United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo

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Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo No. 03-1728
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0281P (6th Cir.)File Name: 04a0281p.06 Appellant. Daniel Y. Mekaru, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul L. Nelson, FEDERAL PUBLIC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEFENDERS OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellant. Daniel Y. Mekaru, ASSISTANT UNITED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
_________________ Appellee.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X _________________
Plaintiff-Appellee, -
- OPINION
- No. 03-1728 _________________
v. -
> RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Martin Saldivar-
, Trujillo, a convicted felon who had previously been deported
MARTIN SALDIVAR-TRUJILLO, -
Defendant-Appellant. - as an illegal alien, pled guilty to one count of again being
present in the United States without authorization. His
N renewed presence violated 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The
Appeal from the United States District Court prior aggravated felony occurred in Wisconsin, where
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. Saldivar-Trujillo was convicted of possessing marijuana with
No. 02-00213—Richard A. Enslen, District Judge. the intent to deliver. After he pled guilty, but before the
sentencing hearing, Saldivar-Trujillo sent four letters to the
Argued: July 8, 2004 district court expressing his unhappiness with his court-
appointed attorney and requesting that the court appoint new
Decided and Filed: August 26, 2004 counsel.
Before: KRUPANSKY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied
MAYS, District Judge.* Saldivar-Trujillo’s request for substitute counsel after hearing
from both Saldivar-Trujillo and his defense counsel about the
_________________ issue. The district court subsequently granted Saldivar-
Trujillo a three-level sentence reduction for acceptance of
COUNSEL responsibility and sentenced him to 96 months in prison
followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal,
ARGUED: Paul L. Nelson, FEDERAL PUBLIC Saldivar-Trujillo contends that the district court abused its
DEFENDERS OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for discretion by denying his request for substitute counsel. For
the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
*
The Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
1
No. 03-1728 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo 3 4 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo No. 03-1728
I. BACKGROUND counsel had failed to attend a meeting with Saldivar-Trujillo
and the investigator to discuss the objections and had failed
Saldivar-Trujillo pled guilty on March 18, 2003. Between to respond to the objections in any way. Saldivar-Trujillo
that date and the date of his sentencing hearing on June 4, further contended in the letter that he had told defense counsel
2003, he sent the district court four letters regarding the several times that he was not happy with counsel’s
performance of his court-appointed attorney. The record does performance and wanted a substitute attorney to represent
not contain copies of the letters, but during the sentencing him.
hearing the district court provided an oral summary of their
contents. In his first letter to the district court, sent on April The district court inquired into Saldivar-Trujillo’s
3, 2003, Saldivar-Trujillo stated that “his counsel did not keep complaints at the sentencing hearing. First the court heard
him informed regarding his case and forced him to plead from Saldivar-Trujillo, who contested the 16-level sentence
guilty despite his lack of understanding of what he is guilty increase based on his prior aggravated felony conviction. The
of . . . .” Saldivar-Trujillo sent the court another letter on court then heard from defense counsel, who explained that he
May 5, 2003, in which he stated that “he told his lawyer and had walked out of the meeting with Saldivar-Trujillo and the
the probation officer that he was not happy with his investigator after he was informed that Saldivar-Trujillo
representation and would like alternative representation” planned to hire a private defense attorney. Counsel said that
because defense counsel had walked out of a meeting with he subsequently called the investigator several times to ask
Saldivar-Trujillo and the presentence investigator. whether she had heard from the private attorney (who was
never in fact hired).
Five days later, on May 10, 2003, Saldivar-Trujillo sent the
court a third letter stating that Saldivar-Trujillo’s attorney also explained to the district
court that he had met with his client in order to discuss the
he attempted to tell his lawyer he wanted to object to the Presentence Report. After discussing a majority of the Report
16 point increase in the offense level which is indicated with Saldivar-Trujillo, defense counsel terminated the
in Paragraph 23 of the report. Paragraph 23 provides a meeting because it “did not go well.” Saldivar-Trujillo
16 level enhancement on the grounds that under thereafter filed his own objections to the Report. Defense
guidelines 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), the offense level has to be counsel did not respond to these objections, however, because
increased by 16 levels because he was convicted of he did not agree with them.
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance
in Wisconsin[,] which is an aggravated felony, and he Defense counsel refused to provide additional information
was deported after that in 1998. regarding his problems with Saldivar-Trujillo to the district
court on the ground that their private conversations were
Saldivar-Trujillo sent a fourth letter to the court on June 4, protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court
2003, the day of the sentencing hearing. In his letter, then asked for comments by the prosecutor, who argued that
Saldivar-Trujillo claimed that defense counsel had not Saldivar-Trujillo was not entitled to the appointment of
explained the indictment to him and had tricked him into substitute counsel.
pleading guilty. The letter also alleged that Saldivar-Trujillo
had prepared his own written objections to the Presentence After hearing from Saldivar-Trujillo and the attorneys for
Report and sent them to the investigator, but that defense both sides, the district court denied Saldivar-Trujillo’s
No. 03-1728 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo 5 6 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo No. 03-1728
request. The court first explained that cases from the Sixth There is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Circuit required it to consider “the timeliness of the defense counsel has not been an effective advocate on
defendant’s motion, whether the conflict between the attorney behalf of the defendant. Additionally[,] I happen to
and client was so great it resulted in a total lack of know defense counsel to be far more than competent as
communication thereby preventing an adequate defense, and a lawyer for a person charged with a crime, and I also
whether the accused’s right to counsel of his choice know he is a committed advocate if ever an advocate I’ve
outweighs the public interest in the prompt and efficient seen.
administration of justice.” Applying these factors, the district
court reasoned as follows: Finally[,] I have to consider whether the balance
weighs in favor of the accused’s right to counsel of his
The Court was first made aware of defendant’s desire to choice or the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient
substitute his lawyer . . . on April 3rd, two months before administration of justice. At this stage, the stage of
his sentencing. That factor weighs in favor of the sentencing, [a] guilty plea has been entered, sentencing
defendant’s request. With respect to the adequacy of the is under way, the public’s interest in prompt
communication between defendant and his counsel, it is administration of justice is great. Defendant should not
clear to me from defendant’s letters, if nothing else, and be permitted to disrupt the judicial system by filing
what he said today, that there was not a total lack of motions for substitution of counsel without good cause.
communication, in his letter he references attempts to In this case, the defendant is represented by more than
obtain information from his lawyer, he expresses adequate counsel. He previously appeared before me [at
dissatisfaction with the responses he got from his lawyer, the guilty plea hearing] and affirmed his satisfaction with
not with the [lack of] opportunity or his [in]ability to talk counsel, and that is apparent in the transcript[,] and
to his lawyer or contact his lawyer. willingly entered a plea. I am concerned that his motion
is an attempt to delay his sentence and not a legitimate
Furthermore, I find that he willingly and knowingly motion for substitute counsel. In any event, he has failed
entered a plea on the charges he now claims not to to show good cause for me to substitute counsel, and I
understand, that’s clear from the transcript and from his find the public interest[] in the prompt and efficient
letter to me. . . . administration of justice outweighs his right to counsel
of his choice. Therefore, his letter motions and his oral
[He] argued that his lawyer’s failure to object to motion to substitute counsel is denied.
certain items in the [Presentence Report] make[s] his
counsel inadequate, specifically he is concerned about In addition to discussing his representation of Saldivar-
the 16 level increase in the offense level as a result of Trujillo, defense counsel argued at the sentencing hearing that
having been deported after a criminal conviction for an the district court should reduce his client’s sentence for
aggravated felony. As a matter of law I find defense acceptance of responsibility. The prosecutor agreed that a
counsel has absolutely no basis to object to that increase, three-level reduction was appropriate, and the court
and such an objection would be frivolous. According to accordingly reduced Saldivar-Trujillo’s offense level by that
Guidelines 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), his base offense level is amount.
properly increased 16 levels.
No. 03-1728 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo 7 8 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo No. 03-1728
II. ANALYSIS Granting Saldivar-Trujillo’s request for substitute counsel,
moreover, would actually have impeded the efficient
A. Standard of review administration of justice because his complaints about his
attorney’s performance were frivolous. Saldivar-Trujillo’s
“An indigent defendant has no right to have a particular essential grievance was that his attorney would not object to
attorney represent him and therefore must demonstrate ‘good the 16-level enhancement based upon his prior aggravated
cause’ to warrant substitution of counsel.” United States v. felony conviction. As the government points out in its brief,
Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990). We will reverse a however,
district court’s decision regarding an indigent defendant’s
motion for substitute counsel only if the district court has Defendant’s complaint stemmed from an apparent
abused its discretion. Id. at 1130 n.8. In order to decide misunderstanding of the law. The Defendant
whether a district court has abused its discretion, we must misconstrued the legal significance of his prior drug
consider conviction and removal. The district court properly held
that it was not necessary for the conviction to state
the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court’s “aggravated” and it was not necessary for the removal to
inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the be as a result of his conviction.
conflict between the attorney and client was so great that
it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an Any objection by defense counsel to this 16-level increase
adequate defense. . . . Further, [c]onsideration of such would therefore have been frivolous, and the district court
motions requires a balancing of the accused’s right to properly refused Saldivar-Trujillo’s request to appoint
counsel of his choice and the public’s interest in the substitute counsel who would make such an argument. As for
prompt and efficient administration of justice. Saldivar-Trujillo’s allegation that defense counsel had not
explained the indictment to him and had tricked him into
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). pleading guilty, the district court correctly concluded that the
transcript of the guilty plea hearing demonstrated that
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by Saldivar-Trujillo fully understood the elements of the offense.
denying Saldivar-Trujillo’s motion for substitute
counsel The only potential harm to Saldivar-Trujillo’s interests
occurred when defense counsel walked out of the meeting
Saldivar-Trujillo’s request for substitute counsel was timely with the presentence investigator. Because the attorney left,
because he wrote his first letter to the judge a full two months the investigator was unable to determine whether Saldivar-
before the sentencing hearing. But all of the other Iles factors Trujillo had accepted responsibility for his actions, thereby
weigh against the granting of his request. The district court entitling him to a sentence reduction. But defense counsel
properly concluded “that there was not a total lack of remedied this potential harm to Saldivar-Trujillo by
communication” because “in his letter he references attempts successfully arguing at the sentencing hearing for the three-
to obtain information from his lawyer, he expresses level reduction. Defense counsel’s actions at the meeting
dissatisfaction with the responses he got from his lawyer, not therefore did not constitute good cause for the district court to
with the [lack of] opportunity or his [in]ability to talk to his grant Saldivar-Trujillo substitute counsel.
lawyer or contact his lawyer.”
No. 03-1728 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo 9 10 United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo No. 03-1728
The only Iles factor that the district court did not consider, based solely upon the facts admitted by Saldivar-Trujillo as
because it was not in a position to do so, is “the adequacy of part of his guilty plea. Blakely therefore does not affect the
the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint . . . .” 906 validity of his sentence. See United States v. Lucca, No.
F.2d at 1130 n.8. This is for us to decide. Our review of the 03-2859, 2004 WL 1698784, at *6 (8th Cir. July 30, 2004)
sentencing hearing shows that the district court summarized (holding that Blakely was not implicated where the defendant
the contents of Saldivar-Trujillo’s letters and allowed was sentenced based solely upon the facts admitted as part of
Saldivar-Trujillo, his defense counsel, and the prosecutor the his guilty plea).
opportunity to address the complaint at issue. We conclude
that this inquiry was adequate because it allowed all of the III. CONCLUSION
interested parties to present their respective evidence and
arguments. For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
The district court correctly determined “that there was not
a total lack of communication” between Saldivar-Trujillo and
his attorney, that Saldivar-Trujillo was not prejudiced in any
way by his attorney’s performance, and that Saldivar-
Trujillo’s right to the counsel of his choice was outweighed
by the public interest in the prompt and efficient
administration of justice. Because Saldivar-Trujillo did not
demonstrate good cause to warrant the substitution of
counsel, the district court’s denial of his request was not an
abuse of discretion.
C. Legality of the sentence under Blakely v. Washington
Saldivar-Trujillo’s final contention is that his sentence
should be vacated pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S.
__, 124 S. Ct. 2351 (2004), where the Supreme Court struck
down a Washington-state sentencing proceeding in which the
judge imposed punishment that the jury’s verdict alone did
not allow. But even if we were to assume for the sake of
argument that Blakely applies to cases involving the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (an issue very much in dispute
at the present time), the Supreme Court’s decision would not
require us to vacate Saldivar-Trujillo’s sentence. The Blakely
Court explained that a sentence may be imposed by a judge if
it is based solely on the “facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.” __ U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 2537
(emphasis in original). The sentence in the present case was