Preyor v. City of Ferndale

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0660n.06
Filed: September 5, 2007
No. 06-1995
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM PREYOR, JR., as Personal Rep. of )
the Estate of WILLIAM PREYOR, III, )
Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CITY OF FERNDALE et al., )
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: KEITH, MOORE, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
KEITH, Circuit Judge. On behalf of his son (William Preyor, III), Plaintiff William Preyor
Jr. brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Ferndale and several of its police officers,
alleging deliberate indifference to his son’s serious medical needs. The parties stipulated to the
dismissal of all Defendants except two (Sergeants Steve Jennings and Thomas Cupples). These two
collectively filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which the
district court denied. They filed this interlocutory appeal; and, for the following reasons, we
AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
Around 12:47 p.m. on September 20, 2002, William Preyor, III was arrested for possession
of a stolen vehicle and taken to the Ferndale Police Department to be booked. Less than twenty
hours later, Preyor was found dead in his cell. The events leading to his death are as follows:
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 2
12:47 p.m.—5:00 p.m.: Sergeant Jennings’ First Shift
Upon arriving at the Ferndale Police Department, Preyor gave the in-take officer (David
Watters) the alias “Derrick Hayden.” Officer Watters booked Preyor under this alias, but, when
Preyor’s true identity was discovered through fingerprint identification (about an hour or so later),
Preyor’s booking forms were changed to reflect this.
Preyor’s “Arrest and Confinement” form indicated that Preyor informed Officer Watters that
he was a diabetic and “on meds.” Preyor also informed the supervisor of the day shift (Sergeant
Steve Jennings) that, as a diabetic, he required a shot of insulin twice a day and that he had not yet
taken his medication for that day. Jennings instructed another officer to call CVS Pharmacy to check
on Preyor’s claims, but, according to Jennings, Preyor’s true identity was still unknown at that time.
And, hence, CVS indicated that it had no “Derrick Hayden” in its system. (Plaintiff has proffered
evidence showing that, at this point, officers had already discovered Preyor’s true identity.)
At approximately 2:01 p.m., Jennings contacted Ferndale Fire Department’s Paramedics
Steven Light and Dennis Barr. After the paramedics arrived at the jail, they checked Preyor’s vitals
and blood sugar level. Tests indicted that Preyor’s blood sugar level was elevated, but Preyor was
given no treatment. The paramedics told Sergeant Jennings that they could not confirm whether
Preyor was taking insulin. They then advised Jennings to continue to monitor Preyor’s behavior and
to call them back if necessary. (JA 150) (Jennings’ Dep. 25). At approximately 2:28 p.m., the
paramedics left the station without treating Preyor. He was placed in a “bullpen” cell in the
meantime.
3:00 p.m.—11:00 p.m.: Lieutenant Czajkowski’s Shift
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 3
At approximately 5:20 p.m., and, again, at 5:40 p.m., Preyor was observed “curled up” and
trembling in the corner of the bullpen cell. The supervisor of the afternoon shift (Lieutenant B.
Czajkowski) immediately called for an ambulance. Paramedics arrived approximately six minutes
later (at approximately 5:46 p.m.). Preyor’s blood sugar level was again found to be
elevated—although slightly less than it had been earlier. The paramedics (Jack Pesha and Dennis
Barr) contacted St. John’s Oakland Hospital and spoke with a doctor, who allegedly informed them
that it was unnecessary to hospitalize Preyor. Lieutenant Czajkowski signed a “no transfer” form
and told paramedics that the officers would try to obtain Preyor’s medication. Preyor was then
placed back into the bullpen.
11:00 p.m.—7:00 a.m.: Sergeant Cupples’ Shift
At approximately 3:05 a.m. the next morning (September 21, 2002), Preyor was again
observed on the floor of the bullpen. Preyor stated that he was experiencing “DT’s” (which the
supervisor of the midnight shift, Sergeant Thomas Cupples, interpreted to mean “detoxification” (JA
210)) and that he did not feel well. Sergeant Cupples was told of Preyor’s complaints and of the
paramedics’ earlier visits, but he did not take any action at this point.
Around 5:30 a.m., after Sergeant Cupples was again informed that Preyor believed that he
was detoxing from heroin and made threats to hang himself, Sergeant Cupples ordered that Preyor
be transferred to the observation cell (or the “fish bowl”) to allow officers to monitor his behavior.
When Preyor realized that he was being transferred to the fish bowl, he pleaded, “Hey man, I’m not
going to hurt myself, I just want some attention.” (JA 398.)
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Within minutes of being transferred into the fish bowl (at 5:45 a.m.), Preyor begged officers
to be transferred back into a cell with a toilet, as “[he] need[ed] to use the bathroom every five
minutes” due to his detoxification. (JA 401.) The officers relayed this information to Sergeant
Cupples, who then instructed an officer to take Preyor to a cell with a toilet so that he could use it.
Preyor was then transferred back to the fish bowl.
Again, within minutes of returning to the fish bowl (at 6:00 a.m.), Preyor requested to use
the restroom. Preyor was taken to another cell to use the restroom, and, as Preyor was being
transferred back into the fish bowl, he informed the escorting officer that he was suffering from
heroin withdrawal. At 6:20 a.m. (twenty minutes had passed from his last visit to the restroom),
Preyor again asked an officer to use the restroom. Preyor was again taken to a cell to use the
restroom. After using the restroom, Preyor attempted to lay down on a bed in the cell, but he was
transferred back to the fish bowl. At this point, Preyor had used the restroom a total of three times
after being transferred into the fish bowl and making complaints about suffering from diarrhea.
(Sergeant Cupples contends that he only had knowledge of two of these three times. (JA 211.))
Around 6:40 a.m., a few officers, including Sergeant Cupples, observed Preyor vomiting in
the fish bowl—two to three times. According to one officer, Preyor had vomited a “large amount
of green vomit on the floor.” (JA 408.) (Sergeant Cupples contends that Preyor had been sticking
his finger down his throat to induce the vomit.)
At 6:45 a.m., Sergeant Jennings returned to the station to begin his day shift. Sergeant
Cupples briefed Sergeant Jennings about Preyor’s condition. Before leaving his shift, around 7:10
a.m., Sergeant Cupples noticed Preyor on the floor of the fish bowl.
7:00 a.m.—7:50 a.m.: Sergeant Jennings’ Second Shift
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 5
Preyor asked Sergeant Jennings to use the restroom. Another officer (as instructed by
Jennings) took Preyor to another cell to use the restroom and then transferred him back to the fish
bowl. At 7:35 a.m., Preyor was allowed to use the restroom again. He informed the escorting
officer that he was suffering from diarrhea because he was detoxing from heroin. After the escorting
officer informed Sergeant Jennings of Preyor’s claims, Sergeant Jennings instructed the officer to
leave Preyor in the bullpen cell, where there was a toilet.
At 7:50 a.m., Sergeant Jennings attempted to move Preyor back into the fish bowl, but Preyor
was lying on the floor and unresponsive. Sergeant Jennings instructed an officer to call the Ferndale
Fire Department, while Jennings unsuccessfully performed CPR on Preyor. Paramedics were also
unsuccessful in reviving Preyor, and he was pronounced dead at 8:37 a.m.
An autopsy revealed that the “cause of death” was due to “drug abuse and complications,”
but it did not determine the “manner of death.” (JA 437) (Autopsy Protocol). The doctor who
performed the autopsy (Dr. Ljubisa Jovan Dragovic) later testified in his deposition that vomiting
and diarrhea can be signs of heroin withdrawal. (JA 452). Dr. Dragovic concluded that “[Preyor]
went into withdrawal, and as a result of that died.” (JA 452.).
A forensic pathologist (Dr. Werner U. Spitz) reviewed Preyor’s case, and determined that
“Preyor died as a result of electrolyte imbalance due to dehydration caused by diarrhea and
vomiting.” (JA 469) (Spitz’s Report). Dr. Spitz also opined, “I do not believe that Mr. Preyor’s
diabetes played a significant role in causing his death. However, diarrhea is a known complication
of opiate withdrawal, thus abstinence from heroin causing fluid loss by way of diarrhea and vomiting
would have been directly implicated in causing the demise.” (JA 469.) According to Dr. Spitz,
“[a]dminstration of fluids at anytime during the night and treatment for diarrhea and vomiting would
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 6
have been lifesaving.” (JA 470.)
On December 24, 2004, William Preyor Jr. (Preyor’s father and personal representative of
his estate) filed this § 1983 action against the City of Ferndale and several of its employees,
including Sergeants Jennings and Cupples, alleging deliberate indifference to his son’s serious
medical needs. On March 16, 2006, Defendants collectively filed a motion for summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of all Defendants except
Segreants Jennings and Cupples. At a June 28, 2006 hearing, the district court denied Sergeants
Jennings and Cupples’ motion without a written opinion. Jennings and Cupples timely filed this
interlocutory appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The first issue on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. As a general matter, our Court has
jurisdiction to review “final orders” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[A] district court’s denial of a claim
of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). However, “[t]o the extent that a denial of summary judgment
finding qualified immunity inappropriate is based upon the district court's determination that a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the decision will not be immediately appealable.” Crockett v.
Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, “if what is at issue in the
appeal is nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular conduct
occurred, there is no appellate jurisdiction because that question is inseparable from the merits of
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the plaintiff’s claim.” Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995).
The district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion was based on its determination that
“genuine issues of material fact” remain as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Preyor’s serious medical needs. However,“[t]he district court’s assertion that there are genuine
issues of material fact does not, standing alone, destroy the appealability of a qualified immunity
ruling.” Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61
F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant’s right to appeal the denial of qualified immunity does
not turn on the phrasing of the district court’s order . . . .”). If a defendant concedes (for the
purposes of appeal) “the best view of the facts to the plaintiff[,]” Berryman, 150 F.3d at 564, the
Court has jurisdiction to determine the remaining legal question of qualified immunity: “whether
the facts as alleged by [plaintiff] demonstrate a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,”
Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding jurisdiction because plaintiff “[did] not
raise the issue of [fact contested in the district court]”); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 701
(6th Cir. 2001) (finding jurisdiction “[a]lthough factual issues were contested before the district court
[because,] for the purposes of [the] appeal, both parties ha[d] explicitly stipulated to plaintiff’s
version of facts”).
Although Defendants have contested factual issues in their appellate briefs, they purported
to correct their position at oral argument and conceded “the best view of the facts to the Plaintiff[.]”
Berryman, 150 F.3d at 564. To the extent that the substance of their arguments reveal that they are
essentially contesting Plaintiff’s version of the facts, we ignore these attempts and address only the
purely legal issues. See Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2005).
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 8
Therefore, “[b]ecause the case before us turns on whether Plaintiff’s facts, admitted by Defendants
for purposes of this appeal, show a violation of clearly established law, not on which facts the parties
may be able to prove, the district court’s denial of qualified immunity is a ‘final order’ under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we have jurisdiction to decide the case on merits.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.
3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
B. Qualified Immunity
Our review of the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity is de novo. Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 2003).
“Qualified immunity provides ‘that government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity, the threshold question is: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Provided the answer is “yes,” “the next, sequential step is to ask
whether the right was clearly established.” Id. We consider each question in turn.
1. Constitutional Violation
Plaintiff contends that “Defendants Sgt. Jennings and Cupples were deliberately indifferent
to Mr. Preyor’s serious medical needs.” (Appellee’s Br. 14.) While the Eighth Amendment
generally provides the legal basis to assert a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs, where that claim is asserted by (or, as here, on behalf of) a pre-trial detainee, the Due Process
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 9
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper starting point. See Watkins v. City of Battle
Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2001). For our purposes, however, the distinction is without
a difference because, under either Amendment,“[t]he test to determine whether [a defendant] acted
with ‘deliberate indifference’ has an objective and subjective component.” Napier v. Madison
County, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
“The objective component requires the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). Whereas the subjective
component requires a plaintiff to show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety, which is to say the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officials, of course, do not
readily admit this subjective component, so “it [is] permissible for reviewing courts to infer from
circumstantial evidence that a prison official had the requisite knowledge.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at
703.
With these general principles in mind, we examine the merits of Plaintiff’s case.
a. Objective Component: Sufficiently Serious Medical Need
In a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts show that Preyor was a diabetic in need of
periodic shots of insulin and that he had exhibited signs of detoxing from an heroin addiction. On
more than one occasion, Preyor vomited a “large amount of green vomit on the floor,” which was
“a clear manifestation of [an] internal physical disorder,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899. On more
than one occasion, he complained of and suffered bouts of diarrhea, eventually causing him to
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 10
dehydrate. On more than one occasion, he was seen lying on the floor of a cell or in the fish bowl.
Cf. Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 312. And, on more than one occasion, Preyor told Officers that
he did not feel well and that he believed he was detoxing from heroin.
Given these facts (which are viewed in Plaintiff’s favor), we find it incontrovertible that these
symptoms show anything but a sufficiently “serious medical condition,” which was “so obvious that
even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.
3d at 899–900 (quoting Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990));
cf. Clark-Murphy, 439 F.3d at 286–87 (noting that “the deprivation of water and medical care . . .
of course would be ‘sufficiently serious’ to satisfy [the objective component requirement]”).
Therefore, the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard has been satisfied.
b. Subjective Component: Sufficiently Culpable State of Mind
The next issues are (1) whether the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff show that
Sergeants Jennings and Cupples had subjective knowledge of Preyor’s serious need for medical
attention; and, provided they did, (2) whether Sergeants Jennings and Cupples disregarded that need.
With respect to Defendants’ subjective knowledge, Defendants argued that the facts do not
show that they had subjective knowledge of Preyor’s serious medical needs. However, “our review
is made difficult by the district court’s failure to make findings of fact for this court to assume as
true.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 701 n.3. As such, the Supreme Court has said that we “may . . .
undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.
With respect to Sergeant Cupples’ subjective knowledge, the facts, in a light most favorable
to Plaintiff, show that (1) when Sergeant Cupples arrived for his shift, he was briefed on Preyor’s
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 11
condition; (2) Sergeant Cupples was informed that paramedics had been summoned to the station
on two occasions; (3) Sergeant Cupples later observed Preyor vomiting green vomit in the fish bowl;
(4) Sergeant Cupples had knowledge that Preyor had frequent bouts of diarrhea; (5) Sergeant
Cupples was informed that Preyor claimed that he was detoxing from heroin; (6) Sergeant Cupples
permitted Preyor use of the restroom on several occasions throughout his shift; and (7) before
leaving work, Sergeant Cupples noticed Preyor lying down on the floor of the fish bowl.
Likewise, with respect to Sergeant Jennings’ subjective knowledge, the facts, in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, show that (1) upon arriving at the station, Preyor informed Sergeant Jennings
that he was a diabetic and required insulin shots;1 (2) paramedics were called during Jennings’ shift,
but no treatment was given to Preyor; (3) paramedics advised Sergeant Jennings to keep a close
watch on Preyor’s condition and to call them back if necessary; (4) when Sergeant Jennings arrived
for his second shift, Sergeant Cupples briefed Sergeant Jennings on Preyor’s condition; (5) Sergeant
Jennings testified that he received training as a “first responder” and was taught “to recognize people
in serious medical distress which can include drug use [and other] medical conditions [including
1
Sergeant Jennings argues that his “conduct relating to Preyor’s diabetes cannot support
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim” because “the cause of Preyor’s death was ‘drug abuse and
complications,’ not diabetes.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. 1-3.) We reject Jennings’ argument for a
couple reasons. First, Plaintiff “need only demonstrate a link between each defendant’s
misconduct and [Preyor’s] injury, which may include his death as well as the ‘pain and suffering’
that preceded his death.” Clark-Murphy, 439 F.3d at 293 (internal citation omitted).
Second, despite Jennings’ contention, the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff show
that a reasonable jury could conclude that the diabetes played some part in Preyor’s death, even if
not a major part. The autopsy report, for example, concluded that the cause of death was due to
“drug abuse and complications”—complications which are unknown at this stage in the case.
(JA 437.) It is true that one of Plaintiff’s experts opined that he did not “believe that Mr.
Preyor’s diabetes played a significant role in causing his death.” (JA 469). Notably, however, the
expert did not conclude that Preyor’s diabetes played no role in his death.
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 12
diabetes]” (JA 149) (Jennings’ Dep. 23); (6) an officer informed Sergeant Jennings that Preyor
claimed “he was detoxing from heroin and also that . . . he was having bad diarrhea” but Jennings
instructed the officer “to leave Preyor in the bullpen” (JA 292); and (7) Sergeant Jennings permitted
Preyor use of the restroom a couple of times during his morning shift. Because “a factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was
obvious[,]” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, we conclude that these facts taken together and in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff support a reasonable inference that both Sergeants Cupples and Jennings
possessed subjective knowledge that Preyor was detoxing from heroin.
Nonetheless, “officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to [a detainee’s] health or
safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Here, the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff
demonstrate that Defendants did not reasonably respond to the risks to Preyor’s health. Although
the paramedics were called the day before during Sergeant Jennings’ first shift (after Preyor indicated
that he was a diabetic) and Lieutenant Czajkowski’s shift (who recognized the need for medical
attention after observing Preyor “curled up” and “trembling” in the corner of a cell), neither
Sergeant Cupples nor Sergeant Jennings summoned paramedics the morning of Preyor’s death (until,
of course, after he was dead), despite signs that his condition had significantly worsened since
paramedics were last summoned. Cf. Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 823 (6th Cir. 2005)
(affirming grant of qualified immunity where, among other things, “[decedent’s] condition neither
worsened nor improved throughout the night”).
Defendants suggest that, because they permitted Preyor to use the restroom throughout the
night and morning, they did not “disregard” his condition. However, Plaintiff is not required to
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 13
show that Preyor was “literally ignored.” LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 2000)). As the Seventh Circuit said in
Sherrod, “If knowing that a patient faces a serious risk of appendicitis, [a] prison official gives the
patient an aspirin and an enema and sends him back to his cell, a jury could find deliberate
indifference although the prisoner was not ‘simply ignored.’ The question mandated by Farmer is
whether the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s health, not whether
the inmate was ignored.” 223 F.3d at 611–12. Therefore, if Sergeants Cupples and Jennings knew
that Preyor was detoxing from heroin (as we have concluded herein), then a reasonable jury could
find that simply granting Preyor opportunities to relieve himself would amount to a disregard of his
condition.
Accordingly, on the basis of these facts (taken in Plaintiff’s favor), we conclude that both
Sergeants Jennings and Cupples “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk
to [Preyor’s health], that [they] did in fact draw the inference, and that [they] then disregarded that
risk.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703.
2. Clearly Established Right
Next, we determine whether the law was “clearly established” at the time of Preyor’s death.
See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530; Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. We conclude that it was.
“For a right to be clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Feathers v.
Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042
(6th Cir. 1992)) (alteration in original). And, “[a]lthough it need not be the case that the very action
in question has been previously held unlawful, . . . in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 14
must be apparent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).
At the time of the incident, the law was clearly established that Preyor was entitled to medical
attention under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Estate of Carter, we recognized that “[a]s early as
1972, this court stated ‘where the circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical
attention for injury or illness, the denial of such aid constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due
process.’” 408 F.3d at 313 (quoting Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972)); see
also Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment right of pretrial detainees to adequate medical care is, and has long been, clearly
established.”); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[W]here the circumstances
are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness, the denial of such
aid constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due process.” (quotation marks omitted)). To make
this right absolutely apparent, “in 1992, this court explicitly held that a pretrial detainee’s right to
medical treatment for a serious medical need has been established since at least 1987.” Estate of
Carter, 408 F.3d at 313 (citing Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Therefore, Preyor’s constitutional right to medical treatment was “clearly established” at the time
of his death.
Accordingly, because the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Preyor’s constitutional right to receive treatment for a serious
medical need, and because that right was clearly established at the time of Preyor’s death, we
conclude that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
06-1995 Preyor v. City of Ferndale Page 15
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.