a Sixth
F.2d at 62; Bengston, 702 F.2d at 663. McFarland attempted Amendment violation increases as soon as the trial court's
to explain to the trial court the reason for her delay in inquiry shows that a possible conflict exists, even though the
objecting–that she had tried to hire a separate attorney, but court fails to respond appropriately to the conflict. The Tenth
had not had enough money. The trial court did not reject this Circuit has reasoned that unless the trial court's duty upon
explanation, but instead severed the cases for trial. timely objection "encompasses a sound resolution of the
conflict problem," the "inquiry mandated by Holloway would
The Warden contends that McFarland's objection was be an empty ritual." Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492, 1503
untimely and therefore "forfeit[ed] as a matter of state law," (10th Cir. 1996). We view the Tenth Circuit's position as
citing People v. Jones, 423 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. more consistent with Holloway, and accordingly we look to
1988). Jones does not involve a conflict of interest and see whether the trial court affirmatively obviated the conflict
merely concludes that Jones's request for substitute counsel by its response of severing the trials.
was untimely, without even revealing when the motion was
made. Even if Jones gave us a state timeliness rule we could The Supreme Court has observed that providing separate
apply, which it does not, Jones does not purport to interpret trials significantly reduces the potential for conflict of interest
the requirements of federal law as set forth in Holloway, from joint representation. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,
which is the relevant question. 784 (1987) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347
(1980)). Here, though the trials were separate, Daggs was
The question remains as to whether the trial court still actively involved in Reeves's trial when he tried
discharged its duty under Holloway by its inquiry and by McFarland's case. Reeves and McFarland were tried before
severing Reeves's and McFarland's cases. The various different judges, beginning on April 5-6 and April 7, 1988,
Circuits have somewhat different views concerning the nature respectively. Both trials were continued after the presentation
and extent of the trial court's duty under Holloway. In of several witnesses, to wait for Agent Hawes, who was
Holloway the trial court violated the defendants' rights when, unavailable when the trials started and who testified on
after timely objection by defendants' counsel, "[t]he judge April 11 in both cases. The April 11 hearing in McFarland's
then failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take case began at 8:50 a.m. and ended at 9:25 a.m. The last
adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to evidence and arguments in Reeves's case also occurred on
warrant separate counsel." 435 U.S. at 484. The Tenth April 11, 1988, but no time of day is noted. Since Daggs was
Circuit has held that this language outlines a duty (1) to present at both hearings that day, we can infer that
obviate the risk by substituting conflict-free counsel or McFarland's happened first. McFarland's trial was then
allowing the defendant to waive the conflict, or (2) to continued to April 21, when the court made its findings.
affirmatively establish that there is no conflict. See United Thus, Daggs was still actively involved in representing
States v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1997). Reeves during McFarland's trial. Though his actions in
The Second Circuit has held that the trial court's duty under McFarland's case were not automatically before the trier of
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 25 26 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
fact in Reeves's case as they would have been in a joint trial, and counsel represented to the court that severance would
still any evidence or argumentation he developed against eliminate any conflict. Accord Wilson v. Morris, 724 F.2d
Reeves would instantly be made available to the prosecutor 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (counsel did not object
for use in Reeves's case. For instance, although in hindsight except to refer to "potential conflict which could arise," but
we know that Hawes would suggest in Reeves's case that the which would be remedied by severance; cases severed for
southeast bedroom was Reeves's, Daggs did not have the trial, and Holloway not applicable). In contrast to Mavrick,
luxury of knowing that in advance. If he had brought this out McFarland objected to the multiple representation, and she
in cross-examination in McFarland's case, for all he knew he certainly did not lead the court to believe that she considered
might have been developing evidence the prosecutor had not her objection obviated by the severance.
yet seized on, which might have helped convict Reeves.
We conclude that if McFarland's appellate counsel had
In Harris v. Carter, we held that severance did not obviate raised the issue of trial counsel's conflict of interest in
the conflict, even though Payton, one of the lawyer's two McFarland's state appeal, McFarland's conviction would have
clients, had already been tried when he was called as a been reversed under the Holloway automatic-reversal rule.
witness in Harris's case. Had the lawyer shown that Payton
was lying at Harris's trial, he would have exposed Payton to B.
perjury charges and revealed confidences from Payton. 337
F.3d at 762. The lawyer's continuing duty to Payton hobbled Under the rule of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980),
him in discharging his duty to Harris, and the trial court was when an attorney's representation of multiple defendants,
bound under Holloway to recognize the lawyer's objection though not objected to at trial, results in an actual conflict of
and look into the conflict the lawyer pointed out. Id. at 764. interest that adversely affects the attorney's performance, the
Similarly, in this case, had Daggs attempted to exonerate defendants' Sixth Amendment rights have been violated, even
McFarland by showing that Reeves controlled the southeast without a showing that the conflict caused the defendant to
bedroom, he would have compromised his duty to Reeves. lose his or her case. Id. at 349-50 ("Thus, a defendant who
shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy
The Warden relies on United States v. Mavrick, 601 F.2d of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order
921 (7th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that severance of to obtain relief.").
McFarland's and Reeves's trials cured the conflict and
rendered Holloway inapplicable. But in Mavrick, the We have historically characterized Sullivan as requiring
defendants did not object to the conflict of interest, and when both "actual conflict" and "effect on representation" to
the trial court brought up the subject, counsel reported that the establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Thomas v.
defendants did not want to be represented by separate counsel Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 481-82 (6th Cir. 1987). To prove that
and that severance of their trials would eliminate the conflict. counsel’s performance was affected by an "actual conflict,"
Id. at 928-30. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[T]he events McFarland would have had to show that Daggs "made a
occurring prior to trial are almost exactly the opposite of choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as
those that triggered the trial court's duty of inquiry in eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but
Holloway." Id. at 930. The crucial event activating the harmful to the other." Id. at 481 (quoting United States v.
Holloway rule, timely objection, was lacking in Mavrick, Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 1983)). “Effect on
where the defendants resisted appointment of separate counsel representation” meant that the conflict caused the attorney’s
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 27 28 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
choice, not that the choice was prejudicial in any other way. There has been some difference in opinion among the
Id. at 483. In Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n. 5 Circuits about when foregoing an available defense because
(2002), the Supreme Court modified this test by putting both of a conflict of interest constitutes evidence of "adverse
the cause and effect elements into the phrase "actual conflict": effect." Some Circuits hold that whenever counsel failed to
pursue a "plausible" defense “that was inherently in conflict
[T]he Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties,”
inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and there is sufficient evidence of adverse effect to show a Sixth
apart from adverse effect. An "actual conflict," for Sixth Amendment violation. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d
Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that Cir. 1993); Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070; United States v.
adversely affects counsel's performance. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1985). Other Circuits also
require that the foregone defense be "reasonable." Freund v.
Mickens changed the terminology, but not the substance of Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 860 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
the test we had applied previously, since the standard still (showing of adverse effect requires proof of tactic foregone,
requires a choice by counsel, caused by the conflict of of reasonableness of tactic on facts, and of a causal link
interest. See Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 466-67 & between conflict and decision to forego tactic); Mickens, 240
n.23, 469 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 303 (2003). F.3d at 361 (same).
Although the choice caused by the conflict does not have to This Circuit has been quite rigorous in demanding more
be prejudicial in the sense of causing the defendant to lose the than omission of a hypothetical or "potential" defense to
case, Thomas, 818 F.2d at 483, the reasonableness of establish adverse effect. See O'Guin v. Foltz, 715 F.2d 397,
counsel’s choice can be relevant as a factor in proving the 400-01 (6th Cir. 1983). Under our cases, counsel’s choice to
choice was caused by the conflict. A defendant or habeas forego a defense that would have been inconsistent with
petitioner does not have to produce direct evidence, such as counsel's duty to another client is evidence of adverse effect
the lawyer's testimony, that the lawyer chose to do one thing only if it is clear that the choice was not part of a legitimate
rather than another in order to accommodate another client's strategy, judged under the deferential review of counsel’s
interests. Causation can be proved circumstantially, through performance prescribed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
evidence that the lawyer did something detrimental or failed 668 (1984). In United States v. Mays, 77 F.3d 906, 908 (6th
to do something advantageous to one client that protected Cir. 1996), we rejected an argument that a conflict caused a
another client's interests. "[B]oth taking action and failing to lawyer's actions where "arguably unwise questions by defense
take actions that are clearly suggested by the circumstances counsel of prosecution witnesses appear to have been part of
can indicate an adverse effect." Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d a losing strategy but they were not the result of choices made
348, 360 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted), where there were clearly better alternatives." (Emphasis
aff’d, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). “[T]he existence of an actual added.) In Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir.
conflict and adverse effects from it are more likely to be 2000), there was no proof of adverse effect where counsel
evident in cases in which an attorney takes positive steps on failed to request an instruction to which the defendant would
behalf of one client prejudicial to another than in cases in have had no right. Even where the lawyer omitted some
which the attorney’s actions are based on inaction and are course of action that undoubtedly would have been
passive . . . .” United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, advantageous to the defendant, there is no proof of adverse
1070 (3d Cir. 1988). effect if there is some other adequate explanation for the
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 29 30 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
omission, see Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 470 (6th See Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230-32 (9th Cir.
Cir.) (lack of plea negotiations resulted from defendant’s 2001) (adverse effect found where petitioner’s trial counsel
protestations of innocence), cert. denied, 124 S Ct. 303 also represented another person implicated in a killing;
(2003), or if the lawyer was ignorant of the facts giving rise counsel failed to make use of “obvious defense” that other
to the conflict, United States v. Hopkins, 43 F.3d 1116, 1118- client was the killer and Ninth Circuit could “discern no
19 (6th Cir. 1995). These cases are consistent with the tactical justification” for counsel’s decision); Griffin v.
Supreme Court’s methodology in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. McVicar, 84 F.3d 880, 886-91 (7th Cir. 1996) (actual conflict
776 (1987). There, counsel’s omission of a defense pointing where counsel presenting joint defense failed to present best
the finger at another person was not evidence counsel was defense that petitioner’s co-defendant, rather than petitioner,
motivated by loyalty to the other person, since the decision shot victim); United States v. Romero, 780 F.2d 981, 986-87
had a “sound strategic basis.” Id. at 784. (11th Cir. 1986) (actual conflict where defendant's "status as
a low level employee [in drug operation] made a shifting
On the other hand, where counsel's choices worked to the blame defense extremely feasible and . . . such a defense was
defendant's detriment but to the benefit of another client, and completely foreclosed to him because it would have
there was no other explanation for counsel's choices, we have implicated his codefendant and another client of his
considered the choices themselves evidence of disloyalty. For attorney."); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157-58 (2d
instance, in United States v. Boling, 869 F.2d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1994) (actual conflict where attorney forewent plausible
Cir. 1989), the defendant's counsel also represented a co- strategy of blaming another of attorney's clients); Fitzgerald
defendant to some extent in a related matter, and had v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1138-41 (D.C. Ct. App.
represented the co-defendant in the past. Counsel pursued a 1987) (where guns and drugs found in various rooms of
"common defense" strategy, which resulted in failing to call house, joint representation led to actual conflict preventing
witnesses favorable to the defendant and unfavorable to the family members from arguing that other members possessed
co-defendant and failing to cross-examine the co-defendant. contraband).
We held the strategy was "unquestionably . . . very harmful"
to the defendant and constituted a violation of her Sixth The record shows that McFarland's best defense would
Amendment rights. Similarly, in United States v. Hall, 200 have been to contend that the drugs belonged to Reeves and
F.3d 962, 966-67 (6th Cir. 2000), we held that counsel's not to McFarland. Under Michigan law, in order to convict
actions were affected by a conflict when he failed to point out McFarland of possession of the drugs, the State had to prove
that there was virtually no evidence linking one of his clients that she exercised control or had the right to exercise control
to cocaine, and the only evidence supporting the conviction over them. People v. Konrad, 536 N.W. 2d 517, 521 (Mich.
resulted from defendant's answer to a poorly phrased 1995); People v. Davenport, 197 N.W. 2d 521, 523-24 (Mich.
question, to which counsel should have objected. Ct. App. 1972), disapproved on other grounds, People v.
Nash, 313 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). There was
Thus, where counsel fails to pursue a strong and obvious strong evidence indicating that Reeves, not McFarland,
defense, when pursuit of that defense would have inculpated controlled the drugs found in the locked southeast bedroom.
counsel's other client, and where there is no countervailing Agent Michael Hawes said that police had received Crack
benefit to the defendant from foregoing that defense or other Hotline telephone complaints about "Donna," and during the
explanation for counsel’s conduct, these facts amount to investigation that led to the search, the confidential informant
evidence of disloyalty under any interpretation of Sullivan. had talked to "Donna," who confirmed that she had dilaudids,
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 31 32 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
but would not sell them to someone she did not know. The made. So how can you associate either–I mean Miss
southeast bedroom contained items that could have been Paula McFarland with anything.
linked either to Reeves or McFarland, such as women's
clothing and mail, money order receipts, and other documents Daggs left the impression that it might have been McFarland
with Reeves's or McFarland's name. Agent Hawes referred who talked to the confidential informant and that he had to
to the southeast bedroom as Reeves's room, and he referred to discredit the confidential informant's report to defend
the second bedroom as McFarland's. Agent Hawes said the McFarland, when it was Reeves who was implicated by the
purse with the pen gun and the letter or card addressed to informant. He argued that neither of the women was involved
McFarland was found in the second bedroom, not the with the drugs, even though there were women's clothes in the
bedroom with the drugs and prescription forms. closet in the southeast bedroom; while it was plausible that
one woman in the house was innocent of involvement with
In McFarland's trial, Daggs not only failed to argue that the drugs, it was far less plausible that both were. Daggs thus
Reeves was guilty, but he affirmatively argued that she was took on a heavier burden than would have been necessary in
innocent. He argued in closing, "There's been no showing defending McFarland alone. See Griffin, 84 F.3d at 890
here by the prosecution that either Paula McFarland or Donna (habeas granted where counsel presenting joint defense
Reeves . . . had possession or control of any narcotic . . . ." In pursued a theory so far-fetched that “no effective attorney
presenting the joint defense, he neglected to point out that the representing Griffin alone would have resorted to it”).
southeast bedroom appeared to be Reeves's room and even Moreover, Daggs failed to adduce any evidence that Reeves
seemed to concede that it was McFarland’s room: even lived at the house, as the prosecutor noted in his
summation in McFarland's trial. ("There's been no direct
I'm assuming if we had two men living there at the same testimony that Donna Reeves lived there.")
time we had two women they were probably maybe
sharing bedrooms so how can we say that Paula Instead of the obvious defense of inculpating Reeves,
McFarland would be guilty of possession and control of Daggs chose to point the finger at Eaton and Rayford. Eaton,
narcotics and not the person maybe who was sharing the though present at the time of the search, had no key to the
bedroom with her. That person could have just as easily locked room. Rayford was not present at the house during the
bought [sic] those pills in there. The same with Donna search and was linked to the house only by the presence of
Reeves. documents, including a marriage license bearing his name and
Reeves's and some letters addressed to him at the house, and
The burden of exculpating Reeves during McFarland's trial the possible inference that he was the male described in the
caused Daggs to make implausible arguments that would not search warrant.
have been necessary had he been defending McFarland alone.
For instance, Daggs addressed the report by the confidential Daggs’s duty of loyalty to Reeves would have been
informant about trying to buy drugs at the house: breached had he actively pursued a theory that she was guilty
of the charges while he was currently representing Reeves in
They says some white lady came to the door, well so a trial on those same charges; had Daggs developed and
what? You knock on my door I'm going to probably presented evidence and arguments establishing Reeves’s guilt,
come to the door, too. . . . But there wasn't any buy for example, by calling McFarland or Eaton to testify, or by
bringing out on cross-examination that Hawes understood the
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 33 34 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
southeast bedroom to be Reeves's, Daggs's work product C.
could have been used against his own client. See Mich. Rules
of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 (1985) ("A lawyer shall not represent McFarland also argues that Daggs’s errors and omissions
a client if the representation of that client will be directly violated her Sixth Amendment rights, even without regard to
adverse to another client . . . ."). whether Daggs was subject to a conflict of interest. Under the
rule of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a
The district court found that Daggs's decision to argue that defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated
neither Reeves nor McFarland possessed the drugs, instead of where counsel’s representation “fell below an objective
contending that Reeves was the owner, resulted from his standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and where there is “a
conflict of interest. The district court found that "Daggs' reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
decision to present a common defense harmful to errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
[McFarland] was the result of his desire to protect Reeves' different,” id. at 694.
interests and thus indicative of his struggle to serve two
masters." (quotation marks omitted). The district court The district court did not reach the claim of ineffective
specifically found that because McFarland and Reeves were assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.
tried separately, there was no countervailing advantage to However, without repeating our discussion in Part II B, it is
McFarland from the common defense strategy pursued by clear that McFarland had a strong argument that Reeves
Daggs. The district court held that this evidence proved that occupied the locked southeast bedroom and possessed the
Daggs made a choice in his representation of McFarland that drugs found there.
was caused by his conflict of interest. The district court's
finding of subjective motivation is not clearly erroneous. See Under Michigan law, the State only needed to prove that
Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. at 785. McFarland had joint, not exclusive, possession of the drugs.
People v. Konrad, 536 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Mich. 1995).
This case therefore presents an actual choice by McFarland’s name appeared on numerous documents found
McFarland's counsel to forego an obvious and strong defense in the dresser of the southeast bedroom, so there was some
to avoid inculpating another client. The district court's legal evidence linking her to the drugs. Still, in order to prevail
conclusion that Daggs labored under an actual conflict of under Strickland, it was not necessary to prove McFarland
interest establishing a Sixth Amendment violation under would necessarily have prevailed at trial, only that there was
Sullivan is correct. a “reasonable probability” that she would have done so.
At the time of McFarland’s appeal, the Michigan Court of After McFarland’s trial, the trial judge mentioned her own
Appeals would, of course, have followed Sullivan. See, e.g., misgivings about the sufficiency of the evidence connecting
People v. Rhinehart, 385 N.W.2d 640, 641 (Mich. Ct. App. McFarland to the drugs. How much more doubt would she
1986). Had McFarland’s counsel raised this argument on have felt if she had been made aware of the many documents
appeal, McFarland should have prevailed. with Reeves’s name found in the dresser of the southeast
bedroom? Or of the fact that McFarland’s purse was found in
the second bedroom, not the bedroom with the drugs? Or if
Hawes had testified, as he did in Reeves’s case, that the
southeast bedroom was Reeves’s and the second bedroom
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 35 36 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
was McFarland’s? Or if counsel had brought out the We have identified a list of relevant factors which help us
exchange between the confidential informant and “Donna”? distinguish a case of ineffective assistance of appellate
Reeves’s connection with the locked room was strong enough counsel from the case in which counsel's decision to omit an
to raise a reasonable probability that McFarland’s trial would argument on appeal falls within the realm of acceptable
have had a different outcome if her lawyer had actively professional performance:
pursued the defense that the southeast bedroom and the drugs
in it belonged to Reeves and to make it unreasonable for (1) Were the omitted issues "significant and obvious"?
Daggs to have failed to do so. (2) Was there arguably contrary authority on the omitted
issues?
We conclude that if state appellate counsel had argued that (3) Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than those
Daggs’s failure to contend that the drugs belonged to Reeves presented?
was ineffective assistance of counsel, McFarland should have (4) Were the omitted issues objected to at trial?
won her appeal. (5) Were the trial court's rulings subject to deference on
appeal?
III. (6) Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral
proceeding as to his appeal strategy and, if so, were the
Having decided that McFarland would likely have justifications reasonable?
prevailed on her appeal if counsel had argued that her trial (7) What was appellate counsel's level of experience and
counsel was ineffective, we must still decide whether expertise?
appellate counsel's failure to raise the argument was (8) Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet and go
sufficiently unreasonable to violate McFarland's right to over possible issues?
counsel. (9) Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the facts?
(10) Were the omitted issues dealt with in other
Failure of appellate counsel to raise an issue can amount to assignments of error?
constitutionally ineffective assistance. E.g., Joshua v. Dewitt, (11) Was the decision to omit an issue an unreasonable
341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2003); Lucas v. O’Dea, 179 F.3d one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt?
412, 419 (6th Cir. 1999); Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-
29 (6th Cir. 1999). However, counsel has no obligation to Mapes, 171 F.3d at 427-28.
raise every possible claim, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751-54 (1983), and the decision of which among the possible We have already decided in part II, supra, that McFarland
claims to pursue is ordinarily entrusted to counsel's received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which should
professional judgment, see Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, have led to reversal of her conviction. It therefore follows
536 (1986). "Counsel's performance is strongly presumed to that this argument was stronger than the seven arguments
be effective." Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 880 (6th Cir. counsel raised on direct appeal. One of those arguments
2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Even if counsel resulted in McFarland's sentence being reduced from twenty
made a mistake, the mistake might not be serious enough to to thirty years to ten to thirty years; nevertheless, it goes
have affected the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. without saying that a defendant would prefer a reversal to
Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 676 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. resentencing.
denied, 535 U.S. 940 (2002).
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 37 38 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
Further, the conflict issue was obvious. Appellate counsel have been difficult, if not impossible, for appellate counsel to
testified he was aware that McFarland and Reeves were argue that trial counsel's conflict prevented trial counsel from
represented by the same attorney at trial. The colloquy pointing the finger at Reeves when appellate counsel was also
containing McFarland's request for separate counsel appears representing Reeves on appeal. This spectre of yet another
in the trial transcript, as does the evidence pointing to Donna conflict of interest contributes to McFarland's showing of
Reeves's occupancy of the southeast bedroom where the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Greer v.
contraband was found. The brief on direct appeal included a Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 680 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and included U.S. 940 (2002).
extensive citation to the trial transcript, thus showing counsel
possessed a thorough knowledge of the transcript. One of the We conclude that appellate counsel's ineffectiveness was
points counsel did raise on appeal concerned the sufficiency the cause for McFarland's failure to raise ineffectiveness of
of the affidavit supporting the search warrant; this affidavit trial counsel on appeal. Because we have already held that
stated that the confidential informant had tried to buy drugs the ineffectiveness claim was meritorious and should have
from "Donna" and that Donna replied that she had dilaudids resulted in a reversal of McFarland's conviction, there is no
but would not sell them to someone she did not know. Thus, question but that appellate counsel's errors were prejudicial.
it is beyond dispute that appellate counsel had information Consequently, McFarland has shown cause and prejudice
before him that pointed to the defense that the drugs belonged excusing her failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial
to Donna Reeves, that appellate counsel knew Donna Reeves counsel on her direct appeal. Nothing, therefore, bars her
and McFarland were represented by the same attorney at trial, from litigating this claim.
and that they had unsuccessfully sought separate counsel.
IV.
The Sixth Amendment violation would have resulted in
automatic reversal under the rule in Holloway. It is therefore The Warden argues that the district court erred in allowing
difficult to excuse counsel’s failure to argue a point that McFarland the evidentiary hearing at which appellate counsel
would have led so expeditiously to reversal of the conviction. testified. The district court found that McFarland "diligently
requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective
Sometimes, omission of certain arguments or evidence is assistance of counsel at every stage of her post-conviction
shown by the attorney's testimony to have been a reasonable proceedings in the Michigan courts." Since McFarland was
strategic decision or to be the result of factors beyond the denied such a hearing, she was therefore entitled to present
attorney's control. See Scott, 209 F.3d at 880-81 (decision not evidence in the habeas proceeding on the subject of whether
to present mitigating evidence part of strategy to keep her appellate counsel was ineffective. The Antiterrorism and
defendant's criminal history from jury); Mapes, 171 F.3d at Effective Death Penalty Act outlines a heightened standard
430 (Siler, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[Counsel] may for a petitioner seeking an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner
have had strategic reasons for omitting the issue, or his client has "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
may have requested that it be omitted."). That is not the case court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000). We have
here. Appellate counsel testified that he could not even recall held that a petitioner who was diligent in seeking a state
whether he had raised a claim of conflict of interest on evidentiary hearing, but whose requests were denied in the
McFarland's behalf. Moreover, appellate counsel himself state courts, did not "[fail] to develop the factual basis of the
represented both McFarland and Reeves on appeal. It would claim" and therefore the heightened standard of § 2254(e)(2)
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 39 40 McFarland v. Yukins No. 01-1360
was inapplicable. Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 681 (6th or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 432 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
(2000)) (petitioner was diligent in seeking hearing on of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in state post- based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
conviction proceedings; therefore, petitioner was entitled to of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
hearing on claim in federal habeas), cert. denied, 535 U.S. U.S.C. § 2254(d).
940 (2002); Sawyer v. Hofbauer, 299 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir.
2002). But cf. Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 615 (6th Cir. The only state court decision on the merits in this case is
2002) (holding that petitioner who failed to raise ineffective the trial court’s response to McFarland’s objection to having
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal had therefore to proceed to trial with the same counsel as Reeves. At that
"failed to develop the factual basis" of that claim, even though time, McFarland’s actual conflict claim, which depends on
petitioner argued that failure was due to ineffective assistance the existence of an adverse effect on Daggs’s representation,
of appellate counsel), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1004 (2002) and and her Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
123 S. Ct. 2601 (2003). The Warden does not dispute the claim, which depends on Daggs’s omission of a defense at
district court's finding that McFarland sought an evidentiary trial, had not matured and so could not possibly have been
hearing in her state postconviction motion and that no hearing included in the trial court’s ruling. It therefore appears that
was allowed by the state courts. The record before us does the Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and Strickland
not contain the motion itself, but it does contain McFarland's claims must be reviewed de novo, rather than under the
postconviction brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, which heightened standard of review appropriate for claims that
specifically requests an evidentiary hearing. The have been adjudicated on the merits in state courts. See
postconviction motion was McFarland's first opportunity to Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Where,
raise the ineffectiveness of her appellate counsel. as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim
Accordingly, the heightened standard of § 2254(e)(2) does not properly raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under
apply to McFarland's case and the district court did not violate the AEDPA does not apply.”). As we have already
§ 2254(e)(2) in affording her a hearing on the subject of her determined that McFarland established Sixth Amendment
appellate counsel's representation. violations on both the Sullivan and Strickland claims, no
further analysis is necessary to establish her right to relief on
V. those claims.
Because this case was filed after the effective date of the The Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), claim (see
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. supra at Part II.A.), however, is subject to the heightened
104-132, Tit. I, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218 (1996), amending 28 AEDPA standard. Under the first clause of § 2254(d), a state
U.S.C. § 2254, in order to decide whether habeas was court decision is “contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly
properly granted, it is not enough to decide whether there was established precedent if the state court . . . confronts a set of
a violation of McFarland’s constitutional rights. We must facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
further determine whether the constitutional claim was [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings. If so, a different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Lockyer v.
writ of habeas corpus may only be granted if the state Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (quoting
adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). This
No. 01-1360 McFarland v. Yukins 41
scenario fits McFarland’s case precisely. McFarland, like the
petitioners in Holloway, objected before trial to having to
proceed to trial with one counsel for two defendants.
Although the trial court severed McFarland’s trial from her
co-defendant’s, which we have determined did not obviate the
conflict of interest, McFarland, like the Holloway petitioners,
was forced, over her objection, to go to trial with counsel who
was actively representing a co-defendant. Forcing McFarland
to go to trial with conflicted counsel contradicts the clearly
established precedent of Holloway v. Arkansas. McFarland
has shown that she is entitled to relief under the AEDPA.
***
For all of the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district
court’s grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus.