United States v. Robert Daniels

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0148n.06
No. 12-2535
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Feb 21, 2014
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
ROBERT C. DANIELS. )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Before: BOGGS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; and COLLIER, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Robert Daniels, also known as “Motor City Mink,” ran a prostitution
ring in metro Detroit, recruiting and overseeing approximately 89 women and teenage girls. See
United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 403–07 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1069
(2012). A jury convicted Daniels on eight counts of child pornography and child and adult
prostitution. See id. at 406. The district court varied below the guidelines range of life
imprisonment and sentenced Daniels to concurrent terms of 420 months of imprisonment on
Counts I, IV, and V. See id. at 403. Daniels appealed his conviction on five counts but did not
appeal his sentence. See id. On appeal, we reversed Daniels’s conviction on Count I, engaging
in a child exploitation enterprise, in violation of U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2). See id. at 411–14. Our
prior opinion stated: “We AFFIRM Daniels’s conviction on Counts II–V, but REVERSE his
conviction on Count 1.” Id. at 415.
*
The Honorable Curtis L. Collier, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, sitting by designation.
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The district court required the parties to brief whether it was required to resentence
Daniels based on our decision, and it appointed the federal public defender to represent Daniels.
Daniels requested resentencing. The district court denied resentencing on the ground that we did
not remand the case and that it, thus, lacked authority to resentence. Daniels now appeals the
district court’s order denying resentencing.
A district court generally may not resentence a defendant, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b), but it
may do so upon remand from a court of appeals. 28 U.S.C § 2106; see United States v. Ross,
245 F.3d 577, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2001). We did not remand. The district court correctly
determined that it lacked authority to resentence Daniels.
Daniels also argues that the district court erred in not vacating the special assessment on
Count I based on our reversal of that conviction. Daniels did not raise this issue before the
district court. Our prior opinion sufficed to eliminate the $100 special assessment previously
imposed on Count I. Indeed, the district-court clerk has already reduced Daniels’s outstanding
special-assessment balance from $800 to $700 to reflect the reversal of Count I. Additionally,
there is no requirement that a district court engage in the formality of entering an amended
judgment under these circumstances.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district-court order.
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