Miguel v. INS

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Miguel v. INS No. 02-3758
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0062P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0062p.06 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Cleveland, Ohio,
for Petitioner. Allen W. Hausman, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, Washington, D.C., for
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Respondent.
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________
_________________
OPINION
ANGELINA MIGUEL, X _________________
Petitioner, - ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Angelina Miguel is a native and
-
- No. 02-3758 citizen of Guatemala who was discovered by Immigration and
v. - Naturalization Service agents after a warrantless entry into her
> home. Miguel claims that the evidence obtained during the
, search of her house should have been suppressed because the
IMMIGRATION AND -
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Immigration
- Judge, relying solely on the admissions of Miguel’s counsel
Respondent. - during a hearing, decided that Miguel should be removed
- regardless of any potential Fourth Amendment violations.
N The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision of
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals. the Immigration Judge. Miguel appeals the denial of her
No. A76 507 819. motion to suppress. Because Miguel’s counsel admitted the
relevant facts establishing her removability, and because the
Argued: February 4, 2004 Immigration Judge did not rely on any of the evidence that
Miguel has asked to be suppressed, this court does not need
Decided and Filed: February 26, 2004 to reach the potential application of the exclusionary rule to
the entry and seizure of evidence from her home in possible
Before: NORRIS, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we deny
Judges. Miguel’s petition for review.
_________________ Angelina Miguel is a 25-year-old native and citizen of
Guatemala. Miguel apparently entered the United States
COUNSEL “without being admitted or paroled” in 1996 near San Ysidro,
California.
ARGUED: Richard R. Renner, TATE & RENNER, Dover,
Ohio, for Petitioner. Mary Jane Candaux, U. S. According to Miguel’s statement, on or about the morning
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, of July 7, 1999, Miguel was at her residence in New
Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Richard R. Philadelphia, Ohio, with another woman and three children
Renner, TATE & RENNER, Dover, Ohio, Raymond Vasvari, whom they were babysitting. Miguel was allegedly upstairs
1
No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 3 4 Miguel v. INS No. 02-3758
in a bathroom, when Immigration and Naturalization Service not revisit the issue. The IJ then asked Miguel some standard
(“INS”) agents knocked at the door. One of the children preliminary questions. In response, Miguel’s counsel
apparently answered the door and let in the three agents, who admitted the factual allegations contained in the NTA.
were soon joined by two more agents. Specifically, Miguel’s counsel admitted that Miguel was not
a citizen of the United States, that she was a native and citizen
Miguel came downstairs, and the agents announced they of Guatemala who entered the United States at an unknown
were looking for a person named Maria Garza. Miguel then time and place, and that she was not admitted or paroled after
retreated upstairs to a bedroom, but the INS agents soon inspection by an Immigration Officer. The IJ thereupon
knocked on the bedroom door. The agents came into the sustained the charge of removal and set a hearing date to
bedroom and began to question Miguel about her immigration consider any relief from removal that Miguel sought to
status.1 Apparently believing she had an obligation to pursue. On August 10, 2001, the day of the next hearing,
answer, Miguel told the agents that she did not have any Miguel’s counsel stated that Miguel did not qualify for any
“papers from the United States” but that she had a birth form of relief. At that hearing, the IJ also indicated that she
certificate from Guatemala. had denied the motion to suppress during the last hearing.
Later that day, the IJ issued a ruling ordering the removal of
As Miguel retrieved her birth certificate from an envelope Miguel to Guatemala.
in her backpack, an agent allegedly snatched the entire
envelope from her hands. The envelope also contained other On Miguel’s timely appeal, the Board of Immigration
documents relating to her fiancé and daughter. Miguel was at Appeals (“BIA”) issued a two-sentence decision affirming the
that time given a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) before the IJ’s decision. Miguel petitions this court for review, claiming
Immigration Court. that the IJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously when she did not
hold an evidentiary hearing on Miguel’s motion to suppress
On October 24, 2000, Miguel filed a motion to suppress all and that the INS agents acted so egregiously when they
evidence derived from the entry and search of her home. The entered her home without a warrant as to require the
motion alleged that the INS agents entered her private suppression of the evidence gained during that entry.
residence without a valid warrant and failed to advise her of
her constitutional rights. On November 8, 2000, the The decision of the IJ was proper because Miguel admitted
Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) in the removal proceeding that she was an alien, that she was not legally admitted into
indicated that an evidentiary hearing should be held on the the United States, and that she has no basis for any form of
motion to suppress. On the date set for the evidentiary relief. An evidentiary hearing as to the possible egregious
hearing, Miguel was late. The IJ denied the motion to nature of the agents’ entry into Miguel’s home would
suppress because Miguel had abandoned it by “her failure to therefore have been irrelevant.
appear” and also because the affidavits did not support a
finding of egregious conduct. After Miguel arrived, the IJ did Miguel admitted before the IJ that she is a removable alien,
and, regardless of whether the evidence at her home should be
suppressed, these admissions establish her removability. See
1
It is unclear whether the wom en let the agents in or if they just
barged in. However, Miguel’s motion to suppress indicates that the
agents simply o pened the doo r without perm ission.
No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 5 6 Miguel v. INS No. 02-3758
8 C.F.R. § 240.10(c) (2000)2 (“The immigration judge shall and is not inadmissible as charged.” 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(c)
require the respondent to plead to the notice to appear by (2000). To avoid removal, Miguel could also show that she
stating whether he or she admits or denies the factual is eligible for some type of relief from removal, but she bears
allegations and his or her removability under the charges the burden of proof in making such a showing. 8 C.F.R.
contained therein. If the respondent admits the factual § 240.8(d) (2000). Miguel admitted later, however, that she
allegations and admits his or her removability under the does not qualify for any form of relief.
charges and the immigration judge is satisfied that no issues
of law or fact remain, the immigration judge may determine Miguel does not contest the jurisdiction of the Immigration
that removability as charged has been established by the Court over her person. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S
admissions of the respondent.” (emphasis added)); 8 U.S.C. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or
§ 1361 (“In any removal proceeding . . . the burden of proof respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself
shall be upon [the alien] to show the time, place, and manner suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is
of his entry into the United States . . . . If such burden of conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation
proof is not sustained, such person shall be presumed to be in occurred.”). Instead, Miguel argues that the IJ improperly
the United States in violation of law.”); see also INS v. Lopez- denied her motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing.
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“In many deportation
cases the INS must show only identity and alienage; the However, even a favorable ruling for Miguel on her motion
burden then shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place, to suppress would not change her established removablity
and manner of his entry.”). because she has not asserted any applicable basis for relief
from removal.3 In Matter of Burgos, 15 I. & N. Dec. 278,
During a hearing, the IJ specifically asked Miguel, through 279-80 (BIA 1975), the BIA concluded that the IJ properly
an interpreter, how she answered the factual allegations found the aliens deportable because of their admissions. The
contained in the NTA. The NTA indicated that she is not a aliens in Burgos had submitted a motion to suppress before
citizen or national of the United States; that she is a native the IJ, but the IJ denied this motion. Id. at 270. In Burgos, as
and citizen of Guatemala; and that she was not admitted or in the present case, the administrative record did not contain
paroled into the United States. Miguel then admitted these any evidence that was obtained in the search, and the aliens
factual allegations through counsel. The admissions have not essentially argued that “their physical presence is the
been challenged on appeal. evidence to be suppressed as that presence was obtained
illegally.” Id. at 280. However, the BIA held that after the
After Miguel’s alienage was established by her admission Burgos aliens admitted their alienage, the burden shifted to
and was not contradicted by any additional evidence in the them to prove their time, place, and manner of entry into this
record, Miguel needed to demonstrate by clear and country. Id. The Burgos opinion continued:
convincing evidence that she is “lawfully in the United States
pursuant to a prior admission, [or that] she is clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States 3
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Me ndoza held tha t the Fourth
Amendm ent exclusio nary rule does not ap ply in deportation proceedings,
but appeared to leave open the possibility that the exclusionary rule might
2
app ly in cases involving “egregious vio lations” of the Fourth Amendment.
8 C.F.R. § 240 has been subsequently renumbered as 8 C.F.R. Lopez-Me ndoza, 468 U.S. at 105 0-51 (plurality opinion). M iguel asse rts
§ 1240. that an “egregio us violation” o ccurred in her case.
No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 7
Since they failed to sustain that burden, they are
presumed to be in the United States in violation of law.
The [INS] did not rely upon any statement taken or any
evidence seized at the time of the [the aliens’] arrest to
establish deportability. Thus, even if the arrest was
illegal, this would not invalidate the subsequent
deportation proceedings . . . .
Id.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez Mendoza did not
change the analysis of Burgos. See, e.g., Yadidi v. INS, No.
92-70042, 1993 WL 306238, at **1 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993)
(“Yadidi’s admissions at the deportation hearing formed the
basis of the IJ’s deportation order. Thus, the IJ did not err by
denying Yadidi’s motion to continue or by refusing to
consider further his motion to suppress.”). Likewise, the
evidence of Miguel’s removability did not come from an
allegedly illegal entry, search, arrest, or interrogation, but
instead the evidence of her alienage and removability came
from her own admissions at a subsequent removal hearing.
As the IJ did not rely on any of the evidence that Miguel
asked to be suppressed, this court does not need to reach the
potential application of the exclusionary rule to the entry and
seizure of evidence from her home in possible violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Miguel’s petition for
review.