United States v. Jonathan Webster

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0473n.06
Case No. 14-3654
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jun 25, 2015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
JONATHAN WEBSTER, ) OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: MOORE, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Circuit Judge. After Jonathan Webster pleaded guilty to stealing hundreds of
individuals’ identities with false offers of lending a helping hand, the district court imposed an
eleven-year sentence. On appeal, Webster claims that the district court misapplied two
enhancements to his advisory sentencing range: one for lying about representing a charity, the
other for targeting vulnerable victims. We affirm.
To trick people into sharing their personal information, Jonathan Webster created
websites for fake charities with reassuring, vaguely religious names such as “The Angel Charity”
and “4 the Glory Charity.” PSR at 6. Webster invited those in need to apply for financial aid
and publicized the nonexistent charities in Job News, a nationwide newsletter catering to
unemployed and recently employed individuals. Over three years, more than 250 people trusted
Case No. 14-3654
United States v. Webster
Webster with their names and Social Security numbers, which he used to file false tax returns
and steal nearly $1.5 million in tax refunds from the government. Webster spent most of that
money on shoring up his struggling Columbus bar. Neither effort worked. The bar failed. And
the tax-refund scheme unraveled in 2013. Webster pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A, 1343.
The district court applied two sentencing enhancements to the wire fraud conviction
pertinent to this appeal: a two-level increase for misrepresenting that he worked “on behalf of a
charitable . . . organization,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), and a two-level increase for preying on
“vulnerable victim[s],” § 3A1.1(b)(1). These yielded a 108-to-135-month advisory guidelines
range for the wire fraud. Aggravated identity theft has no offense level or guidelines range and
carries a mandatory twenty-four-month consecutive prison term. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1),
(b)(2); U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6. All in all, the court imposed a 132-month sentence. Webster
challenges each enhancement.
The charity enhancement. The parties skirmish over whether we may review the charity
enhancement. The government claims that Webster waived any objection to this enhancement
by “agree[ing]” to it and “recommend[ing]” it in his plea agreement, R. 2 at 6, and consenting to
it during the sentencing hearing. Waived claims are unreviewable claims. See United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Webster claims that he did not waive this argument but
merely forfeited it by failing to raise the point at his sentencing hearing. Forfeited claims are
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
We need not resolve the debate. Even if Webster only forfeited his objection to the
enhancement, no plain error occurred.
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United States v. Webster
The charity-enhancement guideline calls for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the offense
involved a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational,
religious, or political organization, or a government agency.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A). The
commentary notes that the charity enhancement “applies in any case in which the defendant
represented that the defendant was acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of a charitable . . .
organization.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B).
As the district court saw it and as the government sees it, Webster deserves the
enhancement. He pretended to “act[] on behalf of a charitable . . . organization,” U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), when he solicited personal information from the victims on behalf of fake
charities.
As Webster sees it, the enhancement does not apply. In his view, the commentary limits
the application of the charity enhancement, and he was not acting to obtain a benefit on behalf of
a charitable organization (as the commentary seems to require). As a general matter, the text of a
guideline trumps commentary about it. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)
(holding that commentary is not authoritative if it “is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of,” the guideline it interprets or explains). But we need not resolve whether the
commentary together with the guideline suggests that the enhancement does not apply in this
instance. Either way, Webster cannot credibly claim that any error (if error there was) was
“plain”—which is to say “obvious or clear.” United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th
Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). By itself, the text of the guideline favors the government.
The recently added commentary to be sure introduces a complication but one that by no means
makes the enhancement in this case obviously wrong. No plain error thus occurred.
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United States v. Webster
The vulnerable-victim enhancement. The sentencing guidelines also provide a two-level
enhancement “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a
vulnerable victim.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). Before the district court, Webster argued that his
identity-theft victims were not “vulnerable.” Webster takes a different tack on appeal.
Apparently conceding that the relevant individuals were vulnerable, he now argues that they did
not count as “victims” because they never suffered any financial loss. Because Webster never
presented this ground to the district court even after being given an opportunity to do so, we
review only for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2004);
Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. That standard “equally applies to instances where the objection raised
on appeal . . . is not based upon the same grounds” raised below. United States v. Campbell,
86 F. App’x 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2004); see United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir.
1989).
A “vulnerable victim,” the guidelines tell us, is “a victim . . . who is unusually
vulnerable” due to conditions that make him “particularly susceptible” to the defendant’s
conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. 2. Who counts as a “victim”? At a minimum, the term covers
not only victims “of the offense of conviction” but also victims of “any conduct for which the
defendant is accountable” under the guidelines. Id. Unlike other guidelines, however, § 3A1.1
does not define “victim” as a standalone term limited to those who suffered a particular sort of
injury. Compare id., with U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmts. 1 & 3(A)(i) (requiring “pecuniary harm” or
“bodily injury”). “In the absence of such a definition,” we give the term “its ordinary or natural
meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). Ordinary usage and legal usage in this
instance point in the same direction. In ordinary usage, a victim is someone “tricked, duped, or
subjected to hardship,” or someone “used or taken advantage of.” Webster’s Third New
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United States v. Webster
International Dictionary 2550 (rev. ed. 2002). In legal usage, a victim is someone “harmed by a
crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1798 (10th ed. 2014). Both definitions are broad, to be sure.
But there is nothing wrong with giving broad terms a broad reading. That is especially so here
because the Sentencing Commission omitted the financial-or-physical-injury requirement
included in § 2B1.1. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
Consistent with this understanding of the term, the vulnerable-victim cases do not require
a specific type of injury to qualify someone as a victim, only an individualized “harm” distinct
from injury to society at large. See United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2008);
see also United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 423–24 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying the
enhancement when the victims suffered no financial loss); United States v. Stewart, 33 F.3d 764,
770–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955, 957–58 (11th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722, 735–36 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).
Webster’s identity-theft victims qualify as “victims” within the meaning of
§ 3A1.1(b)(1), even if they did not suffer any (known) financial loss. People who have their
identities stolen, as we suspect any such person would agree, have been individually harmed.
Not only have they been duped and taken advantage of, but they also must correct the problem,
whether by establishing new bank accounts, obtaining new credit cards, or reissuing other
identifying information now in the possession of others. Whether or not his victims lost money,
Webster stole their personal information and used it to file fraudulent tax returns. That in itself
causes harm. Cf. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 21,751 (May
8, 2009) (stating that identity-theft victims who have been fully reimbursed have nevertheless
suffered loss—and are therefore victims—because of the significant time involved in resolving
credit problems and other related issues). The trouble associated with reclaiming identities and
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United States v. Webster
sorting out any issues with the Internal Revenue Service is all too real—a reality hardly lost on
Webster. At sentencing he told the district court he was “sure out of th[e] five hundred or so
victims, I ruined a few of their lives.” R. 38 at 19.
United States v. Dixon, 66 F.3d 133 (6th Cir. 1995), Webster submits, requires “financial
loss” to qualify someone as a victim. Yet Dixon is not that sweeping. It rejected a vulnerable-
victim enhancement because the alleged victim suffered no injury on account of the defendant’s
offense of conviction. Id. at 135–36. That is not true here, where the offense and the individuals
protected by the statute overlap. Since Dixon, moreover, the Sentencing Commission has
expanded this enhancement to victims “of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which
the defendant is accountable.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). That “relevant
conduct” includes all acts committed “during . . . the offense of conviction.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1);
see Moon, 513 F.3d at 540. Whether Dixon remains good law in light of this new commentary
remains to be seen. But for present purposes it does not aid Webster.
United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2012), also does not aid Webster’s cause.
It too did not issue a sweeping holding that an individual must suffer financial loss to be a
victim. As to individuals unable to access equity in their homes due to Johns’ illegal activity but
who could not have accessed that equity anyway, the court found no harm. Id. at 455, 459–60.
An identity-theft victim by contrast suffers harm, even if often non-financial harm, due at a
minimum to the difficulties associated with restoring confidential identity information.
For these reasons, we affirm.
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